Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 3 Issue 3 - Symposium on Professional
Negligence

Article 2

6-1959

The Care Required of Medical Practitioners
Allan H. McCoid

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 549 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/2

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

THE CARE REQUIRED OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS*
ALLAN H. McCOIDt
I swear by Apollo, the Physician, and Asclepius and Health and Panacea,
and all the gods and godesses, that, according to my ability and judgment,
I will keep this Oath and this stipulation-.... I will follow that system
of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for
the benefit of my patients and abstain from whatever is deleterious and
mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; ... I will not cut persons laboring under the stone
but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of this work.
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the
sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption..
. -Oath of Hippocrates.
These words, allegedly formulated by the "Father of Medicine,"
define the duties which physicians and surgeons over the years have
sworn to perform toward those whom they undertake to treat. Like
many oaths, however, the noble sentiments of the Greek physician
are not sufficient to provide protection for the public. This is
evidenced by the fact that over the twenty year period from 1935
to 1955, according to a survey made by the American Medical Association, some 605 decisions of appellate courts in the United States dealt
with "malpractice" by medical practitioners' and by the further estimates that within a single year thousands of malpractice actions are
commenced. 2 Certainly not all of these actions represent meritorious
claims, but a substantial portion do represent a failure on the part
of the medical practitioners to "abstain from whatever is deleterious
and mischievous" or a failure to use proper care in the treatment of
their patients.
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to the following persons who
read part or all of this paper in the course of preparation and who contributed
substantially to the author's understanding of the subject: Dr. William
Fleeson and Dr. Albert Mowlem, University of Minnesota Medical School;
Professors William Cohen, James F. Hogg and Yale Kamisar, University of
Minnesota Law School, and Messers Kenneth Holmes, Robert Miller, Steven
Scallen and Lawrence Zelle, students at the University of Minnesota Law
School.
' Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. See Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United
States, 163 J.A.M.A. 459 (1957); Stetler, The History of Reported Medical
Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEmP. L.Q. 366 (1957). This survey was
limited to defendants who were licensed doctors of medicine as distinguished
from those who were involved in related practices such as dentistry, osteopathy, chiropractic, etc. The classification of cases by the American Digest
System and the Annotated Reports under "Physicians and Surgeons" does
not make a differentiation.
2. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 521 (3d ed. 1956); Silverman,
Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Part One, The Saturday Evening Post, April 11,
1959. p. 13, 14.
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The professional liability of the medical practitioner is almost
as old as personal injury actions. The first recorded case in AngloAmerican law goes back to the year 1374 when one J. Mort, surgeon,
undertook to treat a wounded hand and allegedly acted in such a negligent manner as to maim the hand. 3 While the action against the
surgeon was dismissed because it was brought in "trespas sur son
case" rather than in trespass vi et armis, the court indicated that if
the surgeon had done as well as he was able and had employed all
his diligence in administering to the patient, "it is not right that he
should be held culpable," reflecting the standard of care suggested
by the Hippocratic Oath. Much of the early development of professional liability of physicians and surgeons appears to have been in
4
terms of a "contractual" undertaking of one in a "common calling"
to exercise his calling with the skill commonly possessed by those
engaged in it.5 The court in Slater v. Baker6 held the surgeon liable
for ignorance and lack of skill, while the appellate court in Seare v.
Prentice7 relied heavily upon the statements of Blackstone as to the
implied contract of "every one who undertakes any office, employment, trust or duty . . . to perform it with integrity, diligence and
skill. And if by his want of either of these qualities any injury accrues to individuals, they have therefor their remedy in damages .... "8
Similarly, the earliest reported American case on professional liability
of doctors, Cross v. Guthery,9 held sufficient a complaint alleging
that the defendant, having held himself out as a practicing physician
skilled in surgery, had undertaken to perform a mastectomy (removal
of a breast) on the plaintiff's wife "with skill and safety" and that
said defendant "performed such operation in the most unskilful,
ignorant and cruel manner, contrary to all the well known rules
and principles of practice in such cases." Somewhat later the Pennsylvania court stated that the obligation of the physician was "to treat
the case with diligence and skill . . . such reasonable skill and
diligence as are ordinarily exercised in his profession . . . such as
thoroughly educated surgeons ordinarily employ";' 0 while the New
3. Y.B. Hill. 48 Edw HI, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374).

4. See Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1888); Arter-

burn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411

(1927); Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REV.

184, 187 (1926).

5. For discussion of the early English and American cases, see Sandor, The
History of ProfessionalLiability Suits in the United States, 163 J.A.M.A. 459
(1957).

Some earlier history of professional liability is to be found in 3
1975-1977 (1954); Arthur, Some Liabilities of the
Physician in the Use of Drugs, 17 RocKy MT. L. REV. 131, 131-32 (1945).
BELLI, MODERN TRIALS

6. 2 Wils. 359, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).

7. 8 East 348, 103 Eng. Rep. 376 (K.B. 1807).
8. 3 Blk. Comm. *163.
9. 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794).
10. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. (10 Harris) 261, 267-68 (1853).
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Hampshire court stated the undertaking of the physician or surgeon
to be:
1. That he possesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience which is ordinarily possessed by the professors of the same art or
science, and which is ordinarily regarded by the community, and by those
conversant with that employment, as necessary and sufficient to qualify
him to engage in such business....
2. [T]hat he will use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the
exertion of his skill and the application of his knowledge, to accomplish
the purpose for which he is employed. He does not undertake for extraordinary care or extraordinary diligence, any more than he does for
uncommon skill....
3. In stipulating to exert his skill, and apply his diligence and care, the

medical or other professional men contract to use their best judgment.... 11

These decisions, of course, antedated any fully developed theory of
negligence as a separate basis for action. Although more recent decisions have not entirely abandoned the view that the physicianpatient relation is a contractual one to which certain implied undertakings attach, the emphasis today is far less on contract and far more
upon the law of negligence as a basis for liability.12
Putting aside the problems of express agreements to cure or to
undertake other particular obligations 13 and the characterization of
unauthorized medical treatment or operation as an assault and battery,14 what follows is an examination of the law of "medical negli11. Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460, 469-72 (1853). See also a later opinion
in the same case in which the court says, "The fact essential to be proved was,
that he was as skillful as surgeons generally in the section of the country in
which he practiced, or, in other language, that his skill was equal to the
ordinary skill of the members of the profession in practice." 31 N.H. 119
(1855).
12. See, e.g., Yeager v. Dunnavan, 26 Wash. 2d 559, 174 P.2d 755 (1946). See
also REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw, 17, 29-30 (3d ed. 1956).
13. While it is generally accepted that a doctor does not promise or undertake to accomplish an absolute cure when he undertakes to treat a patient,
Watterson v. Conwell, 258 Ala. 180, 61 So. 2d 690 (1952); Meyer v. St. PaulMercury Indemnity Co., 61 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1952), aff'd, 225 La. 618, 73
So. 2d 781 (1953); Evangelista v. Black, 97 Ohio App. 390, 126 N.E.2d 71
(1953); McPeak v. Vanderbilt University Hospital, 33 Tenn. App. 76, 229
S.W.2d 150 (1950), a breach of a specific undertaking to cure is actionable, e.g.,
Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surg. Inst., 62 Minn. 146, 64 N.W. 158 (1895)
(deceit action); Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 Atl. 641 (1929) (contract
action); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1949), and a patient may
recover for failure to perform a promised Caesarean section, Stewart v.
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957), or for breach of warranty of
safety of therapy, Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958). As yet,
however, there appear to have been no recoveries by patients for breach of
a contract to sterilize, largely on the ground that no actionable harm has
resulted when an unwanted child is born. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192
Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lycoming 19, 11 Pa. D.
& C.2d 41 (1957).
14. Discussions of the law relating to unauthorized operations and their
treatment as "assault" are found in REGAN, DOCTOR AM PATIENT AN THE LAW,
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gence." Even within such limitations, the topic is sufficiently broad
to provide the basis for an entire book, as evidenced by the recent
publication of Lord Nathan's study by this name of medical malpractice in Great Britain.15 Here I have undertaken to compare the
general principle of negligence with the specific problem of the
liability of the medical practitioner in terms of the definition of
the standard of conduct required of the medical practitioner and the
nature of proof required to establish a deviation from that standard.
The citation of cases is largely illustrative. 16 While reference is made
ch. 11 (3d ed. 1956); McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized
Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957); Smith, Antecedent Grounds
of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 14 RocKY MT. L. REv. 233 (1942);

Wasmuth, Consent to Surgical Procedures, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 235 (1957);
Notes, Civil Liability of Physicians and Surgeons for Malpractice, 35 MINN. L.

Ruv. 186 (1951); Consent as a Prerequisite to a Surgical Operation, 14 U.
CiNc. L. REV. 161 (1940); Surgery Without the Patient's Consent-A New
Test for Liability, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 627 (1957); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695
(1957).
15. NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE (1957).

16. The reader seeking a more exhaustive citation of cases from most jurisdictions would do well to consult REGAN, op. cit. supra note 14, particularly
chapters 1, 2, 3, 8, 11 and 19 or the following annotations in the American
Law Reports, Annotated and supplements thereto (arranged by subject matter) :
Specific types of malpractice: Liability to patient for results of medical or
surgical treatment by one not licensed as required by law, 44 A.L.R. 1418
(1926), supplemented, 57 A.L.R. 978 (1928); Liability of surgeon leaving
sponge or other foreign matter in incision, 65 A.L.R. 1023 (1930); Liability for
malpractice as effected by failure to take or advise the taking of an x-ray
picture after operation, or resort to other means of determining advisability
of a supplementary operation or special treatment, 115 A.L.R. 298 (1938);
Duty of physician or surgeon to advise patient of the possibility or probability
of better results from treatment by a specialist or by a mode of treatment
which he is not qualified to give, 132 A.L.R. 392 (1941); Duty and liability
of physician or surgeon in pregnancy or childbirth cases, 141 A.L.R. 111
(1942); Malpractice: Diagnosis and treatment of brain injuries, diseases or
conditions, 29 A.L.R.2d 501 (1953); Liability for injury by x-ray, 41 A.L.R.2d
329 (1955); Malpractice as to treatment of skin disease, disorder, blemish or
scar, 45 A.L.R.2d 1271 (1956); Malpractice: Treatment of fractures or dislocation, 54 A.L.R.2d 200 (1957); Malpractice: diagnosis of fracture or dislocation, 54 A.L.R.2d 273 (1957); Malpractice in diagnosis and treatment of cancer,
55 A.L.R.2d 461 (1957); Liability of physician or surgeon for extending operation or treatment beyond that expressly authorized, 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957);
Malpractice in nose and throat treatment and surgery, 58 A.L.R.2d 216 (1958);
Liability for injury or death from blood transfusions, 59 A.L.R.2d 768 (1958).
Proof in malpractice actions: Competency of physician or surgeon of school
of practice other than that to which defendant belongs to testify in malpractice case, 78 A.L.R. 697 (1932); Necessity of expert evidence to support an
action for malpractice against a physician or surgeon, 141 A.L.R. 5 (1942);
Presumption or inference of negligence in malpractice cases: res ipsa
loqultur, 162, A.L.R. 1265 (1946).
Other elements of malpractice cases: Proximate cause in malpractice actions,
13 A.L.R.2d 11 (1950); Contributory negligence and assumption of risk as
defense in action against physician or surgeon for malpractice, 50 A.L.R.2d
1043 (1956).
Vicarious Liability: Responsibility of physician or surgeon for acts or negligence of substitutes, 4 A.L.R. 191 (1919); Responsibility of one physician or
surgeon for malpractice of another, 46 A.L.R. 1454 (1927); Liability of operating surgeon for negligence or lack of skill of nurse assisting him, 60 A.L.R.
147 (1929).
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to the practice of persons other than doctors of medicine, it is with
the liability of the latter that I am chiefly concerned. The problem
of the liability of hospitals, as contrasted with members of the staff,
is not considered separately.
THE EXISTENCE OF A DUTY
Before examining in detail the nature of the care which a doctor
is required to use, attention may appropriately be focused upon the
question of when the doctor is required to use any care or to render
any professional service. Perhaps the classic example of non-negligent and non-actionable omission to act is that of the doctor who is
called upon to treat an ill person and who responds with a refusal
to exert his skill at all. In this country the first case to clearly state
this proposition appears to have been Hurley v. Eddingfield'7 in 1901,
although Wharton writing in the 1870's had stated that no question
could exist as to the legal right of a physician to decline to render
service unless he were an officer of the government charged with the
specific duty towards members of the public. 18 Subsequent cases
have sustained this conclusion. 19
While some authorities have discerned an increasing tendency on
the part of courts to impose an affirmative duty to act where a relation
such as master-servant or owner-invitee is present,20 the trend has
not as yet reached the point where a physician by undertaking to
practice medicine generally is held to have subjected himself to an
obligation to provide service for all who come to his door.2 1 Indeed,
Liability of other "medical practitioners": Duty and liability of dentists to

patient, 69 A.L.R. 1142 (1930), supplemented, 129 A.L.R. 101 (1940); Liability
of drugless practitioner or healer for malpractice, 19 A.L.R.2d 1188 (1951);
Nurse's liability for her own negligence or malpractice, 51 A.L.R.2d 970
(1957); Malpractice; duty and liability of anesthetist, 53 A.L.R.2d 142 (1957).
Failureto act: Liability of physician for lack of deligence in attending patient,
57 A.L.R.2d 379 (1958); Liability of physician who abandons case, 57
A.L.R.2d 432 (1958).
17. 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058, 53 L.R.A. 135 (1901).
18. WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE § 731 (1874).
19. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951);
Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Childers v. Frye,

201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931); Rice v. Rinaldo, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 119

N.E.2d 657 (1951).

20. 2 HARPER & JAES, TORTS 1048-49 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 184-85 (2d

ed. 1955); McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J.

1272 (1948), which concludes that affirmative duties are imposed in those

situations where the one under a duty to act has brought himself into a
relationship with others from which he derives or expects to derive benefit.
21. Although in the course of their study of affirmative duties, Professors
McNiece and Thornton, supra note 20, at 1283, make the statement that, "In
the case of certain public trades, such as inn-keepers, carriers, barbers, [the
precursors of surgeons] and physicians, the notion grew up that the persons
plying these trades were under a duty to accept any member of the public as
a customer," this author has found no case law supporting a general imposition
of duty to undertake service on the part of physicians and surgeons. Arterburn in his study of The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA.
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any tendency in that direction would appear to be undesirable since
unlimited demands upon a doctor's time and energy would be likely
to result in inadequate care for all. The distinction is validly drawn
between the duty and no-duty situation in terms of a voluntary undertaking by the doctor to render medical service.
Where the medical practitioner has entered into a specific contract
to render service or to give treatment to the plaintiff or members of
his family in return for a specified retainer, there is little question
but that the relation of physician-patient exists and that the physician
may be liable if his failure to render service is the cause of injury.22
This may be true even when the physician has undertaken to provide
service for a group of employees and the specific employee's name does
not appear on his list, provided that the employee has in fact contributed to the fund which pays the physician's fee.23 The physicianpatient relation which imposes a duty to use care may also come into
being through an agreement by the physician and a third party that
service will be rendered or by the physician in fact undertaking
for a third person to examine or treat the "patient."24
Where no compensation or "consideration" has been received in
return for the physician's promise to render assistance or give treatment, a somewhat more difficult problem arises. The doctrine of
Thorne v. Deas,2 5 that gratuitous promises are not enforceable, rears
its head. In subsequent non-medical cases the courts have on occasion
permitted a plaintiff to recover for injuries resulting from a failure
to perform a gratuitous promise where some affirmative action in
performance has been taken by the promisor,2 6 or where the plaintiff
L. REv. 411, 420-25 (1927), indicates that except for the imposition of a duty
to serve upon all trades during economic and social crises such as the Black
Death in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, the duty to serve and the

duty to use care if service were undertaken were in fact distinct.
22. Cartwright v. Bartholomew, 83 Ga. App. 503, 64 S.E.2d 323 (1951);
Randolph's Adm'r v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 159, 129 S.W. 562 (1910); Klein v.
Williams, 194 Miss. 699, 12 So. 2d 421 (1943). These cases suggest that the
liability is one of contract rather than tort, where the doctor has merely failed
to render assistance when called rather than undertaking treatment and then
performing negligently.
23. Klein v. Williams, supranote 22.
24. One of the oldest cases on this point is Everard v. Hopkins, 2 Bulst. 332,
80 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1615), in which a master sued the physician who had
contracted to care for an injured servant and the court stated that the servant
might have an action on the case for malpractice unless the physician had
been discharged. More recent decisions are Johnson v. Borland, 317 Mich. 225,
26 N.W.2d 755 (1947) (physician called to examine prisoner in jail is liable
for failure to discover cardiac trouble, pulmonary edema and hemorrhage
which resulted in death); Du Bois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325, 29 N.E. 313, 14
L.R.A. 429 (1891) (physician employed by city to treat patients in city almshouse is liable to patient injured through negligence).
25. 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (failure to insure cargo).
26. Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923). See also
Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L. REv.
30 (1951); Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64
HARv. L. REV. 913 (1951).
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has been deterred from seeking other assistance in reliance on the
promise.2 7 These cases have found their counterparts in the medical
field.2 It was also recognized at an early date that the obligation to
use reasonable care and skill in the treatment of a patient did not
depend upon any financial benefit to the doctor but was equally ap2 9
plicable to gratutious service for charity patients.
Short of an actual promise to render assistance, the physicianpatient relation and the resulting duty to use care may arise from the
fact that the physician has in fact undertaken to care for the patient.
This may consist of commencement of actual treatment or performance of an operation. 30 It may also consist of setting an arm and
failing thereafter to do anything more. 31 It is not clear that mere
examination of a patient and diagnosis of his ailment, without more,
would impose a further duty of care. In at least one case, the doctor
was excused from liability for failure to render care after examining
an automobile accident victim and ordering that he return to his home
until he became sober. 32 Where the diagnosis indicates that a specialist should be called in and the examining physician advises his
patient to consult the specialist, this may be sufficient to absolve
him from further obligation to treat the patient for the ailment.3 3 Or
where the doctor is a diagnostician who does not undertake treatment
at all, no further liability may exist. Absent such circumstances,
however, the average patient would assume that when he goes to
the doctor for an examination and diagnosis the doctor will continue
27. Brunelle v. Nashua Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 95 N.H. 391, 64 A.2d 315 (1949).
28. Fortner v. Koch, 272 lich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935); Ritchey v. West,
23 Ill. 385 (1860), in which treatment had been undertaken followed by
promise to return; McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950),
where there was apparent reliance upon the defendant's statements that
further treatment would be undertaken. But see Carroll v. Griffin, 96 Ga. App.
826, 101 S.E.2d 764 (1958); Ballou v. Prescott, 64 Me. 305 (1874); Sibert v.
Boger, 260 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1953), in which there appear to have been neither
reliance by the patient nor failure to consult other available doctors and no
recovery is permitted.
29. Compare McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209 (1866), with Ritchey v. West,

23 111.385 (1860).

30. McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Becker v.
Janinski, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45, 15 N.Y. Supp. 675 (N.Y. Com. P1. 1891);
Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N.W. 247, 60 A.L.R. 658 (1928); Burnett
v. Layman, 133 Tenn. 323, 181 S.W. 157 (1915); Tucker v. Gillett, 22 Ohio C.C.

664, affd, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902); Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash.
489, 68 P.2d 1034 (1957).

31. Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 385 (1860).
32. Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931).
33. But see Welch v. Frisbie Mem. Hosp., 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939), in
which the doctor had directed that an x-ray be taken of the entire leg but
received only an x-ray of the upper three-fifths of the leg which did not show
the ankle joint, and made a diagnosis on the basis of oral reports from this
x-ray that there was no fracture; the court says that the doctor's responsibility did not cease when the patient left the hospital and his care, since he
later received the x-ray itself and knew that it was not what he had ordered
and also knew that the continuation of treatment by the family physician
was likely to be dependent upon the original diagnosis.
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the relationship and undertake treatment within his competence.
Once the medical practitioner has undertaken to treat a patient,

without specific limitation as to time or nature of treatment, the
courts say that
he cannot cease his visits, except-First, with the consent of the patient;
or, secondly, upon giving the patient timely notice so that he may employ
another doctor; or thirdly, when the condition of the patient is such as no
longer to require medical treatment; and of that condition the physician
must judge at his peril.34

Although the initial creation of the relation of physician and patient
is dependent upon the physician's voluntary undertaking, its continuance is not wholly within the discretion of the physician. The
"contract" carries with it some obligations imposed by law and failure
to meet the obligation of attendance upon the patient may constitute
"abandonment" which is actionable. Such abandonment has been
found in cases where the physician failed to return after several
examinations of the patient although he had reason to know the
patient was not cured,35 where the physician declined to attend
a pregnant woman saying that her time of delivery had not yet
arrived,36 where a physician with notice of symptoms which indicate
serious illness delayed a visit to the patient's bedside without adequate explanation, 37 where the physician neglected to act after knowledge of symptoms of serious illness,38 and where the doctor refused
to continue treatment until pre-existing bills were paid.39 This does
not mean that the patient may demand that the physician attend or
treat him at any specific time; 40 nor does it require a physician whose
practice is known to be limited to his office to go to the patient's
home; 41 nor is a doctor required to disregard other patients, 42 nor
travel to other communities at some distance from his normal place of
34. Becker v. Janinski, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45, 49, 15 N.Y. Supp. 675, 676 (N.Y.
Com. P1. 1891). See also Dale v. Donaldson Lumber Co., 48 Ark. 188, 2 S.W.
703 (1887); Mucci v. Houghton, 89 Iowa 608, 57 N.W. 305 (1894); Ballou v.
Prescott, 64 Me. 305 (1874); Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d 257, 130 P.2d 341
(1942); Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W.Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
35. McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Becker v.
Janinski, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45, 15 N.Y. Supp. 675 (N.Y. Com. P1. 1891).
36. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955); Mehigan v.
Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 51 A.2d 632 (1947).
37. Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 173 Iowa 727, 155 N.W. 1007 (1916).
38. Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952); Vann v. Harden,
187 Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948).
39. Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937).
40. Dabney v. Briggs, 219 Ala. 127, 121 So. 394 (1929).
41. Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934); Urritia v. Patino, 297
S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), sub. op., 10 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
But see Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188 So. 815 (1939).
42. Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1948). But see Sinclair v.
Brunson, 212 Mich. 387, 180 N.W. 358 (1920) (doctor should not accept more
patients than he can satisfactorily attend).
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practice. 43 Furthermore, the courts have stated that there is no abandonment where the doctor makes it clear that unless he is called he
will not plan to return to the patient,44 if at the time he leaves the
patient there is no reason to believe that further medical attention
45
is necessary.
Although some attempt may be made to distinguish between "abandonment" of the patient, consisting of an attempted severance or
termination of the physician-patient relation, and a failure to use
proper care in the treatment of a patient, the line is not clearly
drawn. For example, in Groce v. Myers,4 the patient was lodged in
the doctor's clinic for about eight days and during the course of this
stay apparently got under her bed and had to be dragged out. In
the process her arm was broken. When her family was called some
days after this event they discovered bruises of an aggravated nature
upon her face, body, hips and limbs and her arm had swollen to an
enormous size and hung down by her body. The doctor informed her
father that he should tie something around the arm and let it hang
down, but there was no indication that any tape or dressing had been
applied or that other care had been taken of the arm in the clinic.
The court talks largely in terms of negligent treatment, but indicates
that the facts give rise to an inference of abandonment. The same may
be true in such cases as Moeller v. Hauser47 or Goheen v. Graber,48
where the doctors failed to act or to make frequent visits to the
patient or to make careful examinations during visits. 49 In these cases
the courts look more to the standard of acceptable practice in the
profession itself than to any independent duty formulated by the
courts. It may be argued that even in the decisions referred to in the
foregoing paragraph the imposition of a continuing duty to treat and
the qualifications thereof are really reflections of a standard of conduct defined by recognized practices in the profession. The extent to
which it is appropriate for the courts to look to the practice in the
profession as the standard for due care is developed in a later portion
of this paper.
43. McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (1939).

44. See, e.g., Ballou v. Prescott, 64 Me. 305 (1874).
45. But see Vann v. Harden, 187 Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948), where the
doctor testified that on his last visit prior to leaving town for a vacation the
patient had normal temperature and did not complain of pain from the cast
on his thigh nor request that it be examined, although there was other evidence that complaint had been made and his hospital chart indicated that
during the 48 hours prior to the last visit the patient's temperature had varied
from 101.6 to 101 and 100.8 on the morning of the last visit.
46. 224 N.C. 165, 29 S.E.2d 553 (1944).
47. 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639, 57 A.L.R.2d 364 (1952).
48. 181 Kan. 107, 309 P.2d 636 (1957).
49. See also Wilson v. Martin Mem. Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102
(1950). For a detailed study of the lack of diligence as contrasted with
abandonment see Annots., 57 A.L.R.2d 379, 432 (1957).
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In General
When the average layman is charged with negligence in a personal
injury action, his conduct is evaluated by the jury in terms of
the hypothetical conduct of a reasonable and prudent man under the
same or similar circumstances, a standard which may differ considerably from what the defendant and those like him in fact do.
Yet one of the circumstances to be taken into account in determining
this hypothetical conduct is the special knowledge or skill of which the
defendant is possessed or purports to be possessed.5 0 To this extent
the standard becomes somewhat subjectively related to the specific
defendant.
In medical malpractice cases a somewhat similar non-subjective
standard which takes into account specialized knowledge or skill is
applied. However, the standard is more precisely defined as follows:
This legal duty requires that the physician undertaking the care of a

patient possess and exercise that reasonable and ordinary degree of learning, skill and care commonly possessed and exercised by reputable
physicians practicing in the same locality, or in similar localities, in the
care of similar cases; it requires also that the physician, in caring for the
patient, exercise his best judgment at all times.5l
Good medical practice is the standard; it comprehends what the average
or like commucareful, diligent and skillful physician in the community
52
nities, would do or not do in the care of similar cases.
The duty imposed on a physician or surgeon is to employ such reasonable
skill and diligence as is ordinarily exercised in his profession in the same
general neighborhood having due regard to the advanced state of the
profession at the time of the treatment ....

The physician must use such

ordinary skill and diligence and apply the means and methods generally
used by physicians and surgeons of ordinary skill and learning in the
practice of the profession, i.e., in the same general line of practice in like
of the ailment and to act upon his honest
cases to determine the nature
53
opinion and conclusions.
[The physician] assumes toward the patient the obligation to exercise
such reasonable care and skill in that behalf as is usually exercised by
physicians or surgeons of good standing, of the same system or school of
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 290, comment e: "If the actor has
special knowledge, he is required to utilize it, but he is not required to possess
such knowledge, unless he holds himself out as possessing it or undertakes
a course of conduct which a reasonable man would recognize as requiring it."
Id. § 299, comment b: "One may voluntarily do an act which as a reasonable
man he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk to others unless
he exercises peculiar skill. If so, he must possess and exercise such skill and
is liable if through his lack thereof his act causes harm to another ....

On the

other hand, if the actor in fact possesses greater skill than that which he, as
a reasonable man, is required to possess, he must exercise his superior skill
with reasonable attention and competence."
51. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 17 (3d ed. 1956).
52. Id. at 30.
53. McHugh v. Audet, 72 F.Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
54. Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 654, 194 Pac. 488, 491 (1920). See also
Nelson v. Nicollet Clinic, 201 Minn. 505, 509, 276 N.W. 801, 803 (1937).
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practice in the community in which he resides, having due regard to the
54
condition of medical and surgical science at that time.
While by no means exhausting the various verbal formulations of the
test 55 the foregoing suggest that the common elements to be found
are:
(1) a reasonable or ordinary degree of skill and learning;
(2) commonly possessed and exercised by members of the profession
(3) who are of the same school or system as the defendant
(4) and who practice in the same or similar localities;
(5) and exercise of the defendant's good judgment.
The term "average" appears in some formulations in modification
of "skill and learning" or "members of the profession."56 But as the
57
Illinois court pointed out in Holtzman v. Hoy:
While this rule [imposing the standard of the knowledge, skill and care
of a good physician], on the one hand, does not exact the highest degree
of skill and proficiency attainable in the profession, it does not, on the
other hand, contemplate merely average merit. In other words, in order
to determine who will come up to the legal standard indicated, we are not
permitted to aggregate into a common class the quacks, the young men
who have had no practice, the old ones who have dropped out of practice, the good, and the very best, and then strike an average between
them.
"Average" is probably used in the sense of "ordinary," as pointed out
by some courts.8 But this may not be the meaning or connotation
conveyed to the jury unless there is an explicit instruction on this
point.59 And even where the term is qualified by "average member
in good standing" there may be a question as to whether this does
anything more than eliminate those doctors or quacks who have actually lost their licenses or never obtained them.
The courts indicated rather early that it was the actual possession
and exercise of knowledge, skill and diligence which was significant
55. The following decisions also deserve noting for their formulations of the
standard of care: Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951); Sinz v.
Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 753, 205 P.2d 3, 5 (1949); Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn.
167, 169, 27 Atl. 1116, 1116 (1893); Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14
N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938); Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 135, 155 N.W. 1077,
1081 (1916); Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 516-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871);
Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 496, 219 P.2d 79, 87 (1950).
56. See Staloch v. Holm, 100 Minn. 276, 281, 111 N.W. 264, 266 (1907); Pike
v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898); Hazelwood v. Adams,
245 N.C. 398, 401, 95 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1957); Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557,
558 (1876).
57. 118 Ill. 534, 536, 8 N.E. 832, 832 (1886). See also Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal.
App. 2d 28, 42, 45 P.2d 350, 357 (1st Dist. 1935).
58. See, e.g., Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629, 635, 66 N.W. 894, 895 (1896);
Carpenter v. Blake, 60,Barb. 488, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871).
59. See, e.g., Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557, 558 (1876).
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and not merely the reputation for having them. 60 In accordance with
this, it seems to be well established that one of the qualifications of
the standard is not that the doctor be licensed to practice, although
the standard is based on the practice of the licensed practitioner.6'
The two principal aspects of the somewhat varied standards just
described are: (1) That the physician or medical practitioner is not
only to be held to the standard of practice generally accepted by
his branch of the profession but is to be protected by this standard
since compliance with accepted practice is generally taken as conclusive evidence of due care, and; (2) that the patient-plaintiff in
most cases is compelled to rely upon expert medical testimony to
establish his case. What follows is an exploration of some of the qualifications of the general standard, an evaluation of "custom" as the
standard of care, and the problem of proving deviation therefrom.
"School of Practice"or Specialties
The early cases which defined the standard of conduct for medical
practice qualified the obligation by the statement that the practitioner
was entitled to be judged by the standards of that "school" or
"system of medicine" which he himself practiced. 2 The qualification
60. See Holtzman v. Hoy, 19 Ill. App. 459 (1886), affd, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E.
832 (1886); Leighton v. Sargent, 31 N.H. (11 Foster) 119 (1855); Mertz v.
Detweiler, 8 W. &S. 376 (Pa. 1845).
61. See, e.g., Andrews v. Lofton, 80 Ga. App. 723, 57 S.E.2d 338 (1950);
Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925); Brown v. Shyne, 242
N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197, 44 A.L.R. 1407 (1926); Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530,
187 S.E. 788 (1936); Willett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457
(1938); Martin v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 184 Tenn. 166, 197 S.W.2d

798 (1946); Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79 (1950). A few courts
seem to have treated practice without a license as at least some basis for
action if shown to be the proximate cause of injury, see, e.g., Whipple v.
Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927); Joly v. Mellor, 163 Wash. 48,
299 Pac. 660 (1931).
62. See, e.g., Force v. Gregory, 62 Conn. 167, 27 Atl. 1116, 22 L.R.A. 343
(1893); Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene 441 (Iowa 1848); Patten v. Wiggen, 51
Me. 594 (1862).
The schools of medicine which are mentioned most often in the cases are:
"allopathic," a system using remedies which produce effects upon the body
differing from those produced by disease; "homeopathic," a branch of medicine which deals with the investigation and application simile phenomenon
or the law of similars, like is cured by like; "eclectic," a system of medicine
in which physicians select from the various schools what they consider to be
the best doctrines or methods of treatment, special importance being attached
to the development of indigenous plant remedies; "osteopathy," a school of
healing which teaches that the body is a vital mechanical organism whose
structural and functional integrity are coordinate and interdependent, the
perversion of either constituting disease, the major means of treatment being
manipulation, although surgery is also sometimes undertaken; "chiropractic,"
a system of therapeutics based on the theory that disease is caused by abnormal function of the nervous system and which attempts to restore normal
function through manipulation and treatment of the structures of the body,
principally the spinal column; "Christian Science," a system of healing
through prayer and the triumph of the mind over matter, founded by Mary
Baker Eddy; "drugless healing," a system of treatment involving no drugs
or severing or penetration of body tissues except severing of the umbilical
cord at birth.
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seems to have been based on the inability of the jury to evaluate the
merits of each school's tenets and principles or to determine which
had the preferable mode of treatment. 63 This did not mean that any
form of treatment which differed from a generally recognized and
accepted form was entitled to equal weight. For example, in Nelson
64
v. Harrington,
the court refused to permit a "spiritualist or clairvoyant physician" to defend an action brought by the parent of his
patient on the ground that his treatment was in accordance with
the ordinary and customary practices of spiritualists and clairvoyants in diagnosing, attending and treating human ailments. While
recognizing the general principle that a doctor is entitled to be judged
by the practice of his particular school, the court said that:
To constitute a school of medicine under this rule, it must have rules
and principles of practice for the guidance of all its members, as respects
principles, diagnosis, and remedies, which each member is supposed to
observe in any given case. Thus, any competent practitioner of any given
school would treat a given case substantially the same as any other
competent practitioner of the same school would treat it.65
The court found that the "clairvoyant school" agreed only on one
fact, that the means of ascertaining disease and determining the
treatment was through the use of the trance, and that beyond this
there was no uniformity of practice. The mode of acquiring knowledge or information is said not to be determinative of the existence
of a "school" which the courts will recognize, except that all regular
physicians of any school must acquire professional knowledge through
the study of the general principles of science. Along the same lines,
a "magnetic healer" 66 and a Chinese herb doctor 67 were denied the
right to have their treatment judged exclusively by the alleged practices of their "schools" and to exclude the testimony of registered
medical doctors on behalf of the plaintiffs.
In Graingerv. Still,68 the court spoke of osteopathy as sui generis
in that, while it was declared by statute to be outside the practice of
63. See Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 171, 27 Atl. 1116, 1117, 22 L.R.A.
343, 345 (1893): "[F]or, as was said in Patten v. Wiggen, supra, 'the jury are
not to judge by determining which school, in their own view, is best.' . ..
[T]he jury, we think should have been told that the relative merits of the
two schools were in no sense before them for their consideration; . . ."; Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene 441, 442 (Iowa 1848): "The regular, the botanic, the
homoeopathic, the hydropathic, and other modes of treating diseases, are
alike unprohibited; and each receives more or less favor and patronage from
the people. Though the regular system has been advancing as a science for
centuries, aided by research and experience, by wisdom and skill, still the law
regards it with no partiality or distinguishing favor; nor is it recognized as the
exclusive standard or test by which the other systems are to be adjudged."
64. 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 288, 1 L.R.A. 719 (1888).
65. Id. at 598-99, 40 N.W. at 231, 1 L.R.A. at 722.
66. Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655, 64 L.R.A. 969 (1904).
67. Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac. 282 (1920).
68. 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114, 70 L.R.A. 49 (1905).
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medicine and surgery, its practitioners were permitted to cure diseases
of the human body "according to the system, method, or science as
taught by the American School of Osteopathy at Kirksville, Mo., or
any other legally chartered and regularly conducted school of osteopathy." 69 The court then went on to say that since there was no
evidence as to what the system of osteopathy was or how it differed
from the practice of medicine, and since the plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect that osteopaths used the same texts as medical
students and had no fixed rule of practice for the treatment of hip
disease, testimony of medical doctors could be relied upon to establish
the negligence of the defendant's diagnosis and treatment of the
plaintiff's ailment. In other cases the courts also recognized that there
may be a common area of practice to be tested by the principles of
70
any or all recognized schools, most commonly diagnosis of ailments.
In making the qualification of the standard in terms of the practice
of a particular "school" or system, the courts are really recognizing
the respectable division of medical opinion as to the proper methods
of treatment. The statutory imprimatur of license, as in Grainger,
adds only slightly to the acceptance of the group practice as a standard; the essential element is a "fixed rule of practice" to which all
members are expected to comply, coupled with some basic background of scientific knowledge. Some courts in support of the "school
of medicine" qualification pointed to the fact that the patient had
knowingly sought the practitioner and accepted his mode of diagnosis
and treatment.7 1 Where, however, the plaintiff was led to believe
that the defendant had ability to make a diagnosis or render treatment which was actually beyond his limitations, the "assumed risk"
argument was ineffective.72 It may well be argued that aside from
such special groups as Christian Scientists, the patient is ill equipped
to understand the scope of practice and limitations of the practitioner
and therefore the qualification of the practitioner's standard of conduct should not be based on any alleged assumption of risk or
consent theory.
With the development of medical science, the older "schools" of
medicine have tended to give way to what may properly be termed
"the regular practice of medicine" which encompasses much of the
older practice of the allopathic school. Today the regular physician
69. Id. at 224, 85 S.W. at 1123, 70 L.R.A. at 58. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.010
(1949).
70. E.g., Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 173 Iowa 727, 155 N.W. 1007 (1916);
Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015, 31 A.L.R. 826 (1923).
71. Nelson v. Dahl, 174 Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928); Kirschner v. Keller,
70 Ohio App. 111, 42 N.E.2d 463 (1943).
72. See Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925) where
plaintiff recovered on the claim that defendant held himself out as capable of
ascertaining disease and of determining whether his treatment was proper.
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treats all aspects of disease and employs a variety of procedures
and methods of treatment. To this extent the qualification of the
school or system to which he belongs is almost meaningless. It does
retain meaning, however, with respect to some related specialties
such as dentistry,7 3 nursing, 74 X-ray technician's work,75 and veterinary
medicine, 76 each of which is to be judged by the principles and practices of the specialty.
The regular practice of medicine may also be distinguished today
from other disciplines of healing and therapy, the principle ones
being osteopathy, chiropractic, Christian Science, "drugless healing"
and other forms of treatment which rely upon such natural elements
as heat, light, water, "nature food" or massage. Some of these
"schools" or systems, have legislative recognition,7 7 and where they
do the courts may be bound to accept them as separate systems to
be judged independently.7 8
The extent of differentiation between the practice of medicine and
osteopathy varies considerably from state to state. In some the
osteopath is denied the right to use drugs or perform surgery; in
such states the distinction between the two schools is a pronounced
one. For example, in Kansas, although osteopaths must be examined
in many subjects common to medicine, the courts maintain a clear
distinction between the practice of medicine and the practice of
osteopathy,7 9 and the standards of conduct remain distinct.80 On the
73. E.g., Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955); Simone v.
Sabo, 224 P.2d 487 (Cal. App. 1950), subsequent opinion, 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231
P.2d 19 (1951); Bryan v. Grace, 63 Ga. App. 373, 11 S.E.2d 241 (1940); Hazel-

wood v. Adams, 245 N.C. 398, 95 S.E.2d 917 (1957); Malila v. Meacham, 187
Ore. 330, 211 P.2d 747 (1949).

74. E.g., Valentin v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359
(1946). For more detailed discussion of the special duties and liability of

nurses see LESNIK & ANDERSON, NURSING PRACTICE AND THE LAW 247-93 (2d ed.

1955); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 970 (1957).

75. E.g., Facer v. Lewis, 326 Mich. 702, 40 N.W.2d 457 (1950) (x-ray technician); Wood v. Miller, 158 Ore. 444, 76 P.2d 963 (1938) (diathery operator).
76. E.g., Kerbow v. Bell, 259 P.2d 317 (Okla. 1953).
77. For a list of the licensing statutes in the United States, see 1 LAWYERS'
MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES 33-41
(Frankel et. al. ed. 1958).
78. See, e.g., Cummins v. Donley, 173 Kan. 463, 249 P.2d 695 (1952) (osteopath); Bryant v. Biggs, 331 Mich. 64, 49 N.W.2d 63 (1951) (osteopath); Hardy
v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936) (naturopath); Willett v. Rowekamp,
134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (1938) (chiropractor); Sheppard v. Firth, 334
P.2d 190 (Ore. 1959) (chiropractor); Benz v. Levin, 62 York 149 (Pa. C.P.
1948) (chiropodist); Simms v. Gafney, 227 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(osteopath); Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953) (naturopath).
79. State ex rel. Beck v. Gleason, 148 Kan. 1, 79 P.2d 911 (1938), 148 Kan.
459, 83 P.2d 425 (1938) interpreting KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-1201 to
65-1208 (1949), as limited to the fundamental principles of osteopathy which
the court finds not to include drug therapy or operative surgery with surgical
instruments as distinct from "osteopathic surgery" or manipulation of the
body with hands.
80. Cummins v. Donley, 173 Kan. 463, 249 P.2d 695 (1952).
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other hand, where the osteopathic physician or surgeon is permited to
make use of drugs, and, with proper training and testing, to engage
in surgery and obstetrics, 81 the courts seem to treat the practice of
osteopathy as almost co-existent with the practice of medicine so far
as the standard of conduct and the use of experts from medical
practice is concerned.82 While in states such as Massachusetts and
New York, where chiropractors are not licensed to treat human ailments, 83 the courts have shown little willingness to recognize chiropractic as having the status of a special school or system of treatment, and decisions such as Whipple v. Grandchamp8 and Epstein
v. Hirschon8 5 are typical in demanding that the chiropractor live up
to the standards of care established by licensed practitioners of the
healing arts.
The experience of the Washington courts with regard to "drugless
healers" is perhaps illustrative of a development away from the
qualification of the standard of care in terms of schools of practice.
In Wilcox v. Carroll,86 the court affirmed judgment for the parent
of an 8 year old child who died of peritonitis after the drugless
healer had brushed aside the mother's fears of appendicitis and
diagnosed an "inflammation of the spine and congestion of the
bowels" and treated accordingly. While recognizing that the defendant's conduct was to be judged by the degree of skill and learning which ordinarily characterized the school or class of physicians
to which he belonged, the court found that there was a common
ground of diagnosis on which regular medical practitioners might
and did testify adversely to the defendant. Twenty-seven years later
the same drugless healer again failed to diagnose appendicitis and
prescribed a laxative and "sine wave" treatment for the patient,
while telling the patient's wife that there was no need to call an
M.D. and threatening to leave the case if an M.D. was called in. After
the patient's death, the wife brought action. At the trial medical
doctors testified for the plaintiff, and drugless healers testified for the
defendant. The trial court refused to charge that the defendant must
be judged by the standards of drugless healers. In affirming judgment
81. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 71, § 7 (1954).
82. Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174 (1948) where no particular distinction is made between a physician and an osteopathic physician
and surgeon.
83. See list of licensing acts, 1 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 36, 38 (Frankel
et. al. ed. 1958).
84. 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927).
85. 33 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942). Cf. Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah
312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), in which the court concludes that there is no "school"
of chiropractic since, although it is mentioned in the medical arts statute, no
provision is made for licensing of chiropractors. Therefore a witness qualified
to practice medicine is permitted to testify in action against chiropractor
although admitting ignorance of chiropractic.
86. 127 Wash. 1, 219 Pac. 34 (1923).
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87
for the plaintiff, the appellate court in Kelly v. Carroll
went to
some pains to point out that the drugless healer was not a "doctor"
in the medical sense and could not practice medicine as such; that
within the general realm of medicine and surgery a drugless healer
could not qualify as a medical expert witness; and finally that a
drugless healer does not belong to a school of medicine and therefore
cannot claim to be judged by any standard distinct from that applicable generally to medical practice. In this latter decision the court
seems motivated largely by a desire to protect the public and to uphold the legislative power to limit the practice of treating human
ailments rather rigidly. How far the court would go in disregarding
the claims of other "schools" of medicine is not clear, although it did
comment in the course of its opinion:
With the advance of medical science, it is apparent that there is less
and less occasion to invoke the rule ... "each school of medicine is enmethods
titled to practice in its own way, and because one does not use the
of the other is no reason for holding the one for malpractice."8 8
and pointed to the fact that today the distinctions between the homeopathic and allopathic schools of thought have become unknown to the
modern doctor. This may well indicate that within the area of
licensed medical practice in Washington the qualification is no longer
valid.
While the "school of practice" doctrine may now have lost much of
its vigor, there still remains the correlative principle that where
doctors differ as to the proper medical procedure, a doctor who
follows the practice espoused by a reputable minority is not to be
treated as having committed malpractice by doing so.8 9 This doctrine
requires no such formal definition of principles and systems as the
allopathic-homeopathic distinction did. It is necessary, however, for
the evidence or testimony from competent experts to show that some
actual difference of opinion does exist and that there is expert
opinion other than the defendant's in support of his practice. In one
case, such approval of treatment was found to exist in other areas
such as Chicago, Cincinnati, and Vienna, Austria, although at the
time of treatment the defendant was the only one using the procedure
in the St. Louis areaY°

87. 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79 (1950).

88. Id. at 495, 219 P.2d at 87.

89. See, e.g., Graham v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1953); McHugh

v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77
P.2d 455 (1938); Church v. Bloch, 80 Cal. App. 2d 542, 182 P.2d 241 (1947);
Staloch v. Holm, 100 Minn. 276, 111 N.W. 264 (1907); Duckworth v. Bennett,
320 Pa. 47, 181 Atl. 558 (1935); Gresham v. Ford, 192 Tenn. 310, 241 S.W.2d
408 (1950); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940). Cf. Baldor v.
Rodgers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1955) (original opinion); Fritz v. Horsfall, 24
Wash. 2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20
N.W.2d 108 (1945).

90. McClarin v. Grenzfelder, 147 Mo. App. 478, 126 S.W. 817 (1910).

See
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At the same time that the medical profession was abandoning many
of the various "schools" of practice and formulating a single regular
school of medicine, there were developing subdivisions in the form of
specialties which dealt with distinctive portions of the body, such
as dermatology (diseases of the skin), gynecology and urology (diseases of the sexual organs of female and the urinary tracts of female
and male patients), neurology (dealing with the nervous system),
internal medicine (diseases of the circulatory, digestive and respiratory systems), opthamology (diseases of the eye), otolaryngology
(diseases of the ears, nose and throat), proctology (diseases of the
anus and rectum), hematology (dealing with the blood); specialties
dealing with given ailments or forms of treatment such as obstetrics,
pathology, pediatrics, psychiatry, physical medicine and rehabilitation, plastic surgery, radiology, surgery and anesthesiology. 91 The
recognition accorded to these specialties by special certifying "boards"
within the profession itself and the growing practice of many hospitals to insist upon "board certification" prior to permitting a doctor
to engage in the use of its facilities within these specialized areas,
raises the question of whether in place of "school of practice" the
court may properly qualify the required standard of conduct in terms
of a medical specialty or certification by a specialty "board."
It is generally accepted that where a doctor holds himself out as
a specialist in a specific area of medical practice, he may be held to
a somewhat higher standard of knowledge and skill than is the general practitioner.92 This does not mean, however, that everyone who
engages in surgical procedures must meet the standards which are
common among "board" specialists, i.e., a surgeon who has done postgraduate work in surgery or a subspecialty thereof and has received
3
a certification from the American Board of Surgery. In Sinz v. Owens,9
for example, where the patient claimed that the doctor should have
used skeletal traction in reduction of a double comminuted fracture
of the leg, the trial court charged that if the doctor undertakes to
perform service in a special branch of medicine and at that time
other members of the profession practicing in that locality limit their
pages 569 to 575, infra, for discussion of the locality of practice as a qualification.
91. For a summary of the recognized medical specialties, see 1 LAwYERs'
MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA §§ 1.8, 1.9 (Frankel et. al. ed. 1958).

92. See, e.g., Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951); Scarano v.
Schnoor, 158 Cal. App. 2d 612, 323 P.2d 178 (1958); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102
So. 2d 307 (Fla. App. 1958); Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337
(1953); Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957); Carbone v.
Washburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Coleman v. Wilson, 85 N.J.L.
203, 88 Atl. 1059 (1913); Rayburn v. Day, 126 Ore. 135, 268 Pac. 1002 (1928);
Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79, 71 Atl. 1045 (1909); Fox v. Mason, 139 Va. 667,
124 S.E. 405 (1924); Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918);
Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956).
93. 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
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practice to that particular branch of medicine, the doctor must possess
the degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by specialists.
The appellate court found error in such a charge saying that such
duty would devolve upon the doctor-defendant only if he found or
should have realized that something more than the skill of a general
practitioner was required. Similarly in Marchlewski v. Casella9 the
Connecticut court said that "the defendant was not required to use
a degree of care commensurate with that exercised by those classified
as experts." And in other cases the courts have excused obstetricians
from failure to call other specialists when spinal anesthesia used in
the process of childbirth resulted in paralysis, without indicating that
either in administering the anesthetic95 or in attempting treatment of
the patient thereafter 96 was the obstetrician required to use any different standard of care than that of other obstetricians under similar
circumstances.
Somewhat in contrast to these cases is that of Simone v. Sabo 97
in which a dentist who had been in general practice for eight months
but had never removed an impacted second bicuspid, was found by
the jury to have been negligent in the process of removing such a
tooth. Experts for the plaintiff testified that it was customary for a
general practitioner to refer such extractions to an exodontist or oral
surgeon, and to inform the patient of the danger of injury to the
"mental nerve," neither of which the defendant had done. An oral
surgeon testifying for the defendant stated that it was customary and
proper for general practitioners to extract impacted teeth. The intermediate appellate court affirmed judgment for the patient on the basis
of failure to refer the case to an exodontist. 98 The Supreme Court
of California reversed the trial court, 99 relying on the defendant's
evidence and upon the absence of any evidence that he had failed
to act with the care of "a reasonably prudent and skillful oral surgeon." While accepting the defendant's argument that it is not
malpractice per se for a general practitioner to fail to refer a complicated case to a specialist, the court does not reject specifically the
trial court's charge that if a general practitioner undertakes the treatment of a case within the field of specialists practicing in the same
94. 141 Conn. 377, 106 A.2d 466 (1954).
95. Hall v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955), aj'd per curiam,

234 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1956).

96. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
97. 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951).

98. 224 P.2d 487 (Cal. App. 1950).
99. See note 97 supra. Under California practice, the granting of a hearing
by the Supreme Court renders the decision of the intermediate District Court
of Appeals null and void and the appeal is in effect direct from trial court to
Supreme Court, although the opinion of the District Court of Appeal may be
treated as a "brief on the legal questions involved therein ... ." Knouse v.
Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 483-84, 66 P.2d 438 (1937).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

locality, "it is the duty of the general practitioner to possess that
degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by such specialists. '10 0
While the general practitioner may be judged by the standards of
practice of general practitioners, the courts will permit a specialist
to testify in actions against general practitioners. In Wilson v. Corbin'0 1 the Iowa court says that a case against a physician and surgeon
in general practice may go to the jury where a specialist from the
State University Hospitals gives testimony as to the general recognition of the necessity and importance of lateral view X-rays in diagnosis of injury to the spine, saying "most surgeons would think so."
In Sinz v. Owens'0 2 the court does not say that testimony from experts would not be admissible to show the desirability of having
a specialist called into the case, and in Simone v. Sabo10 3 the court
relied on the testimony of an oral surgeon in finding some basis for
a jury determination that non-referral was permissible practice for
a general practitioner. What the courts indicate in these opinions is
that, although the specialist may testify, his testimony should be
limited to a statement of medical facts or a definition of what is
customary practice among doctors of the class of the defendant, i.e.,
general practitioners. I am somewhat skeptical, however, as to
whether the distinction between what the specialist believes a general
practitioner ought to do in a given situation and what general practitioners do in fact do in such situation is clearly drawn in the minds
of the specialists testifying in these cases.
It might be argued that with the development of widely recognized
specialties, requiring intensive post-graduate training and subject to
professional boards of certification, it is appropriate for the courts
to rely upon the standards of the specialist within the area of practice covered by such specialists. It might appear that this would give
greater protection to the patient. The principal difficulty with such
argument lies in the necessity for relying upon general practitioners
to care for the large proportion of human ills today. At the moment,
medical schools and the specialty boards do not turn out enough
specialists to provide care for all, and it would be unwise for them
to reduce their existing standards of performance simply to provide
greater numbers of "specialists." Since the specialties which have
wide recognition cover most of the areas of medical practice today,
any wholesale acceptance of their higher standards of practice as the
general standard would tend to force the general practitioner out of
the picture entirely.
As the specialties become more firmly established and more and
100. 37 Cal. 2d at 254, 231 P.2d at 22.
101. 241 Iowa 593, 41 N.W.2d 702 (1950).

102. 33 Cal. 2d 744, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).

103. 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951).
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more "board" specialists appear in practice in most areas, the tendency may well be toward an increase in the care demanded of all
practitioners, at least to the extent of requiring referrals by general
practitioners in more cases than are required today. To some extent
this is already being done by the extra-legal practice of hospitals in
restricting the use of their facilities to accredited specialists in such
fields as surgery, radiology, pathology, and anesthesiology. This has
the effect of limiting the general practitioner to home and office
treatment and of encouraging him to refer serious cases to the
specialist for treatment. But here the standard of practice is one
set by the profession itself and not imposed upon it from outside.
Locality of Practice
The second principal qualification of the general standard is in
terms of the locality or community in which the defendant-doctor
practices. This appeared in the American decisions of the nineteenth
century'0 4 and is repeated in some recent decisions. 05 The object of
the qualification was to protect the country physician. In Small v.
Howard'0 6 the defendant was a general practitioner in a country
town of 2,500 people. He undertook to care for a serious wound in
the plaintiff's wrist, which required considerable skill in treatment,
although there was an eminent surgeon living only four miles away
and no emergency presented itself. The trial court charged that the
defendant, having undertaken to practice in a town of comparatively
small population,
was bound to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons of
ordinary ability and skill, practicing in similar localities, with opportunities for no larger experience, ordinarily possess; and he was not
bound to possess that high degree of art and skill possessed by eminent
surgeons practicing in larger cities, and making a specialty of the practice of surgery.107
104. E.g., Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 Atl. 1116 (1893); Smothers v.
Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870); Small v.
Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880); Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt.
557 (1876); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504 (1886). See also SHEARmAN &
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE 491 (3d ed. 1874). Lord Nathan in his recent treatise
on Medical Negligence states that this qualification has never been suggested
in England and that it is probable that the courts would reject the contention
that the standard of care should differ from one part of England ,to another.
NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 21 (1957).
See also, Fleming, Developments in
the English Law of Medical Liability, 12 VAm. L. REV. 633 (1959).
105. E.g., Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955); Horton v.
Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368,
54 N.W.2d 639 (1952); Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766
(1956). Cf. Booth v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 235 (Ct. Cl. 1957), in which in
an action for malpractice of U.S. Army doctors stationed in Germany, the
court considers the testimony of German medical experts as to the treatment
and practices followed in that country.
106. 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880).
107. Id. at 132, 35 Am. Rep. at 365.
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On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that it
was common knowledge that a doctor in a small community did not
make a specialty of surgery and would seldom be called upon to
perform difficult operations, and furthermore that he would have
fewer opportunities to observe others in practice than would be
available in larger cities and public hospitals. 08 Other decisions also
place emphasis upon the country doctor's lack of opportunity for
wide experience and acquisition of knowledge. 109
Some decisions recognized that the test must not be one of practice
in the single locality in which the defendant resided, but should extend to "similar localities" because of the possibility that the defendant
would be the only doctor in his own community or that practice of
others in a small or limited area would be below the general standard
of practice by rural physicians." 0 Conversely, in Tanner v. Sanders"' the court specifically limited the standard applicable to a
dentist practicing in Louisville, Kentucky, a city of some 350,000, to
the practice in that community, saying that the defendant was not
entitled to rely upon any larger area since there was an adequate
sample within the city itself.
In Viita v. Dolan,"2 in 1916, one defendant offered to testify, on the
basis of his experience and observation of practice in Cloquet, Minnesota, that the treatment applied by his partner and co-defendant
was that used by physicians of ordinary care, skill and caution. This
testimony was excluded by the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that the exclusion was proper because the area of
practice was too narrowly limited. The court went on to approve
an instruction that the defendants were required to exercise such
reasonable care and skill as an ordinary physician would exercise
under like circumstances, "and that, among the circumstances to be
considered, was the location of the physician in Cloquet rather than
in Duluth, St. Paul, or some other place."" 3 While retaining some
reference to local conditions which might limit the doctor's opportunity for acquiring experience and his access to the most modern
facilities for treatment, the court expanded the standard considerably
by making this only one possible consideration. In fact, at one point
108. Id. at 136, 35 Am. Rep. at 365.
109. Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46
(1870).
110. Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877); Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629,
70 N.W. 750 (1897); Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.E. 1096 (1902); Pelky v.
Palmer, 109 Mich. 561, 67 N.W. 561 (1896); McBride v. Huckins, 76 N.H. 206,
81 Atl. 528 (1911); McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898);
Mutschman v. Petry, 46 Ohio App. 525, 189 N.D. 658 (1933); Bigley v. Fisher,
26 R.I. 402, 59 At1. 72 (1904).
111. 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718 (1933).
112. 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
113. Id. at 137, 155 N.W. at 1081.
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the court indicates that "the same general locality" in which the
standard practice is found to exist may be "the Northwest or the state"
since a physician or surgeon in a village like Cloquet through frequent
meetings of medical societies, articles in journals and work in hospital
facilities available may be placed on an equal footing with his city
brother.
The lessening effect of locality as a qualification of the standard
has become even more apparent within the past twenty years. In 1940,
in Tvedt v. Haugen,114 the plaintiff was injured on his farm and was
treated by defendant, a general practitioner in Larimore, North
Dakota. Plaintiff's injuries included a spiral fracture of the tibia
and rough transverse fracture of the fibula. Defendant's treatment
consisted of fluoroscoping the injury, reducing the fracture, applying
first a splint and then a plaster cast and taking an X-ray, followed
by irregular examinations of plaintiff's leg over a period of three
months. Six months after the injury, defendant learned that plaintiff had consulted doctors in a clinic in Crookston, Minnesota, and
then for the first time recommended that the plaintiff see a specialist
in Fargo. Plaintiff brought action for malpractice against defendant
and obtained a judgment. In affirming the judgment, the court said:
The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as they
exist, and not by what they have been in the past or may be in the future.
Today, with rapid methods of transporation and easy means of communication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is not
fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular village
where he is practicing. So far as medical treatment is concerned, the
borders of the locality or community have, in effect, been extended so as
to include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment
may be had which the local physician, because of limited facilities or
training, is unable to give."65
On the West Coast, one District Court of Appeal in California extended the "locality" qualification to permit testimony by Los Angeles
physicians in an action against a surgeon practicing in Pasadena on
the basis that the two cities were contiguous, located in the same
county and had the same general hospital; 116 while another such
court refused to permit physicians from San Bernardino, a city of
50,000, to testify in an action brought against a physician in nearby
Ontario, population 15,000."1 In 1949, the California Supreme Court
in Sinz v. Owens" 8 sought to clarify this situation. Relying on the
earlier decisions of the Minnesota and North Dakota courts, as well
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
Id. at 349, 294 N.W. at 188.
Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P.2d 505 (1938).
McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (1940).
33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
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as the lower court's opinion, the California court rejected geographic
proximity as a necessary test for determining the qualifications of an
expert on the standard of care. The court recognized that the
opportunity for a doctor to keep abreast of advancement in the
profession and his access to facilities for treatment must be given
consideration. It was unwilling to say that the area in which the
standard of practice must be found to exist would be so extensive as
the entire San Joaquin Valley, containing two large cities and towns
ranging in size down to "way stations." But pointing to the fact
that the experts who testified as to what was proper treatment for
the plaintiff's ailments had practiced in towns not too different in
size from Lodi, the location of defendant's practice, and noting that
all of these towns were tributary to Stockton and that there was
testimony to the effect that the degree of care at the place of treatment
was equal to that in Stockton, the court concluded: "The essential
factor is knowledge of similarity of conditions; geographical proximity is only one factor to be considered.""19 Mr. Justice Carter,
dissenting, would have gone further and have held that any physician
licensed to practice in the State of California was competent to
testify as to the standard of practice throughout the state. 120 He
noted that there were only four medical schools within the state
which were qualified to meet the requirements of the State Board
of Medical Examiners and concluded that there was a presumption of
uniformity of education and training which should be treated as the
critical element rather than the locality in which practice was carried
on.
The following year the Iowa Supreme Court permitted testimony
by doctors from Evanston, Illinois, in an action against doctors
practicing in Davenport, Iowa, on the theory that the practice in and
around Davenport was comparable to practice in and around metropolitan Chicago. 121 Courts in Idaho,'m New Jersey,123 and Pennsylvania 24 have also taken the position that the standard of practice
can no longer be narrowly restricted to the community in which
the doctor operates nor even to communities of the same size, considering modern means of communication and transportation and
the growing availability of clinical facilities in most parts of the
country. The Florida trial court has permitted a plaintiff to rely
upon expert witnesses from Chicago to establish a claim of malpractice, although on appeal the court limits itself to the question of prox119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 756, 205 P.2d at 7.
Id. at 761, 205 P.2d at 10 (dissenting opinion).
McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950).
Flock v. J. C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941).
Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 339 (1939).
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imate cause, apparently on the theory that breach of due care might
125
be established without expert testimony.
These recent decisions do not mean that the nature of the locality
in which the defendant practices may be totally disregarded. For
example, in Josselyn v. Dearborn,2 6 where the defendant practiced
in a small Maine town some one hundred thirty miles from the nearest hospital and laboratories and the disease from which the plaintiff
suffered was a rare one, the test approved by the court was that
reasonable degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by other
physicians under like circumstances. One of these circumstances, the
court pointed out, was the remoteness of the locale. In a recent
Minnesota case the plaintiff relied upon experts from the Mayo
Clinic in Rochester to establish his claim against defendant who practiced in Ancker Hospital, the municipal hospital in the state capitol,
St. Paul. The defendant requested an instruction that the fact that
certain practices were or were not followed in the Mayo Clinic
was not conclusive and that the defendant should not be judged solely
by the standards of the Clinic. The supreme court held that refusal
of such instruction was not error, but stated that the defendant "is
only required to possess the skill and learning possessed by the
average member of his school of the profession in good standing in
his locality .... ,u2 The decision is justified on the basis of earlier
decisions of the court and the fact that the Mayo Clinic and Ancker
Hospital are not remote from each other nor are they, or the communities in which they are located, likely to be distinguishable in
terms of the character of practice found there. However, had the
plaintiff's experts come from the University of Minnesota or any
other "teaching institution" (as contrasted with a proprietary and
primarily treatment institution) some question might be raised as
to whether the standards of treatment or practice were necessarily
identical. It is expected that in a teaching institution advances in
practice may be attempted more rapidly than in clinics or private
practice, that a certain amount of "experimental medicine'? may be
undertaken. Perhaps this sort of distinction between quasi-experimental and conservative treatment can be as appropriate as between
the "city" and "country" doctor of another era.
This last comment is not intended to rule out the case of the
doctor practicing in a remote area or in areas which are so sparsely
populated as to make clinics or modern facilities unavailable in many
cases. Even so, some of the decisions of recent years have unduly
125. Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955), where application of
steaming hot towels to the arm of a premature infant in an effort to restore
circulation resulted in severe burns and loss of fingers.
126. 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174 (1948).
127. Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952).
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emphasized locality, it seems. In Stallcup v. Coscarat,128 an oral
surgeon in Phoenix, Arizona, persuaded the appellate court that his
standard of care should be qualified in terms of the community in
which he was practicing, although that community was the largest
metropolis in the state and in close communication with the rest of
modern medicine. In Huttner v. MacKay,129 the plaintiff's offer of
testimony by an anatomist as to the propriety of invading certain
portions of the brain in the course of surgery was excluded not only
because the witness was not a neurosurgeon (which might not necessarily disqualify him as an expert on the dangers of injury to the
brain) but also because he did not practice in Seattle in the years
1949 and 1950 when the defendant treated the patient.
of
One of the more doubtful decisions qualifying the standard 13
0
Vickers,
v.
Horton
be
to
appear
would
locality
of
terms
in
care
decided in 1955. The defendant was a general surgeon whose work
was primarily in bone and joint surgery and who held himself out
to the public as a specialist in orthopedic surgery in Greenwich,
Connecticut. His background consisted of an M.D. from Johns Hopkins University in 1924, internships in Detroit and Cooperstown, New
York, further study in Vienna, periods as an instructor in medicine
at Johns Hopkins and at Yale University, service as junior assistant
on the staff of Bellevue Hospital and as instructor in surgery at the
College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City, followed by
private practice in Greenwich from 1932. The trial court sitting as
trier of fact was permitted to disregard the testimony of an expert
to the effect that the practice of the defendant was "bad practice,"
apparently on the basis that "the test in this state, in determining
what constitutes reasonable care, skill, and diligence, is that which
physicians and surgeons in the same general neighborhood and in
the same general line of practice ordinarily have and exercise in like
cases" 131 and that "it was impossible to determine from his [the
witness's] use of that phrase whether he meant 'bad practice' as
measured by his 'subjective standards, or by Bellevue Hospital stand32
ards, or by indefinite and unfixed standards of orthopedic surgery.' "1
While the precise nature of the witness's own qualifications or the
answer which he gave is not clear, the background of the defendant
and the modern opportunities for communication suggest that the
orthopedic surgeon in Greenwich may well be held to either the
standards of Bellevue Hospital or those accepted by orthopedic surgeons throughout the country.
128. 79 Ariz. 41, 282 P.2d 791 (1955).
129. 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956).

130. 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955).
131. Id. at 113, 111 A.2d at 679.
132. Id. at 112, 111 A.2d at 678.
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Although locality of practice, like "school of medicine," has declined in importance as a qualification of the standard of care with
modern developments in medicine and communication, it retains some
vigor today. The emphasis is properly placed less upon the geographic location and more upon the character of the defendant's
practice in terms of the opportunities for experience and acquisition
of information concerning developments in medical science and
techniques. By doing this, as by tending toward acceptance of a single
"school of medicine," the courts may achieve a relatively uniform
standard of practice throughout the country. While this standard
will still rely upon the actual practice accepted as proper by the
profession itself, the national level of practice is likely to be improved
by such uniformity.
SOME PARTICULAR DUTIES

In addition to the limitations of the standard of care in terms of
the school or system of medicine or specialty practiced by the doctor
and the locality of his practice, the courts may attempt to frame some
particular standards or obligations which a doctor must observe. In
this section of the paper some of these special obligations are examined with a view to determining whether these obligations are anything more than a recognition by the courts of professional standards
established by the medical profession itself.
Duty to keep abreastof progress
One specific or more nearly specific standard which court and jury
may apply in determining whether a physician or surgeon is negligent is the obligation "to keep abreast of progress in the profession
and to utilize accepted and recognized methods in diagnosis and
33
treatment."1
Perhaps the commonest example of an alleged failure to keep
abreast of progress is the failure to use X-ray for diagnosis of fractures or dislocations. 134 The California court has found it to be a
133. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 41 (3d ed. 1956); Pike v.

Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898) may be the source of
this language, although the idea is to be found in McCandless v. McWha, 22
Pa. (10 Harris) 261, 269 (1853): "And in judging of this degree of skill, in a
given case, regard is to be had to the advanced state of the profession at the
time. Discoveries in the natural sciences for the last half-century have

exerted a sensible influence on all the learned professions, but especially
on that of medicine, whose circle of truths has been relatively much enlarged. .

.

. The physician or surgeon who assumes to exercise the healing

arts, is bound to be up to the improvements of the day. The standard of ordi-

nary skill is on the advance; and he who would not be found wanting, must

apply himself with all diligence to the most accredited sources of knowledge."
134. E.g., Kingston v. McGrath, 232 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1956); Agnew v. City
of Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. 2d 616, 186 P.2d 450 (1947); Johnston v. A.C.
Lumber Co., 37 Idaho 617, 217 Pac. 979 (1923); Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa
457, 41 N.W.2d 702 (1950); James v. Grigsby, 114 Kan. 627, 220 Pac. 267 (1923);
Hoover v. McCormick, 197 Ky. 509, 247 S.W. 718 (1923); De Haan v. Winter,
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breach of duty to fail to use an X-ray in locating a piece of steel imbedded in the patient's eye;135 and the Kentucky court has held it a
breach of a dentist's duty of care to fail to use X-ray to locate the
source of pain (a broken fragment of tooth) following an extraction.13
In Lawless v. Calaway,137 however, the California court refused to
follow such cases to the extent of requiring the use of X-ray to
diagnose appendicitis. In Hunt v. Bradshaw,138 where some five X-ray
pictures were taken in an effort to locate a piece of steel inside the
body, the court concluded that there was no compulsion to take more
pictures although some expert testimony indicated that more views
giving all planes would aid in obtaining a clearer and more concise
idea of where the piece of metal rested. The Washington court in
Derr v. Bonney 139 found that failure to make use of X-ray after applying a plaster cast and after the patient complained of pain was not
negligence per se or even evidence of negligence, when an expert
testified that he used X-ray to check alignment of fractured bones but
that the picture to be obtained through a plaster cast was not too
clear and probably would not have benefited the plaintiff. Several
courts have refused to find that failure to use an X-ray was evidence
of negligence absent expert testimony that such use would be neces40
sary.1
Failure to make use of biopsies or other pathological examinations
which are available to determine the malignancy of a tumor may
give rise to liability,141 although the Nevada court has not found
this conclusive evidence of negligence. 142 Failure to make commonly
recognized tests for pregnancy when such condition is suspected and
reliance on palpation only in a case where surgery may be in order,
has been treated as failure to comply with reasonable medical prac258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W.

1077 (1916); Whitson v. Hillis, 55 N.D. 797, 215 N.W. 480 (1927); Willett v.
Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (1938). See also Annot., 54
A.L.R.2d 273, 297, 302 (1957).

135. McBride v. Saylin, 6 Cal. 2d 134, 56 P.2d 941 (1936).
136. Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956).

137. 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1945).
138. 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
139. 38 Wash. 2d 678, 231 P.2d 637 (1951).

140. E.g., Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938); Pilgrim v.
Landham, 63 Ga. App. 451, 11 S.E.2d 420 (1940); Bierstein v. Whitman, 360 Pa.
537, 62 A.2d 843 (1948); Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47, 181 Atl. 558 (1935);
Gresham v. Ford, 192 Tenn. 310, 241 S.W.2d 408 (1950); Floyd v. Walls, 26
Tenn. App. 151, 168 S.W.2d 602 (1941); cf. Sibert v. Boger, 260 S.W.2d 569
(Mo. 1953).
141. See Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P.2d 142 (1940); Corn v.
Grench, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
142. See Corn v. Grench, 331 P.2d 850 (1958), affirming judgment for defendant and indicating the prior opinion merely permitted the jury to conclude
that there was negligence but did not compel such conclusion.
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tice. 43 In Fortner v. Koch,44 failure to make use of X-ray, blood
tests or biopsy in examining a patient who suffered from syphilis and
had a swelling on his knee which showed symptoms of cancer,
syphilis, simple tumor, abscess or tuberculosis, was held to be negligent, apparently on the basis of expert testimony as to the usual
practices of physicians to use these diagnostic techniques in the community.
In Flock v. J. C. Palumo Fruit Co., 145 the court relied upon expert
testimony that the use of deep X-ray therapy or radium treatments
were the effective treatments for plaintiff's condition and imposed
liability for failure of the contract doctors to provide such treatment
rather than abandoning the patient-employee as incurable. Failure
to give tetanus antitoxin or to incise a "puncture wound" in accordance with generally accepted practice subjected a doctor to liability
in Hodgson v. Bigelow. 146 Similarly, failure to administer silver nitrate solution to a newborn baby's eyes to prevent infection may fall
below the standard established by modern medical practice. 147
In Hansen v. Pock148 a Chinese herb doctor was held responsible
for aggravation of the patient's tuberculosis by following his traditional method of treatment. The court points out that the defendant's
own testimony "discloses that he was profoundly ignorant of the circulation of the blood or the relations of the various organs of the
body or their several functions or where the pulse is situated."'149 The
plaintiff had relied upon expert testimony from doctors of the regular school of medicine in this case.
In the course of extracting eight of his patient's teeth, a dentist
injected novocain three times around each tooth. In an action brought
by the patient for ensuing osteomyelitis, an expert testified that this
type of anesthetizing of the jaw could have caused the disease of the
bone and there was other evidence that a "deep block" method of
anesthetizing was in general use which did not create such risk of
further infection from an already infected mouth. The court concluded that the failure to use the safer method or to send the patient
to a doctor who could administer it could be negligence. 150
143. In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944); Peterson

v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 84 P.2d 999 (1938).

144. 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935), 277 Mich. 429, 269 N.W. 222 (1936)
(decision on second appeal).
145. 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941).
146. 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939); cf. Hembree v. Von Keller, 189 Okla. 439,

119 P.2d 74 (1941).

147. E.g., Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609 (1942); Medlin v.
Bloom, 230 Mass. 201, 119 N.E. 773 (1918); Jordan v.Skinner, 187 Wash. 617,
60 P.2d 697 (1936).

148. 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac.282 (1920).
149. Id. at 54, 187 Pac. at 284.
150. Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co., 300 Mass. 223, 15 N.E.2d 185
(1938), 129 A.L.R. 95 (1940).
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With the exception of some of the X-ray cases, all of these decisions

appear to be based on expert medical testimony in the case itself. And
even in the X-ray cases the courts rely upon the commonly known
fact that X-ray is widely used in the diagnosis of fractures. The
Washington court in Peterson v. Hunt'51 makes this reliance upon the

professional practice clear in distinguishing an earlier decision which
had refused to permit a finding of negligence solely on the basis of
152

failure to use X-ray.
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of the change in medical tech-

niques and the problem of "keeping abreast of progress" is to be
found in the Pennsylvania case of Powell v. Risser'5 3 and later developments. There a patient, who was a manic-depressive, escaped
from a state hospital and was returned in a manic state, "violent,
threatening to run away and liable to injure himself and others,"
but otherwise in good physical condition. The doctors in charge directed nurses to administer a "wet pack" treatment consisting of
wrapping the patient's body and limbs in six or seven wet sheets,
tying two of these around his body so that he was able to move his
limbs but unable to free himself, and then immersing him in a tub
of warm (94-96' F.) water. Three such wet packs were administered
in fairly rapid succession during a 24 hour period, each administration
involving the patient being in water for approximately six hours.
Following the administration of the wet packs the patient suffered a
sixty per cent impairment of the use of his arms and hands. He
brought action against the doctors, claiming that the nature of the
wet packs and the method of administration had caused constriction
of his arms and the resulting disability. The jury brought in a
verdict against the defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed and entered judgment in favor of the doctors.
The majority said:
These wet packs differed in no way from the accepted and standard practice, not only at the Allentown State Hospital but in all other mental
institutions operated and maintained by the Commonwealth. Such treatments are the most modem and humane method yet devised for the
restraint of violent, raving and desperate patients.15 4
Mr. Justice Musmanno, dissenting, commenced his opinion with the
statement:
The assumed therapeutics administered to the plaintiff in this case read
like the chronicle of a medieval torture. This does not say that the
plaintiff's condition might not have warranted such treatment. The care
151.
152.
153.
154.

197 Wash. 255, 259, 84 P.2d 999, 1000 (1938).
Wells v. Ferry-Baker Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 658, 107 Pac. 869 (1910).
375 Pa. 60, 99 A.2d 454 (1953).
Id. at 63, 99 A.2d at 455.
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of mental patients sometimes requires the application of physical restraint
which must seem cruel and biutal to those unfamiliar with the routine
of mental institutions. However, the unnecessary or reckless use of
violent measures which steal away physical assets from one already
robbed of the treasures of a sound mind constitutes a misdeed which
humanity abhors, justice condemns, and the law should correct.155
The facts occurred in May, 1946. The court's decision was rendered
in October, 1953. Within a few years, the development of such
"tranquilizers" as chlorpromazine (Thorazine), reserpine and meprobamate (Miltown) have changed the picture of the treatment of psychiatric and psychotic patients tremendously. 156 The former two have
proved fairly effective in the control of such cases as Mr. Powell's,
and in some institutions have made the "wet pack" an obsolete form
of treatment or restraint. Quaere whether if the same case were to
occur today the court would be willing to absolve the doctors from
responsibility.
155. Id. at 69-70, 99 A.2d at 458. I should include at this point the comments of Dr. William Fleeson, Department of Psychiatry and Neurology, University of Minnesota Medical School, with regard to the Powell case and the
quoted portion of Mr. Justice Musmanno's dissenting opinion: "The wet
sheet pack is a procedure which, if properly done, does not cause disability,
either permanent or temporary, nor even discomfort. Duration of a wet
sheet pack treatment is variable-20 minutes to 7 hours with two hours an
average, see HORMER & HENDERSON, PIcNrPLs AND PRACTICE OF NURSING 484

ff. (4th ed. 1939); Kindwall & Henry, Wet Packs and Prolonged Baths, 92 A..
"Now, if the patient did indeed suffer this disaJ. PsYcIATRY 73 (1934) ....
bility of 60% impairment of the use of his hands and arms it would certainly
appear that the packs or tubs were improperly used. The issue would then be
whether or not the packs (tubs) were properly used according to the then
prevailing standards of practice" rather than whether their use at all was
proper. [This last is a point well taken.]
"Mr. Justice Musmanno, in his dissent, could be interpreted as meaning that
he personally was horrified and emotionally traumatized by his own phantasy
of the nature of the treatment. (Most people are-hence my willingness to
show our own psychiatric wards to interested visitors-there is nothing like
reality to dispel phantasy.) This leads me to speculate, as others have done
before me, on the problem of dramatizing the exotic and bizarre, fostering
emotional reaction to the feared and fearful and thus, in a way, obscuring the
issues before the court. It is an unusual person, Mr. Justice Musmanno not
excepted, who does not think to himself, 'I would feel thus and so if this
happened to me.' Most of us then find rational explanations for the feelings
we experience when confronted with such a situation. This appears to me to
be the dynamic consideration behind such statements as 'I don't want them
experimenting on me' or 'I'd never let them do that to me.'"
156. Although the testing of such drugs began earlier, the reports of clinical
evaluation of their use in the control and treatment of psychiatric and psychotic states seem to have begun to appear in 1954 and 1955. See, e.g., Barsa
& Kline, Treatment of Two Hundred Disturbed Psychotics with Reserpine, 158
J.A.M.A. 110 (1955); Borrus, Study of Effect of Miltown on Psychiatric States,
157 J.A.M.A. 1596 (1955); Elkes and Elkes, Effect of Chlorpromazine in the
Behavior of Chronically Overactive Psychotic Patients, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 560
(1954); Freund, Observations During the Treatment of 175 Psychotic Patients
with Reserpine, 29 PsycmIATRic QUARTERLY 381 (1955); Selling, Clinical Study
of New TranquilizingDrug: Use of Miltown, 157 J.A.M.A. 1594 (1955); Winkelman, Chlorpromazine in the Treatment of Neuropsychiatric Disease, 156
J.A.M.A 18 (1954); Zeller, Graffagnio, Cullen & Rietman, Use of Chlorpromazine and Reserpine in the Treatment of Emotional Disorders, 160
J.A.M.A. 179 (1956).
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It should be noted, as indicated by Mr. Rowland Long in his book,
The Physician and the Law, that in some instances a doctor may find
himself in difficulty in following too assiduously the most recent developments in medical science. 157 For example, the administration of
antibiotics for any and all ailments may prove to be dangerous and
not in accord with accepted medical practice as evidence develops
that these drugs may develop undesirable tolerances in the patient so
that their use in case of serious infection is valueless. Another example is found in Reed v. Church 58 where the defendant-physician
had given tryparsamide injections for the patient's cerebro-spinal
syphilis. Testing of the drug had disclosed that there was a danger
of ocular disturbance from its use. The patient suffered severe effects.
Although the doctor attempted to bring himself within a "recognized
minority" of physicians who did not discontinue the use of tryparsamide when visual disturbances occurred, the court said that his own
testimony that it was usual practice to do so and that he had done
so placed him outside the protection of any "doctors may differ" doctrine. In the case of the tranquilizers mentioned in connection with
Powell v. Risser,159 it was early recognized that certain "side effects"
took place which might give pause to a doctor using them in any
and all cases. Perhaps the most pronounced of these has been the
development of jaundice in cases where chlorpromazine has been used,
although the reports from the use of reserpine have also suggested
160
The possibility that
that there may be undesirable side effects.
some side effects may not appear for a considerable length of time
after the drug is administered may justify hesitancy on the part of
some doctors or the profession as a whole giving wholehearted acceptance to their complete substitution for older methods of treatment. Certainly this risk of side effects should make the courts
hesitant to insist too adamantly that doctors adopt the most recent
developments or discoveries in pharmaceuticals. The unfortunate
1
consequences of the "Cutter Laboratories Case"'' in which a number
157.

LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW

38-39 (1955).

158. 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940).
159. Supra note 156.
160. See Hodges, La Zerte, Jaundice and Agranalocytosis with Fatality Following Chlorpromazine Therapy, 158 J.A.M.A. 114 (1955); Loftus and others,
Jaundice Caused by Chlorpromazine (Thorazine), 157 J.A.M.A. 1286 (1955);
Zeller, Use of Chlorpromazine and Reserpine in the Treatment of Emotional
Disorders, 160 J.A.M.A. 179 (1956). The latter study indicates that among
patients who were treated with chlorpromazine, 9.5% developed dermatitis
and 5% developed jaundice. Reserpine seems to create more uncomfortable
subjective symptoms such as nausea, vomiting and nasal stiffness. Both drugs
apparently may cause Parkinsonism, characterized by rigidity, tremour,
akinesia and loss of spontaneous and automatic movement. The authors conclude that most of such side effects and toxic reactions are controllable by
reduction or elimination of the dosage of the drug or by use of other medication.
161. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, No. 266, 824 and Phipps v. Cutter
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of children received live virus in the early days of mass immunization
with the Salk Vaccine, suggests that keeping abreast of progress may
require some restraint. These comments lead to the next specialized
duty.
Experimentation
It is frequently reiterated in text discussions of medical negligence
that in the treatment of the patient there must be no experimentation
and that experimentation is undertaken at the doctor's peril. 162 A
closer examination of the case law however, suggests that this is
something of an over-statement.
A distinction should be drawn between "therapeutic innovation"
directed primarily to obtaining relief or cure for the ills of a particular patient, which appears to be accepted as a not uncommon practice in most medical offices, 163 and experimental research which has
been defined as "a sequence resulting from an active determination
to pursue a certain course and to record and interpret the ensuing
observations" primarily for the purpose of advancing scientific knowledge. 164 As has been pointed out in a series of recent studies, all of
the cases which purport to state the rule that a physician may not
experiment have dealt with the former situation. 165 Such decisions
deal almost entirely with the failure of the defendant to follow a
well-recognized practice or method of treatment.
In the first case, Slater v. Baker,166 decided in 1767, there is reason
to believe that experimental methods were being used in an attempt
to straighten the patient's leg. 67 Although one writer has concluded
Laboratories, No. 272, 691, (Superior Court of California for Alameda County).
In these actions brought by the children and their parents against the manufacturer of the vaccine which contained live virus, the plaintiffs have
obtained verdicts on the basis of breach of warranty of fitness rather than
negligence. At this writing, the cases are being appealed to the Supreme Court
of California.

162. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 370 (3d ed. 1956); LONG,
THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAw 304 (1955); 41 A.m. JUR. Physicians and Sur-

geons § 86 (1942); Annot., 37 L.R.A. 830, 836 (1897).

163. See Ivy, The History and Ethics of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Experiments, 108 SCIENCE 1 (1948); Shimkin, The Problem of Experi-

mentation on Human Beings: The Research Worker's Point of View, 117
SCIENCE 205 (1953).
164. Shimkin, note 163 supra at 205. See also Ladimer, Ethical and Legal
Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J. PuB. L. 467, 482-86 (1954).
165. Beecher, Experimentation on Man, 169 J.A.M.A. 461, 470-71 (1959);

Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings,
3 J. PuB. L. 467, 476-79 (1954); Note, Torts: Physicians and Surgeons: Malpractice: Liability for Medical Experimentation,40 CALIF. L. REV. 159 (1952).

166. 2 Wils. 359, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
167. The court in granting judgment for the plaintiff said: 'When we consider the good character of Baker [the surgeon defendant], we cannot well
conceive why he acted in the manner he did; but many men very skilful in
their profession have frequently acted out of the common way for the sake
of trying experiments .... It seems as if Mr. Baker wanted to try an experiment with this new instrument .... For anything that appears to the court,
this was the first experiment made with this new instrument. ..."
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that since that case there have been no other appellate cases which
really involved experimentation, 168 at least a few of the cases involve
innovations in treatment or use of techniques which are somewhat
out of the ordinary. 169 Of course, some cases involve mere quack
cures, 170 or misdiagnosis, 1' 1 or a failure to exercise proper care in the
treatment of the patient, 17 2 rather than real experimental methods.
It is significant that in none of the cases has the doctor himself asserted that he was engaging in either experimental or innovational
techniques, probably because of the early statements of the courts in
England and America indicating that such activity would be treated
17 3
as per se negligence.
Some of the language used in the leading case of Carpenter v.
Blake,17 4 suggests that the "experiment" test is really nothing more
than the general standard of care in terms of practice of a reputable
practitioner in the community:
168. Note, 40 CAIF. L. REV. 159, 162 (1952).

169. E.g., Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934) (extraction of
all teeth from upper jaw and removal of tonsils at same time, a procedure
which had been successfully performed in several other cases); Baldor v.
Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1955) (injections of glyocylide for skin cancer
seems to have had limited acceptance; verdict and judgment for patient
affirmed on ground of failure to discontinue treatment when it proved inadequate); Miller v. Toles, 183 Mich. 252, 150 N.W. 118 (1914) (use of "Murphy
Treatment" rather than amputation of foot); Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo.
App. 213, 281 S.W. 682 (1926) (insertion of speculum and injection of caustic
fluid for treatment of mild case of piles, admitted by expert to be known to
medical profession but not practiced by regular school of medicine); McClarin
v. Grenzfelder, 147 Mo. App. 478, 126 S.W. 817 (1910) (injection of paraffin
into groin or muscle over hernia, which was claimed to have caused peritonitis,
had been undertaken by defendant in "hundreds of cases" and had been successfully used in Chicago, Cincinnati and Vienna by other physicians and was
subsequently used by others in St. Louis area); Sawdey v. Spokane Falls &
N. Ry., 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 (1902) (use of long splint rather than extension and counter-extension, which had proved successful in some cases and
according to one witness was approved by some authority, not treated by court
as sufficient to justify disregarding usual procedure).
170. Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932) (self-perfected
"radio-treatment" for osteomyelitis); Graham v. Dr. Pratt Institute, 163 Ill.
App. 91 (1911) (Use of carbolic acid to remove smallpox scars); Board of
Medical Registration and Examination of Indiana v. Kaadt, 225 Ind. 625, 76
N.E.2d 669 (1948) (use of concoction of vinegar, potassium nitrate, pepsin and
takadiastse, taken orally, together with sugar-heavy diet for treatment of
diabetes).
171. Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932); Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577 (1895); Hodgson v. Bigelow, 235 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d
338 (1939); cf. Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 66 P.2d 808 (1937) (claim
of mis-diagnosis of pending miscarriage as placenta previa, for which caesarean operation was performed).
172. E.g., Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Cal. App. 175, 290 Pac. 80 (1930)
(injection of alcohol mixed with novocaine into nasal channel in treatment
of asthma caused blindness when recognized practice of injecting novocaine
first would have prevented injury to optic nerve); Carpenter v. Blake, 60
Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871) (failure to give proper directions to patient as
to care of elbow set and left outside of cast or sling); Davis v. Wilmerding,
222 N.C. 639, 24 S.E.2d 337 (1943) (removal of arm from splints and cast and
massage resulted in crooked arm); Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924
(1902) (scraping of infected uterus under unsanitary conditions).
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If the case is a new one, the patient must trust to the skill and experience
of the surgeon he calls; so must he if the injury or disease is attended
with injury to other parts, or other diseases have developed themselves,
for which there is no established mode of treatment. But when the case
is one as to which a system of treatment has been followed for a long
time, there should be no departure from it, unless the surgeon who does it
is prepared to take the risk of establishing, by his success, the propriety
and safety of his experiment.
The rule protects the community against reckless experiments, while it
admits the adoption of new remedies and modes of treatment only when
their benefits have been demonstrated, or when, from the necessity of the
case, the surgeon or physician must be left to the exercise of his own
skill and experience.175
Later opinions have suggested that even where there is an established mode of treatment, the physician may be permitted to innovate
somewhat if he can establish that in his best judgment this was for
the benefit of the patient and where the established modes have
proved unsuccessfu1.7 6 There appears to be some question as to
whether the patient's condition must be such that death is almost
inevitable 1 77 or whether innovation may be permitted where it would
avoid serious consequences short of death.'7 8 In one case, involving
disciplinary action by the state medical grievance committee rather
than an action by a patient, the court indicated that acknowledged
experimentation with the patient's consent is at least not grounds
for discipline. 1 9 Whether, if unsuccessful it would be a ground for
civil action is not clear.
173. See Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. 359, 362, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 863 (K.B. 1767):
"If it was (the first experiment made with a new instrument), it was a rash
action, and he who acts rashly acts ignorantly ... in this particular case they
have acted ignorantly and unskillfully, contrary to the known rule and usage
of surgeons"; Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 514, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871): "[I]t
is incumbent on surgeons called to treat such an injury, to conform to the
system of treatment thus established; and if they depart from it, they do
it at their peril." Id. at 518: "It is said in Slater v. Baker (supra,) that it is
ignorance and unskillfulness to do contrary to the rule of the profession."
174. 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696
(1872).
175. Id. at 523-24.
176. See Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 540, 39 Pac. 577, 580 (1895):
"[Ilf the physician sees fit to experiment with some other mode, he should
do so at his peril. In other words, he must be able, in the case of deleterious
results, to satisfy the jury that he had reason for the faith that was in him
and to justify his experiment by some reasonable theory." Allen v. Voje, 114
Wis. 1, 22, 89 N.W. 924, 932 (1902): "Nor do we believe that a physician of
standing and loyalty to his patients will subject them to mere experiment,
the safety or virtue of which has not been established by experience in the
profession, save possibly when the patient is in extremis, and fatal results
substantially certain unless the experiment may succeed."
177. Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924 (1902).
178. See Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577 (1895); Baldor v.
Rodgers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1955) ; 40 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 163 (1952).

179. See Stammer v. Board of Regents, 262 App. Div. 372, 29 N.Y.S.2d 38
(3d Dep't 1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 359, 39 N.E.2d 913 (1942) in which a "cancer
cure" proved successful. Compare Baldor v. Rodgers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1955)
where somewhat similar cure was not successful.
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Many of these decisions appear to disregard the fact that there is
no "standard patient" to whom recognized practices can be applied.
Each patient may present a new and novel problem to the doctor.
A realistic view of the physician's practice would seem to call for
some innovation to fit the peculiar circumstances of each case. With
this in mind, it is suggested that the "experiment" cases are merely
a reflection of the general rule that where the defendant has deviated
from the practice which a reasonable member of his profession would
follow under the same circumstances or has undertaken a form of
treatment which the reasonable member of the profession would not
willingly undertake, he may be held liable for harm caused thereby
to the patient.
The only example of judicial consideration of experimental research, as contrasted with therapeutic innovation, appears to be
the "Medical Case" of the Nurenberg War Crimes Trials, in which
some seven officials of the German Reich were sentenced to death
and nine others imprisoned for periods ranging from ten years to life
for their experimentation on human beings. 180 The judgment of the
court contains ten precepts for "permissible medical experiments."' 8'
180.

United States v. Brandt,

1 & 2

TRIALS

OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE

NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1947).
181. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIIViNALs BEFORE THE NURENBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

181-82 (1947): "The great weight of the evidence before us is to the effect

that certain types of medical experiments on human beings, when kept within
reasonably well-defined bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical profession generally. The protagonists of the practice of human experimentation
justify their views on the basis that such experiments yield results for the
good of society that are unprocurable by other methods or means of study.
All agree, however, that certain basic principles must be observed in order
to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts:
"I. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
"This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter
involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.
This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the
nature, duration and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be
expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come
from his participation in the experiment.
"The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engaged in the experiment.
It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another
with impunity.
"2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good
of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random
and unnecessary in nature.
". The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or
other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
"4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
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These have been expanded and somewhat modified by other authorities 182 including the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association. 18 3 But there appears to be unanimous approval of the proposition that experimentation on humans, where conducted by reputable
and qualified investigators who have obtained understanding and
enlightened consent from the subjects and have taken adequate precautions against risk of serious injury, disability or death, is not improper medical practice. Of course, within the area of permitted experimentation there is room for negligent conduct on the part of
the investigator, but it is almost certain that the courts will treat the
consent of the subject as limited to careful conduct of experimental
research. In the Medical Case of the Nurenberg War Crimes Trials
there is no question that the conduct of the experiments was at least
negligent, if indeed not wilful misconduct. 184 But here, as in the
"5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to
believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those
experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
"6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
"7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury,

disability or death.
"8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified per-

sons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all
stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
"9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or
mental state where the continuation of the experiment seems to him to be
impossible.
"10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause
to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result
in injury, disability or death to the experimental subject."
182. See, e.g., Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169 J.A.M.A. 461, (1959);
Ivy, The History and Ethics of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Experiments, 108 SCIENCE 1 (1948); Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical
Research on Human Beings, 3 J. PuB. LAW 467, (1954); Wiggers, Human Experimentationas Exemplified by the Careerof Dr. William Beaumont, ALUMNI
BULLETIn School of Medicine, Western Reserve University 60 (1950). Dr.
Beecher is particularly troubled by some of the problems of "understanding
and enlightened consent" as required by the Nurenberg principles, as well
as the difficulty of determining what are "fruitful results for the good of
society" and the apparent rejection of random experiment as a permissible

practice even though some substantial medical advancement has occurred

through such experiments.
183. Supplementary Report of the Judicial Council of the American Medical
Association, 132 J.A.M.A. 1090 (1946). See also Ethics Governing the Service
of Prisonersas Subjects in Medical Experiments, 136 J.A.M.A. 457 (1948).
184. As the Judgment of the Tribunal sums up the case: 'We find from
the evidence that in the medical experiments which have been proved, these
ten principles [see note 181 supra] were much more frequently honored in
their breach than in their observance. Many of the concentration camps'
inmates who were the victims of these atrocities were citizens of countries
other than the German Reich. They were non-German nationals, including
Jews and 'asocial persons' both prisoners of war and civilians, who had been
imprisoned and forced to submit to these tortures and barbarities without so
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therapeutic innovation cases, the courts appropriately should apply
the standards of the medical profession itself in determining whether
liability should exist for injuries suffered by the subject of the experimental research.
Duty to Inform or Disclose Facts
The courts frequently state that the relation between the physician
and his patient is a fiduciary one and therefore the physician has an
obligation to make a full and frank disclosure to the patient of all
pertinent facts related to his illness. The obligation of disclosure
appears to be of significance in three somewhat different contexts:
in avoiding the statute of limitations, in connection with claims of
unauthorized treatment, and as a basis for liability itself.
The first situation arises where the patient attempts to assert a claim
for malpractice which occurred and caused injury far enough in the
past so that the statute of limitations may have run prior to the
commencement of any action. In such a situation some courts have
adopted a sympathetic attitude toward the patient as opposed to the
knowledgeable doctor and have treated the failure of the doctor to
disclose the existence of a cause of action or his own negligence as
"fraudulent concealment" which will toll the statute.185 A number of
the courts have indicated that in order to so toll the statute the patient
must establish actual knowledge on the part of the physician of the
fact of a wrong done to the patient' 86 and some affirmative act of
much as a semblance of trial. In every single instance appearing in the record,
subjects were used who did not consent to the experiments; indeed, as to some
of the experiments, it is not even contended by the defendants that the subjects occupied the status of volunteers. In no case was the experimental
subject at liberty of his own free choice to withdraw from any experiment.
In many cases experiments were performed by unqualified persons; were conducted at random for no adequate scientific reason, and under revolting physical conditions. All of the experiments were conducted with unnecessary
suffering and injury and but very little, if any precautions were taken to
protect or safeguard the human subjects from the possibilities of injury,
disability or death. In every one of the experiments, the subjects experienced
extreme pain or torture, and in most of them they suffered permanent injury, mutilation or death, either as a direct result of the experiments or
because of lack of adequate follow-up care." 2 TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 183 (1947).

185. E.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1949); Stafford v.
Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 25 Cal. 2d
226, 153 P.2d 325 (1949); Groendal v. Westrade, 171 Mich. 92, 137 N.W. 87
(1912); Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931); Moses v.
Miller, 202 Okla. 605, 216 P.2d 979 (1950); Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70,
45 S.W.2d 1072 (1932). Contra, Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475
(1936) (assuring plaintiff that radium beads inserted in body for treatment of
cancer had been removed); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.
Supp. 529 (1930) (defendant knew that he had left forceps in plaintiff's
abdominal cavity); McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935)
(assurances for four years that X-ray burns were superficial and would
soon pass away).
186. E.g., Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940); Hudson v. Moore,
239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940); Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452,
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concealment or misrepresentation. 187 The cases most frequently involve the negligent act of leaving foreign objects in the patient's body,
although some do arise in the situation where the doctor has assured
the patient of a cure which has not been accomplished or where the
doctor has failed to disclose a worsening of the patient's condition.
These are to be distinguished from other cases in which the statute
is tolled during the period of treatment on the theory that the doctor
has a continuing duty to diagnose the patient's infirmity and to
render reasonable treatment therefor, so that his failure to do so may
constitute a continuing negligence. 188 In all of these cases the failure
to disclose is not itself being held actionable but merely precludes
the doctor from asserting that the statute has run prior to the date
on which the patient acquires knowledge of his injury and the negligent acts which led to it. In a few cases the courts have said that
even where the patient knows of injuries, the confidential relationship
and reliance upon the assurances of the physician as to proper care
may excuse the patient from further inquiry into why the injury
occurs or why a cure is not accomplished. 189 It does not appear that
the confidential relation of doctor and patient is being strained too
far when the courts decide that a doctor who should realize something is amiss but fails to inform the patient cannot complain of the
patient's delay in bringing action.
In the second type of situation, the physician or surgeon is charged
with treating the patient without consent on the ground that the
patient was not fully informed of the nature of the treatment or its
consequences and therefore any "consent" obtained was ineffective.
In Paulsen v. Gundersen'90 the plaintiff was having trouble with his
ear and placed himself under the doctor's care. The doctor informed
his patient that an operation would be necessary, but in response to
the plaintiff's inquiry said that it was "a 'simple' mastoid operation
unaccompanied by any danger." In fact a "radical"'19 operation was
97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 104 (1934);

Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (1942).
187. E.g., Pickett v. Aglinski, supra note 186; De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich.
293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Carrell v. Denton, supra note 186.
188. E.g., Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936); De Haan
v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354,
236 N.W. 622 (1931); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902);
Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 123 N.E. 238 (1919). Contra, Conklin v.
Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1930), af'd, 254 N.Y. 620, 173

N.E. 892 (1930); McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935).
189. E.g., Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Wohlgemuth

v. Meyer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (1956); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d

791 (Ky. 1952).

190. 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).

191. Used in the medical sense of going to the root of illness by removal of
diseased portions of the body or extensive surgery as contracted with "conservative" treatment which attempts to save the diseased organ. Both are
accepted modes of treatment.
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performed in the course of which a facial nerve was severed and the
plaintiff not only lost the hearing in one ear but also suffered paralysis
of the left side of his face. The court indicated that failure to disclose
fully the nature of the treatment might vitiate the consent. Similarly,
in Wall v. Brim,192 what was described as a simple operation to remove
a cyst turned out to be a major operation resulting in partial paralysis
of the patient's face.
In Waynick v. Reardon 93 plaintiff suffered from some occlusive vascular or peripheral vascular disease, not clearly diagnosed. The
physician recommended a lumbar sympathectomy which was described as "a minor or simple operation requiring only a small incision
in his back and a clipping of a nerve, which operation would necessitate his being in the operating room only 40 to 45 minutes." Instead
an eight-inch incision was made in his torso and an operation performed which, due to complications, threatening the patient's life,
lasted for over seven hours and ultimately resulted in the loss of
both legs, hospitalization for a period of over four months and morphine habituation. The court indicates that the operation performed
may have been unauthorized.
In Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp.,194 the patient went to a urologist
because of bladder trouble and apparently consented to a cystoscopic
examination and some form of operation (although the exact extent
of consent is not clear). He was not informed that part of the
procedure of a prostate resection (the standard operation for the
correction of the plaintiff's difficulty) would be the tying off of
his sperm ducts. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plaintiff might recover for the sterile condition alleged to have resulted
from this operation, saying:
While we have no desire to hamper the medical profession in the outstanding progress it has made and continues to make in connection with
the study and solution of health and disease problems, it is our opinion
that a reasonable rule is that, where a physician and surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative solutions and no immediate
emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative possibilities and given a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the
operation. By that we mean that, in a situation such as the case before
us where no immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed
before the operation that if his spermatic cords were severed it would
result in his sterilization, but on the other hand if this were not done there
would be a possibility of an infection which could result in serious consequences. Under such conditions the patient would at least have the
opportunity of deciding whether he wanted to take the chance of a possible infection if the operation was performed in one manner or to become
sterile if performed in another.195
192. 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
193. 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952).
194. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
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In Corn v. French,196 the patient executed a written consent to the
performance of a "mastectomy" (removal of the breast) without
knowing the meaning of the term, although she claimed that subsequently she informed the doctor that she did not wish her breast
removed. After the performance of a radical mastectomy, the doctor
discovered that the patient was not suffering from carcinoma of the
breast, as he had believed on the basis of visual examination, palpation and her medical history. In an action for unauthorized treatment, the court indicated some doubt as to the right of the patient to
repudiate a written consent after the operation as distinguished from
withdrawal of consent based on later statements to the doctor. Even
in the absence of withdrawal of consent, it may be questioned whether the patient is not entitled to an explanation of the consequences
of the operation in terms understandable by the layman.197
On the other hand, in Hunt v. Bradshaw,198 the doctor had assured
the patient that an operation to remove a small piece of steel which
was imbedded in his neck would be "very simple." The court indicated that the evidence was such that the jury might conclude that
the operation was of a very serious nature. With regard to the disclosure by the doctor, the court said:
It is understandable that the surgeon wanted to reassure the patient so
that he would not go to the operating room unduly apprehensive. Failure
to explain the risk involved, therefore, may be considered a mistake on
the part of the surgeon, but under the facts cannot be deemed such want
of ordinary care as to import liability.199

In Kinney v. Lockwood 2° ° the patient claimed that the doctors had
undertaken to perform a simple operation for Dupuytren's contracture and had stated that her hand would be all right in three days,
whereas the operation was in fact serious, precarious and dangerous,
and in a large number of cases had proved unsuccessful and caused
serious permanent injury, and in fact did so in this case. The Ontario
trial judge concluded that it was the duty of the defendant doctors to
"enlighten the patient's mind in a plain and reasonable way as to
what her ailment was, as to what were the risks of operating promptly,
195. Id. at 434, 88 N.W.2d at 190. In the second trial of the case the jury
entered a verdict for the defendant-urologist. There appears to have been some
evidence introduced by defendant to the effect that the trans-uretheral resection to which the patient had consented would itself have resulted in sterility,
or that the patient's condition would have caused sterility in any event.
196. 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
197. See also Theodore v. Ellis, 141 La. 709, 75 So. 655 (1917) (failure to
fully explain operation and necessity therefor); Hunter v. Burroughs, 123
Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918) (failure to warn patient of risk of X-ray treatment

for eczema).

198. 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
199. Id. at 523, 88 S.E.2d at 766.
200. (1931) Ont. Rep. 438, (1931) 4 D.L.R. 906 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
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what were the risks of delaying the operation, and what were the
risks of not operating at all,"'201 and found for the plaintiff. On appeal
the judgment was reversed,20 2 the appellate court saying that there
was some testimony that the doctors had explained all details to the
plaintiff, although the extracts contained in the opinions indicate that
the doctor admitted to having said that the operation was not a very
serious one and that he had not clearly presented the alternatives
to the plaintiff. One judge on the court of appeals concluded:
The relationship between the defendant Stoddart and the plaintiff was
that of surgeon and patient, and as such the duty cast upon the surgeon
was to deal honestly with the patient as to the necessity, character and
importance of the operation and its probable consequences and whether
success might reasonably be expected to ameliorate or remove the trouble,
but that such duty does not extend to warning the patient of the dangers
incident to, or possible in any operation, nor to details calculated to
frighten or distress the patient. 203
and another said:
To fasten on a physician or surgeon the obligation to discuss with his
patient the possibilities and probabilities of an operation (without any
request by the patient) in order that the patient might make an election
as to when the operation shall take place, simply because of the
fiduciary and confidential relationship existing between a patient and
20 4
her surgeon or physician, is to my mind unwarranted.
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that where the
physician or surgeon has affirmatively misrepresented the nature of
the operation or has failed to point out the probable consequences
of a course of treatment, he may be subjected to a claim of unauthorized treatment. But this does not mean that a doctor is under
an obligation to describe in great detail all of the possible consequences of treatment. Indeed, it might be argued that to make a

complete disclosure of all facts, diagnoses and alternatives or possibilities which may occur to the doctor could so unduly alarm the patient
that it would constitute bad medical practice. This is suggested by
the results of two recent cases, Ferrarav. Gulluchio=5 and Furniss v.
Fitchett,2 6 decided respectively in New York and New Zealand during the past year, in which disclosure by a doctor of the facts known
to him and of future possibilities gave rise to severe reactions on
201. Id. at 442, (1931) 4 D.L.R. at 907.

202. Sub. nom. Kenney v. Lockwood, (1932) Ont. Rep. 141, (1932) 1 D.L.R.
507 (Ct. App.).

203. Id. at 160-61, (1932) 1 D.L.R. at 525.
204. Id. at 167, (1932) 1 D.L.R. at 528.
205. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958), 23 ALBANY L. REV. 191 (1959), 33 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 163 (1958), 45 VA. L. REV. 127 (1959), and discussed infra at
p. 596.
206. [1958] N.Z.L.R. 398, discussed in detail in Fleming, Developments in
the English Law of Medical Liability,infra pp. 633, 643.
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the part of the patient. The "golden mean" between the two extremes
of absolute silence and exhaustive discussion is well described by the
California District Court of Appeal in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr.
Univ. Board of Trustees.207 There the plaintiff suffered from paraplegia alleged to have resulted from performance of an aortography
procedure involving injection of radio-opaque substance into the
aorta. Plaintiff claimed that he had not been informed as to
the nature of the procedure; the doctors contradicted this, although
admitting that the details of the procedure and possible dangers had
not been explained. The trial court gave a broad instruction to the
effect that the doctor owed a duty to disclose "all the facts which
mutually affect his rights and interests and of surgical risk, hazard
and danger, if any." On appeal, the instruction was held to be overly
broad:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis
of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure
or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time
the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and
this very fact places him in a position in which he must sometimes choose
between two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the
patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no
matter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is
already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake
surgery in which these is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in
actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological result of the
apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents
a separate problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition
is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing
the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed
consistent with the full disclosure necessary for an informed consent.
The instruction given should be modified to inform the jury that the
physician has such discretion consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent. 208

Again the claim of the patient is not strictly in terms of a breach

of duty to disclose since in these cases unauthorized treatment is dealt
with as the civil wrong. But the effect is to compel disclosure in
order to assure that consent is obtained. The cases last discussed
indicate that the duty to disclose may be limited to those disclosures
which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same
or similar circumstances, possibly with a presumption on the part of
the courts that disclosures will be made where the consequences are
serious and substantially certain to occur.
207. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
208. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
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A third class of cases involve claims somewhat more directly based
on the failure to disclose facts to the patient. In Stafford v. Shultz20 9
a succession of doctors had undertaken to treat or care for plaintiff's
wounded leg and according to his allegations each had failed to repair
or restore a damaged artery and severed nerve while assuring him
that such repair or restoration were not necessary to effect a cure.
The court indicates that plaintiff has a cause of action for the loss
of his leg due to the damages not repaired over a period of time. In
Taylor v. Milton,210 the Michigan court affirmed a verdict for the
plaintiff on the issue of whether the defendant doctor had concealed
the fact that, during treatment for urinary difficulties, a filiform had
been passed into the patient's urethra and broken off and that the
broken piece lodged in the bladder. In Kelly v. Carroll21 ' and Baldor
v. Rodgers21 2 the courts indicate that the practitioner has an obligation to disclose to his patient the fact that treatment which he has
undertaken is not effective or will not be effective in the cure of
the patient's condition. In the former case the practitioner was a
drugless healer who undertook to deal with a case of acute appendicitis, which the court found to be beyond the range of his competence;
in the latter the doctor had undertaken a somewhat unusual treatment for cancer and over a period of time should have discovered
that this treatment was not in fact effective, but detrimental.2 1 3 On
214
where the patient claimed that
the other hand, in Cady v. Fraser,
the doctor had failed to inform her that a broken and unhealed bone
was in need of further treatment, the court said that since there was
evidence that in fact gristle had formed between the ends of the bone
and held them in position and there was no evidence that further
treatment was required, the failure to inform the plantiff fully as to
the condition of the bone was not actionable. In all of these cases the
failure to disclose is interrelated to other negligent treatment.
A somewhat different situation is presented where the doctor discovers a condition which may require further treatment or a variation in the patient's way of life and fails to disclose this. In Aberson
v. City of New York2 15 and Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp.216 a
209. 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954).
210. 353 Mich. 421, 92 N.W.2d 57 (1958).

211. 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79 (1950).
212. 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1955).

213. See also Lewis v. Dwinell, 84 Me. 497, 24 Atl. 945 (1892) (failure to
discover ruptured perineum or concealment); Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338,
294 N.W. 183 (1940) (failure to disclose that bones were misaligned or to
urge specialist be consulted); cf. Benson v. Dean, 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125
(1921) (failure to disclose presence of broken surgical needle not to be actionable).
214. 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
215. 205 Misc. 727, 132 N.Y.S.2d 357 (City Ct. 1954).
216. 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939).
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discovery of mistake in diagnosis of fracture on the basis of X-rays imposed upon the doctor an obligation to disclose, although there is no
suggestion of prior negligence in diagnosis. In Union Carbon & Carbide Corp. v. Stapleton217 the plaintiff was an employee who received
periodic examinations and chest X-rays in the medical department
of his employer. Over a period of eight years some fourteen such
X-rays were taken, all of which indicated that the worker suffered
from an arrested case of pulmonary tuberculosis without significant
change. The company doctors and the company did not notify the
worker of this fact. The worker did not consult any other doctors
during this period. When the tubercular condition became worse
and the worker suffered total incapacity, he brought action. The
court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, saying that the company (and its physicians) had a duty to give warning to the
worker of the condition. More recently, in Maertins v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.218 the patient had consulted an internist specializing in
the field of cardiology concerning a heart murmur. X-ray films were
taken as part of the diagnosis. The radiologist reported to the internist that there was an area of infiltration of the left lung and suggested
that plaintiff be evaluated for possible lung disease. Although treatment by the internist extended over a period of a year and other
X-rays were taken which indicated that the infiltration had almost
completely cleared, the patient was never informed of this condition.
Later the patient developed a cough and temperature and was referred
to a specialist in lung disease, who diagnosed a moderately advanced
case of tuberculosis. At the trial of the resulting malpractice action,
one specialist testified that he could not answer for certain whether
the plaintiff-patient had had tuberculosis a year before diagnosis, but
that he would be suspicious of it from the films presented in evidence,
although it was a minimal case. Another doctor testified that where
there was any infiltration of the mid-lung area discovered it was
standard medical practice to make every effort to establish a diagnosis
including a full history of contacts with tuberculosis, complete physical examination and whatever laboratory work was necessary. The
appellate court reversed a jury verdict and judgment for the defendant saying that there was no presumption of proper care on the
facts.
In Brown v. Scullin Steel Co.,219 on the other hand, failure to disclose information discovered in a medical examination for employment purposes was not held actionable. The employee had originally
been examined on his employment in 1943, at which time the company
217. 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956).
218. 328 P.2d 494 (Cal. App. 1958).
219. 364 Mo. 225, 260 S.W.2d 513 (1953).
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doctor discovered a heart murmur or whistle which indicated some
lesion in the heart. The doctor, relying on his past experience with
men having similar lesions, who had done regular work, approved
the worker for heavy labor involving lifting and carrying weights of
25 to 175 pounds. The doctor claimed he had told the worker of the
murmur, but the worker denied this. There were further examinations in 1946 and 1947 and 1948. In August, 1948, the worker went
to the company medical department claiming he had "busted his
heart" in a fall, and after examination the doctor told the worker
merely to take a few days off and to take it easy, but failed to mention the heart murmur. Later it was discovered that the worker had
cardio-vascular syphilis and he became unable to work. The trial
court dismissed the worker's action against his former employer.
This was affirmed on appeal, the appellate court saying that although
the doctor may have been wrong, there would be no liability in the
absence of further proof that he did not possess the requisite skill or
that he failed to use this skill and knowledge in arriving at his conclusion or that the conclusion was not based upon nor in accord with
recognized medical theory. In short, the duty to disclose was framed
in terms of the performance of a reasonable and prudent practitioner
under the circumstances rather than in the form of an absolute duty.
Failure to give a patient proper instructions as to his own care
has been treated as actionable.220 In Newman v. Anderson,221 the doctor applied an ointment to the patient's body. The ointment caused
irritation and burning for which the patient sought to recover. Both
defendant and another doctor testified to the practice among physicians in the locality of washing off the ointment if it produced irritation, but there was no evidence that any instruction to this effect was
given to the patient or his family. The court stated that the doctor
had an obligation to give such instructions and reversed judgment
for the defendant following a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Similarly,
giving a patient six 1/h grain Nembutal capsules with directions to
take "one when necessary for pain" without warning as to the possible
effect upon the patient's mental and physical faculties, may result in
liability where the patient takes several capsules and then drives
off the road.22 Also a failure to warn the family or attendants or
220. E.g., Beck v. The German Klinik, 78 Iowa 696, 43 N.W. 617 (1889)

(failure to give proper instructions on discharge of fracture case from hospital); Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898) (failure to give
proper instructions to patient with broken kneepan); Everts v. Worrell, 58
Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043 (1921) (failure to inform patient that he was suffering
from syphilis); Miles v. Hoffman, 127 Wash. 653, 221 Pac. 316 (1923) (failure
to give careful instructions to lay persons nursing and attending patient after
serious wound).
221. 195 Wis. 200, 216 N.W. 306 (1928).
222. See Whitfield v. Daniel Construction Co., 226 S.C. 37, 83 S.E.2d 460
(1954).
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third persons of the dangers resulting from contact with the patient
223
may give rise to liability.
24
In Corn v. French, where the defendant performed a radical
mastectomy after diagnosis of malignancy based on physical examination and palpation but without a biopsy or pathological examination
of tissues, the court indicated that the jury might be justified in concluding that the doctor was negligent in failing to disclose to his patient the fact that no local pathologist was available but that a
biopsy and pathological examination could be obtained at cities within
a few hours airplane trip from Las Vegas. On a second trial, the
plaintiff requested an instruction "that the jury must find for plaintiff if there was no emergency and no explanation was given as to
why a specimen could not have been sent to an outside pathologist
or the plaintiff referred to another city for treatment where these
services were available or why she was not advised of Clark County's
lack of such facilities and the availability of these facilities in some
other city that could readily be reached by air transportation." The
request was refused and the jury brought in a verdict for the doctor.
On appeal, the Nevada court indicated that while its original opinion
had been that the evidence raised issues requiring a jury determination, it was not held there that such evidence would compel a finding
for the plaintiff.225 The trial court had given instructions that the
doctor might be held liable if he failed to follow standard practice
in the community, which the appellate court indicated was the sole
legal standard applicable, expert evidence of any standard of practice
being negative.
Thirteen years ago, in a pair of articles in the Tennessee Law Review, 226 Drs. Charles C. Lund and Hubert Winston Smith discussed
at some length the physician's obligation to disclose to his patient
"the whole truth" concerning the patient's illness and the possibility
of a "therapeutic privilege" of the physician to withhold some facts.
Their respective conclusions were that while the doctor is bound to
do whatever is best for the patient,
223. Jones v. Stanko, 228 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928) (failure to warn
neighbors that patient suffered from smallpox, so that neighbors caring for
him contracted it); cf. Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921)
(failure to give notice to family of typhoid fever not shown to have caused
harm); Bullock v. Parkchester General Hospital, 3 App. Div. 2d 254, 160
N.Y.S.2d 117 (1st Dep't 1957) (failure to warn nurse of psychotic condition
of patient not sufficient where doctor had no knowledge of aggressive tendencies when patient assaulted nurse).
224. 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955). The consent issue in this case is noted
above at p. 589.
225. 331 P.2d 850 (Nev. 1958).
226. Lund, The Doctor, The Patient and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. REv. 334

(1946); Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Pa-

tient Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349 (1946).
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In discussing his patient's condition, the doctor realizes that there are
some circumstances where he cannot, for the patient's own good, tell him
2 27
the "whole truth."

and
The writer [Dr. Smith] believes that, in general, no medical privilege
should be recognized to withhold the diagnosis in ordinary cases where
the usual patient would feel entitled to have the information as a basis
for charting his course and there being no apparent grounds for supposing
that a disclosure of the truth would engender in the patient reactions
dangerous to his health or life .....
...
. The writer strongly believes that the physician should be recognized to have a therapeutic privilege to withhold part or all of the facts
regarding a dread illness, when he has reason to believe that communicating them freely to the patient will involve risks of causing his death
or serious impairment of his health without any countervailing gain. It
is suggested that this should be in the nature of an imperfect privilege,
to be passed upon by the presiding judge in the light of evidence adduced
in the particular case.=

It should be noted that neither doctor was urging any right to

withhold information which the patient should know for purposes of
future treatment and that both assumed that the doctor could and
would be held responsible for negligence in diagnosis and/or con-

cealment of essential facts resulting in a worsening of the patient's
condition.22 9 What is indicated is that the obligation to disclose infor-

mation should not be an absolute one but should be qualified in
terms of reasonable medical practice. This is a point made in an
early Massachusetts case in which the court said:
Upon the question whether it be good medical practice to withhold from
a patient in a particular emergency, or under given or supposed circumstances, a knowledge of the extent and danger of his disease, the testimony of educated and experienced medical practitioners is material and
peculiarly appropriate. 0

I am unaware of any American case similar to the recent New
2 31 in which the doctor's disZealand decision in Furniss v. Fitchett,
closure to the patient's husband of her mental condition was held to
be actionable when the patient learned of it and suffered a severe
232
reaction. A related situation has arisen in Ferrara v. Galluchio,

227. Lund, supra note 226 at 348.
228. Smith, supranote 226 at 350-51.
229. See also FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 60-61 (1954) and symposium

review, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157 (1956) in which the moral obligation of the
doctor to tell his patient "the truth" is recognized by all but imposition of
any legal liability for breach of this moral obligation is found to be doubtful.
230. Twombly v. Leach, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 397, 405-06 (1853).

231. (1958) N.Y. L. REV. 398, discussed in detail in

FLEMING, DEVELOPMENTS

12-16.
232. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958); 23 ALBANY L. REV. 191 (1959); 33
ST. JOHN'S L. RzV. 163 (1958); 45 VA. L. REV. 127 (1959).
IN THE ENGLISH LAW OF MEDICAL LIABILITY
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where the patient developed a "cancerphobia" following disclosure by
a dermatologist that X-ray burns negligently caused by the defendants
might result in cancer. The court's decision that the cancerphobia
might be a basis of action against the doctors who negligently caused
the X-ray burn of which this was a proximate consequence, is not
without precedent.23 3 Certainly the informing doctor should not be
treated as negligent in giving the information since it was necessary
to alert the patient to the importance of periodic checkups. However,
the two cases raise the interesting question of whether a doctor, with
reason to know that the patient's reaction to disclosure of medical
facts is likely to be severe, might not be held liable for disclosure
which was not so essential to further treatment. Certainly the determination of when disclosure is necessary and when it is dangerous
should be considered in the light of medical knowledge and probably
should be governed by the standards of acceptable medical practice
rather than by any absolute obligation imposed by the courts or jury
in the absence of expert testimony.
Duty to Refer to Specialist
The possibility of formulating a specific standard or duty on the
part of a general practitioner or non-specialist to refer a patient to a
specialist has already been raised by cases discussed above.23 4 Each
of these indicates that while the defendant may have an obligation to
refer the patient when the situation is beyond his capacity or requires knowledge and skill of a character which he does not possess,
the precise point at which this duty arises is to be defined by the
medical profession itself. It may be assumed, however, that if the
average general practitioner were to undertake brain surgery, or
open heart surgery, in the present state of the medical profession the
court would not hesitate to say that this went so far beyond normal
practice of the profession as not to require precise medical expert
testimony. In one case,23 5 a third year resident in surgery (already a
licensed M.D.) undertook to perform an apparently delicate operation
involving cutting of the sympathetic nerve controlling the muscles
around blood vessels in the patient's leg. The diagnosis of the patient's
difficulty was apparently uncertain, ranging from Buerger's disease
233. Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143 (1921)
(patient suffering from malignant disease requiring surgery recovered for
emotional distress resulting from physician's disclosure that such surgery
would not be advisable because of the damage done to her heart through the
defendant's negligence).
234. See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Simone v. Sabo,
37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3
(1949); Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940); Derr v. Bonney,
38 Wash. 2d 678, 231 P.2d 637 (1951); Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 481, 219

P.2d 79 (1950).

235. Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952).
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to arteriosclerosis. The court made point of the fact that the resident did not call upon any senior staff member to be present and that
when he ran into unexpected difficulties there was considerable delay
before the head of the department could be contacted and arrive to
repair the damage done. The combination of the resident's inadequacies and the delay in obtaining a more competent surgeon resulted
in the loss of the patient's legs, a four month hospital stay and ultimately morphine addiction as a consequence of the drugs used to
deaden his pain. But even here, the court seemed to rely upon the
testimony of experts in determining when a referral or calling in
of a specialist would be necessary.
At the conclusion of this survey of the general standard of care
and of some possible specific duties which a doctor owes to his patient,
it appears that the standard throughout is largely one established by
the profession itself. After a short view of a related problem, we
shall pass on to a consideration of the merits of using "customary
practice" as a standard of care.
VIcARIOus LiABILITY
Although the central focus of this article is on the professional
conduct of the doctor and the way in which "professional negligence"
varies from the garden variety, some reference should be made to the
problem of the vicarious liability of the doctor for the acts of others.
I will not discuss the possible liability of a doctor as a partner for
the torts of a co-partner, although this is not uncommon.2 36 Instead I
wish to direct attention to the possible liability of the doctor for the
conduct of nurses, X-ray technicians and assistants in the performance of operations or other treatment or diagnostic procedures. I
shall also refer only in passing to the liability of hospitals as that
may bear on the liability of the doctor working in a hospital.
Generally the principle of respondeat superior is applicable to professional men and the primary factor in imposing liability is the
right of the doctor to control the conduct of subordinates or assistants.
For some time, the courts were reluctant to impose any liability
upon hospitals for the conduct of nurses and staff members in the
operating room, either on the theory that these were "professional
activities" over which the hospital could not have a right of control
since it was not competent to practice medicine, 3 7 or on the theory
236. See, e.g., Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225, 23 N.E. 156 (1890); Haase v.
Morton & Morton, 138 Iowa 205, 115 N.W. 921 (1908); CRANE, PARTNERsuIps §
280 (2d ed. 1952);

REGAN,

DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 114 (3d ed. 1956).

237. This view was largely limited to New York, where it originated in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914),
52 L.R.A., (n.s.) 505 (1914) (non-liability of hospital for acts of physician and
nurses in performance of unauthorized operation), and further refined in
Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924) (non-
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that the nurses and others became "borrowed servants" of the head
surgeon and, for the time being, were subject to his exclusive right of
control.2 3 8 The head surgeon then became responsible for the torts
of these assistants. There has been a growing tendency in recent
years, however, to recognize that hospitals may be liable for the
miscarriage of those services which hospitals normally provide for
patients, including the professional services of staff members.M One
aspect of this is illustrated in the recent case of Swigert v. City of
Ortonville,240 in which the court treats the activities of a nurse in administering a heat treatment prescribed by a physician as not being
subject to the immediate control of the doctor but "administrative"
in character so that the hospital could be held liable. The "administrative-professional" distinction used in New York to immunize
hospitals from liability for the conduct of employees has fallen into
some disrepute,241 and it may be unfortunate that it appears again in
the allocation of responsibility between the hospital and a doctor
who is not an employee of the hospital.242 If an allocation of responsibility for the acts of hospital employees is to occur, and it may be
possible to have both the private doctor and the hospital liable, the
more appropriate technique would be in terms of actual supervision
liability for acts of orderly performing work normally done by nurse);
Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 286 (1937)
(liability for negligence of "ordinary employee"); Berg v. New York Society
for Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d 523 (1956)
(liability for non-professional employees). The latter case sheds considerable
doubt on the administrative-professional or medical distinction, which has
been abandoned completely in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3
(1957). For details see 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 170-74 (1952). The distinction may be
applicable in Minnesota and Pennsylvania as well, see Swigert v. City of
Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956); Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa.
574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956).
238. E.g., St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558,
4 N.W.2d 637 (1942); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923);
Minogue v. Rutland Hosp., 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796 (1956); Hillyer v. Governor of Saint Bartholomew's Hosp., (1909) 2 K.B. 820 (C.A. 1909).
239. See REGAN, op. cit. supra note 236, at 133. Included among these are
such procedures as the preparation of the patient .for an operation, Clary v.
Christiansen, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 254, 83 N.E.2d 644 (1948); and post-operative
care, e.g., Shull v. Schwartz, 364 Pa. 554, 73 A.2d 402 (1950).
240. 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956).
241. See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957) and comments
thereon, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1041 (1957); 32 N.Y.L.F. 435 (1957); 32 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1314 (1957); 9 SYRACUSE L. REV. 123 (1957); 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 128 (1958);

Berg v New York Soc'y for Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d
499, 136 N.E.2d 523 (1956); Bobbe, Tort Liability of Hospitals in New York,
37 CORNELL L.

Q. 419

(1952); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1397 n.9

(1956)

refers to the "ultimate absurdity" of distinguishing between the ministerial acts of an employee-doctor and his "professional" acts.
242. See also Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956) in which
the court uses the distinction in determining whether the doctor who directs
the placing of hot water bottles at the patient's feet should be held responsible.
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or control of the staff by the doctor in the conduct of various pro243

cedures.
So long as the conduct of an auxiliary is in fact directed and supervised by the private physician or surgeon, there seems to be no reason
not to hold him responsible for negligence of the auxiliary. The
service being rendered is service which the doctor himself would
presumably have to provide if the nurse or assistant were not available. The right to control does exist, whether or not it is exercised.
Moreover, the patient may not be conscious of who actually renders
the individual services to him and may appropriately look to the one
principal contact he has with medical services, his physician. Whether
the doctor should then be entitled to indemnification from the nurse,
or assistant, or attendant depends on whether one is committed to the
244
or
common law theory of indemnification by the active wrongdoer
is
a
device
superior"
accepts the more recent view that "respondeat
for imposing upon the head of an economic enterprise the responsibility for all conduct within the enterprise and that indemnity should
not be permitted to defeat the possibility of better distribution of
loss through "enterprise liability" and insurability.2 45 Of course,
where the hospital is in the picture and the patient is paying this enterprise for the services of its staff members, the concept of enterprise liability may warrant absolving any individual staff member
or doctor from responsibility for the acts of other members of the
staff and imposing sole liability upon the hospital itself. While the
case law indicates that hospitals are being subjected to liability for
the acts of professional staff,2 4 6 there is as yet no indication of any
legal absolution of the individual staff member from responsibility
243. For cases imposing liability on the hospitals, see, e.g., Rice v. California
Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945); Piedmont Hosp. v. Anderson, 65 Ga. App. 491, 16 N.E.2d 90 (1941); Flower Hosp. v. Hart, 178 Okla.
477, 62 P.2d 1248 (1936). For cases imposing liability on supervising physician

or surgeon, see, e.g., St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212
Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d 637 (1942); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac.
752 (1923); Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759 (1947); Minogue
v. Rutland Hospital, 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796 (1956).
244. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 723 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 250 (2d ed.
1955); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 96 (1937).

245. See 2 HARPER &

JAMES,

TORTS 770-71, 1370-74 (1956).

246. E.g., Garfield Memorial Hosp. v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir.

1953) (physicians and nurses); Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1957)

(neuropsychiatrist who is medical director); Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99

So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957) (interne diagnosing); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368,
54 N.W.2d 639 (1952) (resident in diagnosis and treatment of gangrene);
Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952) (resident operation):
See also Gold v. Essex County Council, (1942) 2 K.B. 293; Cassidy v. Ministry
of Health, (1951) 2 K.B. 343; Roe v. Ministry of Health, (1954) 2 K.B. 66,
in which the English courts have avoided the apparent holding in Hillyer v.
Governor of St. Bartholomew's Hosp., supra note 238, to the effect that the

operation room was not under the control of the hospital and therefore it could

not be responsible for its employees therein. The liability of hospitals in
England is discussed in Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical
Liability, infra p. 633.
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for his own acts or possibly for those acts which he has a duty to
supervise. I will not pursue here the possibility of imposing liability
upon the hospital for all injuries occurring to patients while in the
hospital due to the negligence of anyone operating in its facilities
with its consent, which might have the advantage of assuring a solvent
defendant capable of distributing the loss broadly while leaving open
the opportunity of the hospital to require indemnity from the private
doctor making use of its facilities. 246a
Absent such "enterprising" theory, however, there is a real problem
involved in the possible imposition of liability upon the head surgeon
in the operating room. In an earlier day when the operating room was
a relatively simple place with one or two nurses and an assistant
whom the surgeon actively supervised, it was not inappropriate to
impose liability upon him. Today, however, the hospital operating
room has become an increasingly complex enterprise in itself which
involves increasing specialization of the participants in the operation.
The responsibility for anesthetizing the patient and maintaining his
physical well-being during the operation has passed largely from the
joint control of the surgeon and a nurse-anesthetist into the hands
of a doctor-anesthesiologist who is himself a product of graduate
medical training. The job of keeping track of sponges and instruments used in the operation is largely in the hands of the "sponge
nurse" or the "scrub nurse" and the head nurse who supervises them.
Thus the surgeon is left free to concentrate his full attention on the
actual operative procedure. 247 It is no longer true that the head surgeon necessarily supervises all the participants in the operating room.
Yet in 1957, the Colorado court imposed liability upon a surgeon for
injuries suffered by a patient who fell from the operating table because the orderly who had been caring for him left the table momentarily in response to the surgeon's request for a strap. 4 8 The court
reasoned that the surgeon was in fact in charge of the orderly and in
any event since the patient was unconscious, unless the surgeon in
charge of the operation was held responsible or was charged with a
duty to see that no preventable harm occurred, the patient might be
remediless. And in 1949, the Pennsylvania court imposed liability
upon an obstetrician for damages caused when an intern negligently
246a. I am indebted for this suggestion to Professor William Cohen of the
University of Minnesota Law School.
247. For an interesting and technically accurate description of the workings

of an operating room see the recent book, ENGEL, THE OPERATIoN (1958), which
describes an open-heart operation at the University of Minnesota Hospitals.
Although the operation there described is undoubtedly far more complex than
the average one, much of the routine of preparation of equipment and handling of equipment during the operation is duplicated every day in many
hospitals across the country.
248. Beadles v. Matayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957).
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administered silver nitrate to a newborn baby's eyes.m 9 At the time
of the activity the obstetrician was fully occupied attempting to stop
severe hemorrhaging of the mother, although he admitted at the trial
that everyone in the operating room was subject to his control. The
act of administration of the silver nitrate and tying off the umbilical
cord were conceded to be simple and routine procedures frequently
left to the hospital staff as a matter of course.
In contrast to these two cases is the situation presented to the
federal district court in the recent case of Thompson v. Liiiehei,250
in which the court takes a more realistic view of the allocation of responsibility in the modern operating room. In this case an open heart
operation was to be performed on an eight-year-old girl to correct
a congenital defect in her heart. The operation involved the use of
"controlled cross circulation," a special procedure perfected at the
University of Minnesota Hospitals by Drs. Lillehei and Varco, two
of the defendant-surgeons, which contemplated that the patient be
temporarily sustained by a "donor" who occupied an adjoining table
during the operation and through a system of connecting tubes
furnished the heart and lung facilities to the patient while the heart
was being operated upon. In this case the donor was the patient's
mother, and the plaintiff in the action. The medical procedures preceding the operation took several hours. The patient and donor
were placed on two operating tables some four feet apart; both were
anesthetized and prepared for the operation. Before this operation
actually got under way, and before the donor and patient were
joined by the cross circulation mechanism, it was found that the
donor's heart beat and blood pressure could not be detected. It
appeared that a bottle of glucose and water hanging over the donor
and connected into her veins had become empty. An operating diagnosis of an air embolism was made and the donor was restored, but
serious damage had been done to her brain, apparently or allegedly
through bubbles of air entering her veins and being carried to the
brain. The operation was terminated. The court described the situation:
Dr. Lillehei was the surgeon at the patient's table. He performed no
surgical procedure upon the donor. He was solely occupied with the
preparatory operation upon the patient. Of necessity his back was to the
donor's table. There was no showing that he failed in any responsibility
following the emergency when it became impossible to detect the donor's
pulse, or at any other time.
Dr. Varco served as an assistant surgeon to Dr. Lillehei at the patient's
table. He had no responsibility in connection with the surgical procedures
or anesthetics on the donor.
249. McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
250. 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958).
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Dr. Buckley was the anesthesiologist at the patient's table. He had no
responsibility in connection with any procedures at the donor's table. Dr.
Warden was assigned as surgeon at the donor's table. There was no
evidence that he negligently performed or failed to discharge any of his
responsibilities. One Dr. X, not a defendant in this lawsuit, was anesthesiologist at this table and, it would appear, was solely responsible for the
administration of anesthetics and the operation of the "i.v." of glucose
and water which allegedly became empty. There was no evidence indicating that this was Dr. Warden's duty.2 51

It was noted that each of the named defendants was a member of
the University of Minnesota Medical School faculty, engaged in
teaching duties and surgical practice as members of a "team" on
the assignment of their respective superiors, the surgeons being assigned by the head of surgery, Dr. Wangensteen, and the anesthesiologists by Dr. VanBergen, the head of the corresponding department
of anesthesiology; that each doctor was responsible to his own department head and that none of them were receiving a fee from the
patient. Therefore, when the jury failed to agree upon a verdict, the
court granted judgment notwithstanding failure to agree 252 to each of
the named defendants, finding that there was no personal negligence
on the part of any of them and that none of them could be held
vicariously responsible for the conduct of Dr. X. The court concluded:
To extend the doctrine of respondeat superior to a situation such as that
reflected in the evidence would be to strain the doctrine beyond the basis
for its creation. See Prosser, Torts, 2d Ed. 1955, Sec. 62. There is no
evidence that Lillehei engaged or directed Dr. X or any of the others in
the operating room, or that he had the authority to do so. The evidence
is to the contrary. The only evidence is that Lillehei was the one through
whom the operation was arranged-the one who dealt with the plaintiffs
in connection with it. This relationship does not spell out responsibility
by Lillehei for every event which transpired in the operating room. It
is manifest from the evidence, and especially from one of the exhibits
received in evidence, that the plaintiffs contracted that the operation be
performed, not by Lillehei, but by the "staff of the University Hospital."253

Since the University Hospital is an agency of the State of Minnesota,
it was immune from tort liability.25 4 In support of its conclusion, the

court cites prior cases which had recognized the separation of func251. Id. at 719-20.
252. This procedure is authorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (b).
253. 164 F. Supp. at 721.
254. Minnesota does not recognize the "charitable immunity" of non-profit
hospitals, see Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392,
175 N.W. 699 (1920). Nor has it immunized a city-owned hospital which is
treated as a proprietary rather than governmental activity. See Borwege v.
City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N.W. 915 (1933). But the State and its
immediate instrumentalities are immune from tort liability, see Dunn v.
Schmid, 239 Minn. 559, 60 N.W.2d 14 (1953).
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tions within the operating room. 255 While most of these dealt either
with non-liability of hospitals for the conduct of their professional
employees,25 6 or the non-liability of an anesthetist for the conduct of
the operating surgeon,25 7 some recognized the non-liability of the
head surgeon for the conduct of a skilled anesthetist whose services
were provided for by the hospital or were arranged for on an
independent basis.25 8
Another recent example of division of function is found in Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.25 9 where the attending physician had
ordered an aortograph of a patient for purpose of diagnosing cardiovascular difficulties. The attending physician was present when
the procedure started but gave no instructions and did not participate in the actual administration of the aortography procedure.
The procedure was in fact done by a "team" of the hospital staff
members. The evidence indicated that it was not customary for
attending physicians to perform or be present at the performance of
an aortography procedure and that it was customary to have such
procedure performed by the hospital personnel who were accustomed
to work together. The court indicated that the attending physician
might be responsible if he had failed to determine that the hospital
team was competent, but criticized instructions which were open to
the interpretation that the attending physician should be responsible
for the negligence of an apparently competent team of staff members.
While the attending physician was a member of the faculty of the
Stanford Medical School, his relation with the patient appears to
have been on the basis of a special referral to him as an individual
and not merely as a staff member of a hospital.
The conclusion which I draw from these cases is that the customary
practices of the medical profession again are significant, this time in
determining who does have control of a given situation and who has
supervisory power over the negligent assistant. Where the individual
physician undertakes to treat a patient as his private patient and has
control over or the right to exercise control over the conduct of others
255. Morey v. Thybo, 199 Fed. 760 (7th Cir. 1912); Runyan v. Goodrum, 147
Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921), 13 A.L.R. 1403 (1921); Huber v. Protestant
Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n, 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E. 864 (1956); Nelson v. San-

dell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926), 46 A.L.R. 1447 (1926); Meyer v. St.
61 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1952), aff'd 225 La. 618, 73

Paul-Mercury Indem. Co.,

So. 2d 781 (1953); Brossard v. Koop, 200 Minn. 410, 274 N.W. 241 (1937);
Richardson v. Denneen, 192 Misc. 871, 82 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Cty. Ct. 1947); Wood-

son v. Huey, 261 P.2d 199 (Okla. 1953). See also REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT
AND THE LAW 104 (3d ed. 1956).

256. Runyan v. Goodrum, Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n, supra
note 255.
257. Morey v. Thybo, Nelson v. Sandell, Brossard v. Koop, supra note 255.
258. Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n; Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury
Indem. Co.; Woodson v. Huey, supra note 255.
259. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 770 (1957).
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in accordance with accepted medical practice, he may be held responsible; but where accepted professional practice recognizes a division
of function, the courts should recognize a division of responsibility.
This may not fully meet the argument of some of the courts that the
patient may have no way of knowing who is "medically responsible"
for given acts or which of a number of individuals has been negligent
in handling him, the basis upon which liability of the head surgeon or
physician in charge of the case may be justified. 260 Perhaps this
difficulty may be overcome, however, not by a wholesale imposition of
liability on whomever has dealt with the patient as "his physician,"
but by permitting the patient to join his physician and the assistants
and the hospital as defendants or permitting the physician to interplead the others as possible defendants, and then allow the co-defendants to establish the existing medical practices and explain, if possible,
how the accident or injury to the patient occurred. This is basically
a problem of procedure and proof which is discussed later. Arguments in favor of imposing liability upon the head surgeon based
on "enterprise liability" and "loss distribution" seem inappropriate
in situations in which the "inferior" may be another equally highly
trained professional with equal means of distributing loss through
insurance or an employee of a hospital-enterprise to which the patient normally has paid some fees and which is as good, if not a
better, loss distributor. Moreover, because of the reflection on professional competency and professional reputation incident to any
recovery against a doctor in a "malpractice" action, the significance
of "respondeat superior" as a loss distribution device probably should
be greatly diminished and the emphasis placed on the older view of
right to control.
CUSTOMARY PRACTICE AS THE STANDARD OF CARE

Evidence of custom or a relatively well defined and regular usage
among a group of persons, frequently a trade or occupational group,
is generally admissible in determination of the proper standard of
conduct in negligence actions, 261 although, as Professor Clarence
Morris has pointed out,262 evidence of compliance or non-compliance
with custom is really relevant only to the determination of (a)
whether an imposition of liability upon the defendant will have an
unduly disrupting effect on existing business practices, (b) whether
260. Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1925); McConnell v.
Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).

261. 2 HARPER & JAVEs, TORTS 977 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 135 (2d ed. 1955);
2 WIGMORE, Evnwp.c., ',5-90 (3d ed. 1940). The Harper and James treatment of custom as a test of due care originally appeared as James, Parti-

cularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Cases, 5 VAND. L. REV. 697
(1952).

262. Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1147-55 (1942).
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some other precautions than those taken by the defendant are feasible
or practicable, and (c) whether the defendant had an opportunity
to know of other precautions from the existing practices of others.
With few exceptions, 263 however, evidence of customary 264practice is
not conclusive on the question of the care to be taken.
When we examine cases of medical negligence, however, we find
that custom does become, almost exclusively, the measure of due
care. As one author has put it, "Good medical practice is the standard,"2 65 and it is a standard to be established by expert medical testimony as to what is accepted as good practice by reputable members of
the profession practicing under similar conditions. One might argue
that "customary practice" is not the same as "good medical practice"
and that the test requires that for non-liability something more than
mere compliance with local custom must be established, i.e., that the
local custom is in fact reasonable. But aside from broadening the
standard to include more than a limited portion of the profession in
terms of "school of practice" and more than a limited area of practice,
the courts have not so indicated. It might also be argued that the
standard of practice accepted by the profession is in fact more demanding than a standard framed in terms of "a reasonable and pru263. The "exceptional" cases tend to be those of a servant suing a master
for failure to provide safe tools or safe working conditions, Shadford v. Ann
Arbor St. Ry., 111 Mich. 390, 69 N.W. 661 (1897); Warmacj v. Orr, 352 Mo.
113, 176 S.E.2d 477 (1943); Ellis v. Louisville & N.O. R.R., 136 Pa. 618, 20 Atl.
517 (1890), and generally are not followed in other cases in the jurisdictions,
see Clark's Adm'r v. Kentucky Util. Co., 289 Ky. 225, 158 S.W.2d 134 (1942);
Barnes v. F. C. Garrell & Sons, 196 Ky. 583, 177 S.E.2d 395 (1943); Steggal
v. W. T. Knapp & Co., 241 Mich. 260, 217 N.W. 16 (1928); Cameron v. Small,
182 S.E.2d 565, (Mo. 1944); Carver v. Missouri-Kentucky-Texas R.R., 362 Mo.
897, 245 S.W.2d 96 (1952); Maise v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d
850 (1945); Donnelly v. Fred Whittaker Co., 369 Pa. 387, 71 A.2d 61 (1950).
264. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903): "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to
be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is
complied with or not." See also, Uline Ice Co. v. Sullivan, 187 F.2d 82 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (defendant's use); Troupe v. Chicago D. & G. Bay Transit Co., 234
F.2d 253 (2nd Cir. 1956) (defendant's use); Pauly v. King, 44 Cal. 2d 649, 284
P.2d 487 (1955) (defendant's use); Albrethson v. Carey Valky Reservoir Co.,
67 Idaho 529, 186 P.2d 853 (1947) (defendant's use); Langer v. Caviness, 238
Iowa 774, 28 N.W.2d 421 (1947) (defendant's use); Clark's Adm'r v. Kentucky Util. Co., 289 Ky. 225, 158 S.W.2d 134 (1942) (defendant's use); Hartman
v. National Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804 (1953) (plaintiff's use);
Buccafusco v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 49 N.J. Super. 385, 140 A.2d 79
(App. Div. 1958) (plaintiff's use); Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 362
Mo. 897, 245 S.W.2d 96 (1952); (plaintiff's use); Morris v. Cleveland Hockey
Club, 157 Ohio St. 225, 105 N.E.2d 419 (defendant's use); Donnelly v. Fred
Whittaker Co., 369 Pa. 387, 72 A.2d 61 (1950) (defendant's use); J. Avery
Bryan, Inc. v. Hubbard, 32 Tenn. App. 648, 225 S.W.2d 282 (1949) (relied on
by defendant to establish contributory negligence of plaintiff); and secondary
authorities cited in note 261 supra.Note that this does not deal with the plaintiff's attempting to establish negligence on the basis of defe'dant's failure to
continue or to comply with customary practices on which plaintiff has come
to rely, see, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930); Illinois
Cent. Ry. v. Maxwell, 292 Ky. 660, 167 S.W.2d 841 (1943).
265. REGAN, op. cit. supra note 255, at 30.
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dent man under the same circumstances." No very clear resolution of
the comparative demands of the two tests can be reached on the basis
of opinions which concentrate largely on the professional test. It
should be noted, however, that to a substantial degree the professional
standard is assumed to offer the medical practitioner as much if not
more protection than would a more general standard. 266 Of course,
where a layman or quack purports to act as a qualified physician the
professional standard may become a "sword" for the plaintiff rather
than a "shield" for the defendant.
Reliance upon professional custom as the primary test of conduct
might be explained historically by the fact that before the law of
negligence had developed or the "reasonable and prudent man" had
seen the full light of day, the older English cases had dealt with
physicians and surgeons in terms of the knowledge, skill and care
which they held themselves out to the public as possessing, i.e., at
least that commonly had by members of their "profession. 2' 67 This is
not a wholly satisfactory explanation, however, since other persons
engaged in "common callings" such as innkeepers, ferrymen and
common carriers failed to achieve any special "immunity" on the
basis of reliance on accepted practices of their trade. In fact the
courts tended to impose a stricter standard of care on the persons
engaging in such common callings than on the general run of man26 8
kind.
A second, and somewhat more persuasive, explanation for the
reliance on custom of the profession is the lack of capacity of any
layman trier of fact, be he judge or juryman, to adequately evaluate
the conduct of a doctor or to determine what a reasonable and prudent
man under the same circumstances (including specialized training
and knowledge of the physician or surgeon) would have done or re266. See statements such as "A physician is only required to possess and
exercise the degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed by members of
his school of the profession in good standing, and to apply that skill and
learning with reasonable care and diligence and his best judgment," Nelson

v. Nicolet Clinic, 201 Minn. 505, 509, 276 N.W. 801, 803 (1938). See also
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 CoLuM. L. REv. 1147, 1165 (1942); James,
Particularizingthe Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REV.

697, 710 and n. 74 (1952), which suggest that there is some special protection
in the standard for the doctor. Cf. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60, 86-88 (1956), dealing with the related question of the more
exacting requirement as to the persuasive character of evidence as to the causal relation between the alleged "negligence" of a doctor as compared, for
example, with the "causal relation" which the plaintiff in a hunting accident
case must establish.
267. See, e.g., Y.B. 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374); Everard v. Hopkins, 2
Buls. 332, 80 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1615); Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. K.B. 359,

95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767); Seare v. Prentice, 8 East. 348, 103 Eng. Rep. 376
(K.B. 1807).
268. See Cooley's description of the liabilities of innkeepers and common
carriers, which approaches that of an insurer for the goods of the guest or
shipper or owner, CooLEY, TORTS 635-42 (1st ed. 1879).
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frained from doing. This is, of course, reflected in the general requirement that expert medical testimony is essential on the issue of
the standard of care and breach thereof. But again, the answer is
not wholly satisfactory for in some cases the court permits the jury
to evaluate medical conduct without expert medical testimony 20 9
A third explanation seems even more persuasive. The "preferred
position" granted by the courts to the meAical profession (and to
other professions) may be in recognition of the peculiar nature of
the "professional" activity. The qualified practitioner of medicine
has undertaken long years of study to acquire knowledge of man, his
body and its illnesses and the means of combatting such ailments,
coupled with an intensive training of the senses and mind of the
physician to respond to stimuli in a manner best described as "the
healing art." A large measure of judgment enters into the practice of
this art. That judgment should be free to operate in the best
interests of the patient. If the "judge" is himself to be judged
by some outsider who relies on after-acquired knowledge of unsatisfactory results or unfortunate consequences in reaching a decision
as to liability, the medical judgment may be hampered and the
doctor may become hesitant to rely upon his developed instinct
in diagnosis and treatment. If, on the other hand, the doctor knows
that his conduct is to be evaluated in terms of what other highly
trained medical practitioners would have done or would accept as
competent medical practice, he is more likely to pursue his own
judgment when he is confident of the diagnosis and line of treatment, and is more likely to provide good medical service for his
patient. While no absolute proof of the deterring effect of a nonprofessional standard of conduct is available, the concern expressed
by doctors at the growing number of malpractice claims 270 and some
271
statements of hesitancy to engage in free use of medical judgment
support this conclusion.
269. The most notable examples are the X-ray cases discussed supra p.

575, and the "sponge" cases discussed infra p. 610.
270. See REGAN, op. cit. supra note 155, at 521-28; Sandor,

The History of

Professional Liability Suits in the United States, 161 J.A.M.A. 459 (1957);
Stetler, The History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30
TEmP. L. Q. 366 (1957); Analysis of Professional Liability Claims and Suits

165 J.A.M.A. 608 (1957).
271. See- REGAN, op. cit. supra note 155, at 524-25, 526-27; Wachowski &
Stronach, The Radiologist and Professional Medical Liability, 30 TEMP. L. Q.
398, 399-400 (1957). See also the statement of an anonymous doctor reported
in Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Part One, Saturday Evening Post,
April 11, 1959, p. 13 at p. 48: "Now, whenever a new patient comes into my
office, I ask myself, 'Is this the fellow who's going to sue me?' and, God help
me, I'm beginning to decide my treatments not on the basis of what's best for
the patient, but on what will look best in court." This latter article also points
to the increased cost of medical care in terms of additional consultations and
diagnostic procedures which doctors may feel compelled to undertake not for
the benefit of the patient but for their own legal protection.
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I believe that the courts are fully justified in taking a position
which accepts customary medical practice as the standard of care. This
does not protect the activities of the quack or charlatan. It does not
condone malafide practice nor slipshod methods, except as the medical
profession itself approves these. There is no persuasive evidence
that the profession does so approve. At most it recognizes human
weakness and is somewhat less blinded to the inadequacies of its
own members than is the average layman. Knowing that inherent
inadequacies of judgment and skill do exist, the medical profession
may be hesitant to judge too harshly the conduct of its members.
All of this, however, does not bring much comfort to the maimed,
the injured and the infirm, nor to their families. In this day of increasing emphasis upon "loss distribution" and "adequate compensation" by business enterprises for the injuries caused by their activities,
those who suffer injuries in the course of medical treatment may
argue that it is appropriate to impose the burden of loss upon the
professional practitioner who can then distribute it in the form of
increased fees to all persons who benefit from his ministrations or
by insurance to all who benefit from medical practice. Two replies
may be made to this argument. First, unlike much business enterprise the cost of medical service is not distributed on a pro rata basis.
A substantial portion of medical care is provided either on a charitable or reduced fee basis, while other patients with more adequate
resources may make up the difference. Unlike workmen's compensation or automobile liability insurance, the distribution of loss is likely
to be unequal and unrelated to risk to the individual patient and
therefore possibly undesirable. Second, the imposition of liability
in malpractice cases involves a great deal more than mere loss
distribution. The doctor who is sued for malpractice is immediately
under some suspicion; the doctor against whom such a claim is successful is branded as professionally incompetent or worse. While
many of the defendants against whom verdicts are rendered may
be lacking in professional competence, it seems not unlikely that
many are also guilty only of a single act of deviation from competent
practice. Moreover, the increasing number of malpractice claimsit is estimated that one in every seven doctors in the country, and
as high as one in four in some states, have been sued 2 7 -- points to a
substantial danger of undermining public confidence in the medical
profession unless such claims are measured by a standard determined
by persons fully cognizant of the perils and practicalities of medical
practice.
272. Silverman, supra note 271 at p. 14. For an indication that 12.8% of doctors are involved in such suits see Analysis of Professional Liability Claims
and Suits, 165 J.A.M.A. 608 (1957).
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The "Sponge" Cases
That the "custom of the profession" may not always be the standard
applied by the courts is suggested by the "sponge" cases involving
sponges (gauze pads) and other foreign objects left in incisions by
surgeons. In an early such case, Samuels v. Willis2 73 the patient complained that a sponge which was left in her body for some thirty
days following an abdominal operation had resulted in infection and
injury to her internal organs. Several of the medical experts for
the defendant testified that "the best of surgeons sometimes left a
sponge or some foreign substance in the bodies of their patients in
performing similar operations." The court refused to accept the defendant's argument that this established that he had used ordinary
care, saying:
Because all men are at some time careless does not relieve any man from
the legal consequences of his careless act; but even that was for the jury
to say whether appellant exercized the degree of care in the case which
ordinarily prudent and skilled surgeons, who practice in similar localities,
usually exercise in such matters.A74
There was, moreover, s6me expert evidence for the proposition that
the defendant had not followed all of the customary precautions for
verifying that all sponges were removed before he closed the incision.
In later cases medical experts have testified that it is common
practice for the operating surgeon to delegate to a nurse the job of
keeping track of the gauze pads and instruments used in the operation. The procedures vary somewhat from place to place, the commonest being "sponge counts" made prior to the operation of all
sponges available for use and subsequent to the operation of used and
unused sponges, the use of tabs, tags, strings, etc., to be attached to
each and every sponge handed to the surgeon or others working in
the body so as to leave telltale appendages outside of the wound, and
the use of sponges marked with radio-opaque materials to permit
their discovery by the use of x-ray or fluoroscopy of the area of
operation. In spite of these precautions, sponges and other items do
2 75
remain in wounds in a number of operations.
A summary of the law relating to such accidents as of the year
1930276 concluded that: (1) the operation did not terminate until the
incision was closed and the surgeon had a duty to use due care to
remove all foreign matter used in the operation; (2) the question
of whether the failure to remove a sponge was negligent was gener273. 133 Ky. 459, 118 S.W. 339 (1909).

274. Id. at 466, 118 S.W. at 342.
275. For a recent survey estimating that the "sponge" cases represent about
8% of the malpractice claims, see Analysis of Professional Liability Claims
and Suits, 165 J.A.M.A. 608, 610 (1957).
276. Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1023 (1930).
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ally left to the jury, although some courts treated it as negligence
per se; (3) the burden of explaining a failure to remove sponges was
placed on the defendant in most cases which considered the question;
and (4) while a custom of having attending nurses make a careful
count of sponges before and after the operation was reasonable,
proper and wise, it did not excuse the surgeon from liability if the
foreign object was in fact left in the wound.277 A few cases, however,
did recognize that the surgeon might reasonably rely upon the customary practices such as the count of an assisting nurse,2 8 and others
permitted the doctor to introduce evidence of such custom as one
factor to be used by the jury in determining whether due care had
been observed.2 79 Almost thirty years later these conclusions still seem
to be supported by the courts. Courts will permit the jury to infer
negligence from the presence of a foreign object in the patient's body
following an operation, 8 0 or may treat evidence of such fact as creating a presumption of negligence, 8 1 and generally the surgeon is not
permitted to relieve himself of responsibility by showing reliance on
customary practices for avoiding injuries of this sort.282
The few cases which indicate that reliance upon customary procedures in this area may be due care deserve some examination. In
Harris v. FaI28 3 the plaintiff complained that the surgeon had failed
to remove from her incision pieces of fabric used in draining the
wound. Although the court refused to permit the defendant to rely
upon a purely local custom, limited to practice in Chicago hospitals
when the patient and surgeon were from out of the locale, it did
reverse the trial court's giving of an instruction to the effect that the
defendant-surgeon must discharge his obligation to care for the
patient as though no house doctor were present. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said that the doctor could rely upon
277. E.g., Spears v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S.W. 524 (1925); Walker

v. Holbrook, 130 Minn. 106, 153 N.W. 305 (1915); Palmer v. Humiston, 87
Ohio St. 401, 101 N.E. 283 (1913); Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 Atl. 1007
(1913).

278. Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (7th Cir. 1910); Funk v. Bonham, 151 N.E.
22 (Ind. App. 1926), rev'd 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932); Guell v. Tenney,
262 Mass. 54, 159 N.E. 451 (1928). Cf. Brown v. Bennett, 157 Mich. 654, 122
N.W. 305 (1909).
279. Barnett's Adm'r v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S.W. 461 (1915); Ault v.
Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928).
280. Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d 36
(1957); Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956); Funk v. Bonham,
204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932); Jackson v. Hansard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17 P.2d
659 (1933).
281. Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951); Smith v. Zeagler,
116 Fla. 628, 157 So. 328 (1934); LeFaive v. Asselin, 262 Mich. 443, 247 N.W.
911 (1933); Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941); Carruthers v. Phillips, 169 Ore. 636, 131 P.2d 193 (1942).
282. E.g., Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305
P.2d 36 (1957); Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957).
283. 177 Fed. 79 (7th Cir. 1910).
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a general custom of hospitals providing services for the care of
dressings etc. In Brown v. Bennett 4 while the operating surgeon
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, in discussing the
liability of his assistant, the personal physician of the patient, the
court intimated that the operating surgeon might properly rely upon
the nurse and her assurances that the sponges had all been accounted
for.
In Guell v. Tenney, 5 the court said that the surgeon was not to
be held liable for leaving a sponge in the incision where there was
no evidence to show that his care and treatment was unskillful or
improper and went on to say that he would not be held responsible
where the nurses provided by the hospital failed to keep an accurate
count of sponges, apparently approving his reliance on the custom of
nurses to do this. In Funk v. Bonham, 6 the surgeon attempted to
defend an action for malpractice by showing that it was customary
to rely upon the sponge count of hospital nurses who were not his
employees. The Indiana Court of Appeals at first agreed that this
would absolve him from liability,2 7 but on a second trial the Supreme
Court of Indiana stated that the surgeon could not delegate his duty
to keep track of sponges to the employees of the hospital in which
he operated.- 8 In Blackburn v. Baker,28 9 the New York court accepted
testimony of compliance with customary practice as satisfying the obligation of the defendant to explain an inference of negligence arising
from the presence of a sponge in the patient's body, although the
evidence also indicated that the defendant-surgeon and his assistant
had made a manual examination of the abdominal cavity before it was
closed, and there was expert evidence for the defendant that it
would have been unwise to have made a more extensive examination
for foreign substances because of the danger of paralysis of the intestines. The Illinois intermediate appellate courts have also recognized that in an emergency the doctor may properly delegate the
duty of counting sponges and dressings to others in an attempt
to center his attention on preserving the patient's life; 290 but absent
such emergency, the defendant may be held liable in spite of reliance
on customary practices.291 In Sheridan v. Quarrier292 the Connecticut
court absolved a staff surgeon from a claim of negligence in connection with a gauze pad left in a patient's body following an opera284. 157 Mich. 654, 122 N.W. 305 (1909).
285. 262 Mass. 54, 159 N.E. 451 (1928).
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

N.E. 22 (Ind. App. 1926), rev'd, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932).
N.E. 22 (Ind.App. 1926).
Ind.170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932).
App. Div. 588, 237 N.Y. Supp. 611 (3d Dep't 1929).
0lander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930).
151
151
204
227

291. Hall v. Grosvenor, 267 Ill. App. 119 (1932).
292. 127 Conn. 279, 16 A.2d 479 (1940).
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tion in which the surgeon had assisted, relying upon the customary
practice for after-care of the patient to be in the hands of other physicians. The case is not strong authority, however, since it appeared
that it was proper and reasonable to leave the gauze dressing in the
wound at the time of the operation. In two opinions, Cassingham v.
Berry293 and Roark v. Peters, 294 while the courts did not go so far as
to declare that reliance upon customary procedures and the nurses'
count was due care as a matter of law, the language used in affirming
verdict for the doctors tended strongly in that direction.
While the case law in this area is hardly a basis for the assertion
that custom is the standard of care, it may be reconciled with the
general conclusion reached above. Professor Clarence Morris has
treated these cases as in a class of their own.2 5 He notes the various
procedures for the prevention of loss of sponges in wounds and concludes that if the customary procedures described are in fact followed
this should constitute due care. Even so, he asserts that the courts
may permit a jury to find negligence in the face of evidence of compliance by the doctor with custom, on the ground that since customary practice should assure that no sponge or foreign object is left in
the body, the evidence of the plaintiff that one did remain after the
operation may indicate that the defendant's testimony of compliance is
either mistaken or dishonest. He would not, of course, preclude the
jury from believing the defendant rather than the plaintiff.
It may not be necessary to go so far as Professor Morris suggests
in accepting custom as the standard of care even in the sponge cases.
In fact the customary practices may be reasonably effective without
being one hundred per cent effective. But unless doctors are under
an obligation to use absolutely safe procedures as contrasted with
reasonably safe procedures, and most courts have not stated this as
the duty of the doctor,2 96 the mere failure of the customary practice
to prevent loss of a sponge or instrument should not create liability.
Of course, if there is negligence in the performance of a procedure,
either on the part of the nurse or on the part of the surgeon, this may
give rise to liability.297 And negligence may be inferred from the
293. 67 Okla. 134, 150 Pac. 139 (1915).
294. 162 La. 111, 110 So. 106 (1926).
295. Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1166-67
(1942).
296. See, e.g., Watterson v. Conwell, 258 Ala. 180, 61 So. 2d 690 (1952);
Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 61 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1952), aff'd,
225 La. 618, 73 So. 2d 781 (1953); Evangelista v. Black, 97 Ohio App. 390, 126
N.E.2d 71 (1953); McPeak v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 33 Tenn. App. 76, 229
S.W.2d 150 (1950); REGAN, op. cit. supra note 155, at 38, for the proposition
that the doctor does not insure cure or favorable progress and is required
only to exercise reasonable bare considering the circumstances.
297. See discussion of vicarious liability for acts of nurses and assistants
supra pp. 598-601.
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existence of the sponge in the body. However, the jury should be
charged that if they believe the doctor has followed the customary
practices to protect the patient, and if the persons for whose acts he
is responsible have followed such procedures, they may not hold him
liable simply because the sponge or other foreign matter remained in
the body.
PROOF OF THE STANDARD OF CARE AND BREACH

A discussion of the standard of care required of physicians and
surgeons or other practitioners of healing is incomplete without some
reference to the methods by which the injured patient may establish
the standard and breach thereof. In fact, in making a decision as to
whether the courts may appropriately defer all determination of the
standard of care to the medical profession itself, it is essential to
consider how the plaintiff may go about proving his case.
Expert Opinion
Courts in all jurisdictions appear to agree to the general principles
that the plaintiff in a malpractice action bears the burden of persuading the jury that the defendant doctor has failed to comply with
the standard of practice accepted by the medical profession as
reasonable care and skill under like circumstances and that to meet
this burden of persuasion the plaintiff must generally rely upon the
testimony of medical experts. 298 Sometimes the courts speak in terms
of a "presumption of due care" on the part of the physician, 299 but
this appears to be merely a manner of describing the burden placed
on the plaintiff to persuade the jury by the introduction of expert
testimony that the defendant was negligent.30 0 The courts also recognize that evidence that some doctors do not approve the practice of
the defendant is not sufficient where there is also evidence that at
least a respectable minority of doctors would approve it, so that if
unimpeached expert opinion in the case is divided the jury may not
be permitted to pass on the question of liability.301 In some cases, to
298. See 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2090 (a) (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 141 A.L.R. 5,
6 (1942).
299. See, e.g., Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951); Stallcup v.
Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 45, 282 P.2d 791, 793 (1955); Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga.
269, 271, 98 S.E.2d 552, 554 (1957); State to the use of Janney v. Housekeeper,
70 Md. 162, 171, 16 Atl. 382, 384, 2 L.R.A. 587, 589 (1889); Wintersteen v.
Semler, 197 Ore. 601, 609, 250 P.2d 420, 423 (1952); Devereaux v. Smith, 213
S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
300. Included within the requirement that the plaintiff has the "burden of
proof" in a civil action are the twin requirements of the burden of coming
forward with evidence from which reasonable men could infer the existence
of the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action rests and the burden of
persuasion of the jury that the existence of such facts is more likely than not.
See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE §§ 306, 307, 318 (1954).
301. See text at p. 565 and authorities supra note 89. For example, in Baldor
v. Rodgers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1955), one of the plaintiff's claims was
that the defendant had undertaken to use the "Koch method" of treatment of
plaintiff's cancer and that this was not a proper form of treatment. There was
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be discussed later, the courts deviate from the requirement of expert
medical testimony in support of the plaintiff's case on the ground
that the misconduct of the defendant as established by the evidence
30 2
is "so gross as to be within the comprehension of laymen."
The decisions of courts which define the standard of care in terms
of the care exercised by a practitioner of the school to which the
defendant belongs and in the same or similar locality, might suggest
that the "expert" must come from the same school and locality as
the defendant. But this is not necessarily true. Where the distinction
between schools of medicine is recognized, if the witness testifies that
the principles of his and the defendant's schools or systems are the
same, he is permitted to testify as to the care required of the defendant. 30 3 The most frequent example of such an area of "common practice" appears to be that of diagnosis. 3°4 In some cases the courts have
permitted a witness from a school of practice other than that of the
defendant to testify that the defendant went beyond the limits of
his own system and undertook to act within an area generally limited
to practice by another school, usually the regular school of medicine.30 5 In a few cases the courts have stated that a doctor of medicine
sharp conflict of medical testimony as to what was the proper method of treatment with almost uniform agreement that there was no certain cure. The
appellate court decided that this issue should not go to the jury (although permitting the jury to pass on the propriety of continuation of the treatment
when it proved unsuccessful), saying: "There could have been no clear-cut
issue whether the appellant committed malpractice when he used a certain
method, for no infallible cure has been discovered. Upon the absence of certain cure there is agreement so that it cannot be logically declared that the
jury could determine the responsibility of the appellant because of a treatment
that might be, from the witnesses they chose to believe, more acceptable. If
there is no certain cure and if the physician did not indulge in quackery by
representing he had one, both of which were well established by testimony,
then the issues raised by the pleadings in this case and the facts built around
them did not justify the jury in concluding that for the appellee's misfortune
the appellant should pay.
"As was said by the Supreme Court of Washington in Dahl v. Wagner, 87
Wash. 492, [495], 151 P. 1079, 1080 [1915], 'the courts cannot hold a defendant
in a malpractice suit to the theory of the one [opinion of physicians on a set
of facts] to the exclusion of the other [contrary opinion by other physicians].'
...No doubt is cast on the respectability of the physicians who testified that
they used the treatment employed by the appellant. Some of them were emphatic in their condemnation of the 'classical' methods which the appellant is
now charged with failure to use." 81 So. 2d at 660.
302. Annot., 141 A.L.R. 5, 12 (1942).
303. E.g., Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 327 P.2d 131 (Cal. App. 1958); Van
Sickle v. Doolittle, 173 Iowa 727, 155 N.W. 1007 (1916); Mann v. Grim-Smith
Hospital & Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 147 S.W.2d 606 (1941); Hansen v. Isaak, 70 S.D.
529, 19 N.W.2d 521 (1945); Porter v. Puryear, 153 Texas 82, 262 S.W.2d 933
(1953); Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918); Morrill v. Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
304. E.g., Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 173 Iowa 727, 155 N.W. 1007 (1916);
Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114, 70 L.R.A. 49 (1905); Kelly v.
Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79, 19 A.L.R.2d 1174 (1950); Kuechler v.
Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015, 31 A.L.R. 826 (1923).
305. E.g., Brown v. Guy, 144 Cal. App. 2d 659, 301 P.2d 413 (1956); Cook
v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529, 78 A.L.R. 694 (1931); Epstein v. Hirschon,
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is qualified by his training to testify as to the propriety of practice
in other branches of healing.30 6 Whether a witness may qualify himself to testify as to the practices of another school or system by reading the literature of that school or by talking to practitioners of the
3°7
other school is unsettled.
Within the regular school of medicine, a specialist is permitted to
testify as to the standard of care required of general practitioners. 308
Similarly, a general practitioner may be permitted to testify as an expert witness in an action brought against a specialist, on the theory
that a medical doctor may be qualified to express an opinion on any
medical subject provided that the trial court is convinced that he has
sufficient experience and knowledge, the absence of specialization in
his practice going to the weight of his testimony rather than to its
admissibility. 3 9 One of the notable examples of a "general expert" is
the case of Dr. Frank Webb who, after ten years of general practice in
New York, a short term as staff doctor in a railroad hospital, and six
years of teaching anatomy and pathology first in a medical school and
then in a dental school, spent over twenty-five years as autopsy
surgeon in the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office, where he performed about 40,000 autopsies in connection with which he obtained
medical histories of the decedents and sometimes consulted the attending physician or surgeon as well as consulting with doctors on the
staff of the county hospital. On the basis of this experience he was
permitted to testify as an expert in a case arising from the death of
a hospital patient from tetanus alleged to have resulted from negligence in the operative and post-operative care,3 10 in a case involving
diagnosis of cancer and removal of the patient's breast, 31 ' and in a
case of paralysis alleged to have resulted from negligent administration of a spinal anesthesia with regard to the location and cause of
33 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79,

19 A.L.R.2d 1174 (1950); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W.2d 108

(1945).
306. E.g., Nicodeme v. Bailey, 243 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937).
307. Compare Pedler v. Emmerson, 331 Mich. 78, 49 N.W.2d 70 (1951) denying qualification on this basis, with Mann v. Grim-Smith Hospital & Clinic,
347 Mo. 348, 147 S.W.2d 606 (1941) and Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170
Pac. 135 (1918) permitting testimony based on information acquired from
literature. Cf. Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946) where an
orthopedic surgeon was allowed to testify as to the nature and method of administration of electro-shock treatments based on knowledge of the literature
and treatment of patients who had suffered fractures, as well as talking to
various specialists who administered the treatment, although he had never
administered electro-shock treatments himself.
308. See text at notes 101-02, supra.
309. See, e.g., Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950); Carbone
v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Young v. Stevens, 132 N.J.L. 124,
39 A.2d 115 (1944).
310. Valentin v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359 (1946).
311. Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950).
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paralysis, the traumatic and mechanical nature of the injury and the
means by which the injury could have occurred.3 '2 On the other hand,
the courts found him not qualified to testify as to the reasonable
and proper degree of skill and care to be used in giving a spinal injection,313 or to describe the existing standards of practice in urology
(although he was found competent to testify as to the cause of infection in the genito-urinary system),314 or to describe the proper and
requisite care involved in diagnosis and treatment of an epidural
hemorrhage.3 15 This line of cases gives to the trial court very broad
discretion in determining the qualification of the particular expert,
while laying down as a test:
[I]t must be shown that the witness (1) has the required professional
knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under inquiry sufficient to
qualify him to speak with authority on the subject, and (2) is familiar
with the standards required of physicians under similar circumstances....
Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowl-

edge goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility.316

However, in Hunt v. Bradshaw317 the trial court refused to permit a
radiologist to testify as to proper surgical procedures in preparing for
and performing a chest operation, and in Huttner v. MacKay3 8 the
trial court excluded testimony by an anatomist as to the negligence
of a neurosurgeon in invading certain portions of the brain, both of
which were affirmed by the appellate courts.
As we have already seen, the courts have tended to extend the
"locality" in which the standard of practice may be found to exist so
that it is possible that a medical expert may be qualified to testify
in any part of the country as to the practice in a community of similar
size and with similar access to clinical facilities as that in which he
practices or whose practice he is familiar with.31 9
On the basis of such liberalized qualifications of an expert witness,
it could be possible, though rare, that an expert other than a medical
doctor might be called upon to testify as to matters relating to the
312. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
313. Ibid.

314. Moore v. Belt, 34 Cal. 2d 525, 212 P.2d 509 (1949).
315. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951).
316. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. App. 2d 557, 565, 218 P.2d 66, 73
(1950).
317. 251 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1958).
318. 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956).
319. See text at notes 112-25 supra. Of particular interest are the cases of
Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (witnesses came from Chicago
to Florida); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950) (doctors from the metropolitan area of Chicago testified as to the care of a doctor
located in Davenport, Iowa); and McClarin v. Grenzfelder, 147 Mo. App. 478,
126 S.W. 817 (1910) (it appears that some of the experts may have come from
Chicago and Cleveland to testify as to the propriety of the care taken by the
defendant in St. Louis).
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standard of care required of a doctor of medicine. In a few cases a
chiropractor 320 or osteopathic physician3 1 has been permitted to
testify as to the practice of a doctor of medicine. It is possible that a
toxicologist or pharmacist might be called upon to testify as to the
amount of a given drug commonly prescribed by doctors in the community and as to the toxic characteristics of the drug as prescribed,
although in Hawkins v. McCain2 the court said that in the absence
of expert medical testimony as to the nature of the patient's disease
or the description of the medicine which the defendant prescribed,
the jury could not infer negligence from the existence of skin disorders which might be traced to the pre-existing disease. Or an
anatomist or physiologist having graduate training in the basic
sciences but without clinical training might be called upon to testify
as to the possible or probable effects of a given treatment, or the
practices normally followed by doctors with whom the witness has
had professional association. In Huttner v. MacKay2 3 however, an
anatomist was not permitted to testify as to the care of a neurosurgeon in operating on a particular portion of the brain.
Some cases have indicated that the plaintiff may rely upon the
statements of the defendant himself in proving the standard of care
which the defendant must meet. In McCurdy v. Hatfield,2 4 the defendant was called as a witness by the plaintiff under the California
statute, = and gave evidence as to what he considered to be "proper
procedure."3 2 6 The appellate court reversed a nonsuit entered at the
close of the plaintiff's case, stating that the plaintiff could rely upon
defendant's testimony as a basis for establishing the standard of care
used by physicians in the locality and upon plaintiff's own testimony
to the effect that this procedure was not followed. In Snyder v.
Pantaleo37 the Connecticut court permitted the plaintiff to rely upon
the defendant's statement as to the proper use of didrast iodine in
performing a radiological diagnostic procedure and the dangers of
320. Ness v. Yeomans, 60 N.D. 368, 234 N.W. 75 (1931); Wemmett v. Mount,
134 Ore. 305, 292 Pac. 93 (1930).
321. Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 327 P.2d 131 (Cal. App. 1958); Mann v.
Grim-Smith Hospital & Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 147 S.W.2d 606 (1941); Swanson
v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918); Morrill v. Komasinski, 256 Wis.
417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
322. 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
323. 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956).
324. 30 Cal. 2d 492, 183 P.2d 269 (1947).
325. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2055 (West 1955) providing that one party may
call an adverse party and examine him as if under cross-examination and not

be bound by the testimony of such witness. Similar provisions exist under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(b), and state rules, e.g., IDAHO R.
Civ. P. 43 (b); IowA R. Civ. P. 140-144; MiNN. R. CIrv. P. 43.02; N. J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:81-11 (1957); N.D. REV. CODE § 31-0202 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.07
(Anderson 1953).
326. See also Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal. 2d 83, 156 P.2d 441 (1945); Lawless
v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944).
327. 143 Conn. 290, 122 A.2d 21 (1956).
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not adequately testing the patient 32 8 to define the standard of care and
to establish deviation from the standard by the testimony of the
patient's family physician as to the admissions of the defendant with
regard to the mode of administration actually followed. In other
cases the courts have permitted the defendant's own admissions to be
relied upon by the plaintiff in establishing lack of due care.3 9 In several states which permit the defendant to be called by the plaintiff as
an adverse witness whose testimony is not binding upon the plaintiff
but may be impeached or contradicted, the courts have refused to
permit the plaintiff to use the defendant as an expert witness on the
standard of care as contrasted with obtaining defendant's testimony
as to "material facts.' 33 0 In other cases the testimony of the defendantdoctor on the stand at the plaintiff's request seems to have justified the
trial court's granting of a nonsuit.331 In California at least, the plaintiff
is permitted to rely upon the statements of the defendant or his witnesses in establishing the basis for "res ipsa loquitur, '' 2 but may
find that the inference arising from a res ipsa case is dispelled by the
defendant's testimony when called as an adverse witness. 3
Still another means of meeting the requirement of medical expert
evidence may be to rely upon publications such as medical treaties or
articles in professional journals by members of the profession. Generally the use of such writings as substantive evidence has run afoul
of the hearsay rule, since the authors are not present in court and
therefore not subject to oath or cross-examination by the opponent.-3 4
A few jurisdictions, however, have recognized that such learned
writings may be treated as trustworthy evidence. 8 5 In Bowman v.
328. This information came from defendant's own direct examination rather
than as witness for plaintiff, as was true in Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263
Pac. 26, 56 A.L.R. 814 (1928); Jacobs v. Grigsby, 187 Wis. 660, 205 N.W. 394
(1925).

329. E.g., Scott v. Sciaroni, 66 Cal. App. 577, 226 Pac. 827 (1924); Wilson v.
Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950); Hansen v. Isaak,
70 S.D. 529, 19 N.W.2d 521 (1945). But see Quickstad v. Tavenner, 196 Minn.
125, 264 N.W. 436 (1936) indicating that defendant's own evaluation of his
practice may be irrelevant where there is evidence showing that it complied
with the accepted practice of the profession.
330. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967, (1913); Hull v. Plume, 131
N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915
(1931); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
331. E.g., Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga. 269, 98 S.E.2d 552 (1957); Pierce v.
Edgerton, 151 Kan. 107, 98 P.2d 129 (1940); Bettigole v. Diener, 210 Md. 537,
124 A.2d 265 (1956); Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A.2d 706 (1956).

332. Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85
333. Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d 36
(1957).
334. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 296 (1954); 6 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1690
(3d ed. 1940); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930); Note, 12 So. CAL. L. REV. 424
(1939); Note, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 252 (1954).
335. See particularly Wigmore's presentation of the arguments for the admissibility of such evidence. 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1691-92 (3d ed. 1940).
(1953).
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Woods33 6 the Iowa court stated that since the expert witness may base
his opinion on scientific treatises of recognized authority and may even
refer to such works to justify his opinion, the standard medical book
should be admissible in evidence of the author's opinion upon questions of medical skill or practice. Subsequently, however, the Iowa
courts took a more restrictive view of the admission of medical
treatises as evidence,3 7 and today their admission is controlled by a
statute stating that "books of science or art ... made by persons indifferent between the parties, are presumptive evidence of facts of
general notoriety or interest therein stated"3 38 which effectively precludes the plaintiff from satisfying the requirement of expert testimony by the use of books. Alabama is the only state which today recognizes the use of medical books as substantive evidence on the basis
of court-made law.339 Massachusetts and Nevada have recently
adopted statutes which provide:
A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained
in a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion of the court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the
writer of such statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an
expert on the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for
malpractice, error or mistake among physicians, surgeons, dentists,
optometrists, hospitals and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove said
fact or as opinion evidence; provided, however, that the party intending
to offer as evidence any such statement shall, not less than three days
before the trial of the action, give the adverse party notice of such
intention, stating the name of the writer of the statement and the title
of the treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet in which it is contained. 340
South Carolina permits the use of medical books, "in addition to
expert testimony," as evidence of facts in actions in which the question of sanity or insanity or the administration of poison or other
article destructive of human life is involved-a fairly restricted class
of cases.341 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, drawing on the earlier
Model Code of Evidence, contains a provision which would permit the
introduction of:
A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of . . . science

or art to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the judge takes
336. 1 Greene 441 (Iowa 1848).
337. Wilcox v. Crumpton, 219 Iowa 389, 258 N.W. 704 (1935); Bixby v.
Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898).
338. IOWA CODE § 622.23 (1954).

339. City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857).
340. MAss. AN. LAWS c. 233, § 79c (1956); NEV. REV. STATS. § 51.040 (1957).
The language quoted is that of Massachusetts. Nevada includes a number of
other practitioners, reflecting its broader licensing laws.
341. S.C. CODE § 26-142 (1952). This section is rather restrictively interpreted, see Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931).
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judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority in the subject.=
While the courts of many jurisdictions have been willing to permit
the use of medical treatises for impeachment of expert witnesses,3 43
they have been hesitant to permit their use as affirmative proof of
facts. There appears to be no good reason why the plaintiff in a malpractice action should not be permitted to rely upon published expert
opinion or statements of professional practice to establish his prima
facie case, provided that the author's qualifications as an expert are
established as though he were a witness at the trial. The risk of inaccuracy or untrustworthiness or undue influence of the printed word
seems slight since the defendant would be free to challenge the authority of the treatise or article by evidence of his own showing that
the author is not accepted by the profession as an authority, or that
developments in medical science have occurred since the date of publication which would challenge the conclusions, or that there is other
equally respected authority to the contrary.
Res Ipsa Loquitur3 "
In spite of the general requirement of expert testimony to support
a patient's claim for malpractice, courts have been willing in some
cases to permit the plaintiff to get his case to the jury without such
evidence where the conduct of the defendant has been thought to be
so gross and patently negligent as to be within the comprehension of
laymen. Examples already discussed are the failure of a doctor to use
X-ray for diagnosis of a fracture or dislocation and failure of a doctor
to remove sponges or foreign matter from the patient's body. 345 This
substitution of "common knowledge" for expert testimony tends to
become categorized as "res ipsa loquitur," the happening of an unusual occurrence which creates an inference of negligence on the part
of the doctor. The elements of the traditional elements of a res ipsa
loquitur case are: that the accident must be one which normally does
not occur without negligence on the part of someone, that the instrumentality or agency which caused injury was under the control of the
defendant, and that the plaintiff himself was not a voluntary contributor to his own injury. 346 The courts have had the most difficulty
with the first.
342. UNIFORm RULES OF EvIDENCE 63(d), adopted from A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE, RULE 529.

343. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1700 (3d ed. 1940), indicating that in most
jurisdictions if the witness testifies that his opinion is based on standard
authorities these and some other standard works may be used for impeachment purposes.
344. See Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability,
12 VAND. L. REV. 633, 646 (1959) for a discussion of "The Ybarra v. Spangard
Syndrome" as found in the British and Commonwealth countries.
345. Supra,notes 134-36, 273-82.
346. See PROSSER, TORTS §§ 42, 43 (2d ed. 1955).
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Two early, and widely cited, attempts to make use of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine in malpractice cases were unsuccessful. In Ewing v.
Goode,347 in which the patient had lost an eye after an operation for
cataracts, William Howard Taft sitting on the circuit bench said:
A physician is not a warranter of cures. If the maxim, "Res ipsa loquitur"
were applicable to a case like this, and a failure to cure were held to be
evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or
surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to
practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial liability
for nearly all the "ills that flesh is heir to."348

In Sweeney v. Erving,349 involving an X-ray burn, the trial court refused to give a charge that the fact of the burn itself was evidence of
negligence which cast upon the defendant doctor the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's injury had
not been caused in whole or in part by the doctor's negligence. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, citing the language quoted above. The
Supreme Court's affirmance did not clearly pass upon the propriety of
the plaintiff's claim that the burn was itself evidence of negligence,
turning instead on the impropriety of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 350
In spite of such rebuffs, by the early 1940's the doctrine had found
at least limited acceptance in malpractice actions. 351 It had been applied in cases involving sponges or foreign objects left in the patient's
body,352 burns from hot water bottles,3

3

an unexplained burn in the

3

course of an operation, 5 and a broken finger suffered by a dental patient while under anesthetic.35 On the other hand, the courts tended
not to apply the doctrine where a needle broke in use,35 where the
347. 78 Fed. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897).
348. Id. at 443.
349. 35 App. D.C. 57 (1910), aff'd 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
350. 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
351. See, Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 187, 217 (1944).
352. Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923); Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d
82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932);
Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932); Palmer v. Humiston,
87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N.E. 283 (1913); Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 Atl. 1007
(1913); Evans v. Munro, 83 Atl. 82 (R.I. 1912). Cf. Bouffard v. Canby, 292
Mass. 305, 198 N.E. 253 (1935) (glass left in wound); Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah
37, 38 P.2d 712 (1934) (doctrine rebutted by defendant's evidence).
353. Timbrell v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 68, 47 P.2d 737 (1935); Quillen v. Skaggs, 233 Ky. 171, 25 S.W.2d 33 (1930).

354. Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934).
355. Wolfe v. Feldman, 158 Misc. 656, 286 N.Y. Supp. 118 (1936).

356. Robinson v. Ferguson, 107 Ind. App. 107, 22 N.E.2d 901 (1939); Ernen v.

Crofwell, 272 Mass. 172, 172 N.E. 73 (1930); Mitchell v. Poole, 229 Mo. App. 1,
68 S.W.2d 833 (1934); Tady v. Warta, 111 Neb. 521, 196 N.W. 901 (1924); Smith

v. McClung, 201 N.C. 648, 161 S.E. 91 (1931). Contra, Benson v. Dean, 232 N.Y.
52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921); Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255
(1941); Tennant v. Barton, 164 Wash. 279, 2 P.2d 735 (1931).
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patient's mouth was cut during dental procedures,3 7 where a tooth
was dislodged 35 8 or a jaw fractured3 9 in the course of an extraction
or performance of a tonsillectomy, or where death or injury followed
361
In
from anesthesia, 360 or tetanus developed following treatment.
362
A distinction
cases involving X-ray burns, the courts were divided.
might have been made between burns suffered in the course of diagnostic procedures and those suffered during or as a result of X-ray
treatment where the very object was the burning or destruction of
tissue. But in a case such as Lewis v. Casenburg363 where the patient
had received some 160 treatments over a period of six years, the court
found that burns occurring in the course of the last treatment created
an inference of negligence. The doctrine was generally inapplicable
where injury occurred to the part of the body on which treatment was
being performed, 36 or where there was erroneous diagnosis, 365 on the
theory that in such cases it could not be said to be a matter of common
knowledge and observation that such consequences would not ordinarily occur if due care were used.
The recent use of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice actions has been
most notable in the California courts.366 In late 1944, the case of
357. Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 150 Atl. 516 (1930); Schmidt v. Stone,
50 N.D. 91, 194 N.W. 917 (1923); Vale v. Noe, 172 Wis. 421, 179 N.W. 572 (1920).
Contra, Vergeldt v. Hartzell, 1 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1924); Evans v. Roberts, 172
Iowa 653, 154 N.W. 923 (1915); Ellering v. Gross, 189 Minn. 68, 248 N.W. 330
(1933).
358. Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930); Hazard
Hosp. v. Combs' Adm'r, 263 Ky. 252, 92 S.W.2d 35 (1936); Henley v. Mason,
154 Va. 381, 153 S.E. 653 (1930). Contra, Whetstine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352,
291 N.W. 425 (1940).
359. Hill v. Jackson, 218 Mo. App. 210, 265 S.W. 859 (1924). Contra, Brown
v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352, 277 Pac. 134 (1929).
360. Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 Pac. 488 (1920); Lippard v. Johnson,
215 N.C. 384, 1 S.E.2d 889 (1939).
361. Hembree v. Von Keller, 189 Okla. 439, 119 P.2d 74 (1941).
362. See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 638 (1944) concluding that the courts are about
equally divided as to whether the doctrine can be applied to X-ray treatment
or examination. The division of the courts is further documented in Annot.,
41 A.L.R.2d 329, at 355-367 (1955), indicating that the critical question is
whether such injuries are likely to occur in the absence of negligence, a point
on which there is considerable disagreement.
363. 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d 808 (1928).
364. Trindle v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. 2d 330, 143 P.2d 932 (1943) (burn on ankle
during diathermy for arthritis); Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d
695 (1939) (severing of nerve in knee during operation on knee).
365. Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944) (diagnosis of
ptomiane poisoning when decedent suffered from appendicitis); Adams v.
Boyce, 37 Cal. App. 2d 541, 99 P.2d 1044 (1940) (failure to discover foreign
body in eye).
366. Reference should be made here to the study of Mr. R. Crawford Morris,

"Res Ipsa Loquitur"-Liability Without Fault, 163 J.A.M.A. 1055 (1957) re-

printed in 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 97 (1958), in which the author charts the use
of the doctrine from 1941 to 1955. It is noteworthy that of the twenty-one applications of the doctrine during that period which he mentions, eight of them
occurred in the state of California, and that in discussing the growth of the
doctrine, Mr. Morris relies almost exclusively on the California experience.
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Ybarra v. Spangard367 came before the Supreme Court of California.
Ybarra had submitted to an operation for appendicitis and when he
regained consciousness following the operation he felt a sharp pain
about half-way between his neck and the point of his right shoulder.
In spite of diathermy treatment the condition became worse and ultimately developed into paralysis and atrophy of his right arm. Ybarra
brought action against all of the doctors involved in the operation,
the head nurse in the operating room and the special nurse who
cared for him following the operation. At the trial he introduced
expert evidence to the effect that his disability was of traumatic
origin and testified himself that during adjustment on the operating
table, his body had been placed against two hard objects at the top of
his shoulders (a fact contradicted by the operating surgeons). The
trial court granted nonsuit as to all defendants. The supreme court
reversed and remanded for new trial. After pointing out that there
was an injury to a portion of the body not involved in the operation,
that the patient was unconscious during most of the relevant time
and was therefore unable to describe what had occurred to him, and
that the defendants as a group had control over the patient and all
instrumentalities which might have caused injury, the court concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, saying:
We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case may be applied to other situations in which the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We merely hold that where a patient
receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical
treatment, all those defendants who had any control over his body or the
instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be
the inference of negligence by giving an explanation
called upon to meet
368
of their conduct.
On a second trial, each of the defendants took the stand and testified
that at all times when he or she was present at the operation or thereafter nothing occurred which could have given rise to the plaintiff's
difficulty. There was also some evidence that Ybarra had suffered in
the past from bad teeth and that his present disability could have been
systemic in origin rather than traumatic. In spite of this, the trial
judge entered judgment against all defendants, saying:
Even though their explanations were honest, that there was something
they did not appreciate happened in the course of the operation, in the
the patient. This is the way I figure the case and that
course of handling
369
was my decision.
367. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (1944).
368. Id. at 494, 154 P.2d at 691, 162 A.L.R. at 1264.
369. Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App. 2d, 43, 46, 208 P.2d 445, 446 (1949).
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The judgment was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal.3 70
While Ybarra extended the doctrine by making it applicable to the
situation where the patient joined as defendants all persons who
had some control over him or things which caused his injury, it was
consistent with the earlier view that the injury must be one which
normally would not occur in the course of proper care. In subsequent
cases this aspect of the doctrine was also liberalized. In Cavero v.
Franklin General Benev. Soc. 371 the plaintiff recovered for the death
of a six year old child under anesthetic for a tonsillectomy, apparently
on the basis of testimony that such operations were normally safe. In
Costa v. Regents of the University of California72 the plaintiff received X-ray treatment for an epidermal carcinoma of the tongue and
mouth and suffered a burn of the mandible (jawbone) which ultimately developed osteomyelitis. In an action against the doctors and
hospital the trial court entered judgment for the defendants. The
district court of appeal originally affirmed saying that the Ybarra
case was inapplicable since the injury was not to an unrelated part
of the patient's body, and therefore a layman could not infer negligence from the burning of the mandible.373 On rehearing, however,
the court reversed on the basis that the plaintiff had been denied the
opportunity to elicit from defendant's experts whether they had ever
seen such a bad result from similar treatment, stating that had such
information been elicited the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might be
applied. 374 This would appear to bring the doctrine to the point
where any unusually unsuccessful treatment could be the basis for
an inference of negligence. In Bauer v. Otis, 375 the patient felt severe
pain at the time of an injection of "Thex," a vitamin B complex solution, and subsequently suffered a "wrist drop." An operation indicated that there was a lesion of the right radial nerve. In an action
against the doctor who had directed the injection and whose employee
administered it, testimony was introduced to the effect that if Thex
had been injected into the deltoid muscle it could not have caused
injury to the radial nerve and that under normal circumstances the
administration of Thex would not cause a wrist drop. There was
also testimony that it was possible for a solution to travel to a different portion of the arm and that almost all such solutions used in
injections could be dangerous to nerves. One expert for the defendant
370. Ibid. See Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L.
REV. 643 (1950) for a criticism of this decision; and Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur
Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. Ruv. 1 (1951) for a defense of such use of the doctrine.
371. 36 Cal. 2d 301, 223 P.2d 471 (1950).
372. 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953).

373. 247 P.2d 21 (1952)
later opinion).

(the major portion of this opinion is cited in the

374. 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953).

375. 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P.2d 133 (1955).
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testified that the radial nerve had not been punctured or severed and
that injections frequently caused hemorrhages which would allow
the solution to gravitate to other portions of the arm resulting in scar
tissue and pressure on the nerves. The trial court refused to give res
ipsa loquitur instructions. In reversing judgment for the defendant
on the ground that such instructions should have been given, the
appellate court said:
While injections and the use of Thex are primarily medical matters, it is
a matter of common knowledge among laymen that injections in the
muscles of the arm, as well as other portions of the body, do not cause
trouble unless unskillfully done or there is something wrong with the
serum. Needle injections of cold shots, penicillin, and many other serums
Certainly if expert testimony is
have become commonplace today....
not indispensable in cases involving improper use of anesthesia, improper
but that
tonsillectomies, failure to use x-rays, there can be no question
3
it is likewise not indispensable in cases involving injections. 76
This line of cases does not mean that in California any untoward
result gives rise to recovery, as some may fear. At the same time that
they were deciding the foregoing, the courts refused to permit the
defendant to be held without expert testimony as to his lack of care
in cases involving infection of the urinary tract following a systoscopic examination, 377 fracture of both femurs in the course of
electro shock treatments, 378 a hole in the patient's bladder following a
total hysterectomy, 3 9 and severing of the mandibular nerve in the
0
course of extracting the patient's tooth.3 There is no doubt, however,
that the California courts have been generally solicitous of the
injured patient.
Two decisions involving paraplegia following injections in or near
381
the spine deserve special note. In Seneris v. Haas the plaintiff received a spinal anesthetic during her accouchement. She had had four
prior deliveries and prior spinals without difficulty, but on this case
paralysis developed. The defendant-anesthesiologist testified as to the
proper manner of administering a spinal anesthetic and stated that
normally there was no paralysis where due care and proper practice were followed. He stated as his opinion that the paralysis and
loss of sensory perception suffered by the plaintiff was the result of
an unusual reaction to the anesthetic and a "psychic overlay" arising
from domestic difficulties. The appellate court reversed a nonsuit,
stating that res ipsa loquitur could apply on the basis of defendant's
admission that where ordinary care was used such paralysis was un376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id. at 443-44, 284 P.2d at 136-37.
Moore v. Belt, 34 Cal. 2d 525, 212 P.2d 509 (1949).
Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953).
Dees v. Pace, 118 Cal. App. 2d 284, 257 P.2d 756 (1953).
Simone v. Sabo, 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951).
45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
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likely to follow, coupled with the plaintiff's prior history. In SaZgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.,382 defendants injected a solution of
seventy per cent urokon into the patient in the course of making
an aortogram, following which the patient developed paraplegia.
There was evidence from experts that paralysis or paraplegia was
a rare complication of an aortography procedure, since the needle
did not normally enter the spinal column itself. One witness, relying
on X-rays, was of the opinion that in the course of a second injection
(which was denied by the defendants) the needle was either near
or in an artery supplying blood to the spinal column and that the
urokon injected thereby into the spinal column caused the paraplegia.
All other experts testified that the exact cause of injury could not be
determined but that it could be (a) constriction of blood vessels leading to the spinal cord due to urokon; (b) damage done directly to
the spinal cord by urokon in the circulatory system, or (c) plaintiff's condition, a partially blocked aorta, arteriosclerosis and high
blood pressure, combined with an obligeration of the blood vessels
and blood supply to the legs. Only the first two of these could have
been due to the negligence of the defendants. The trial court charged
that res ipsa loquitur was applicable and the plaintiff obtained a verdict. This was reversed on appeal on the ground that

The jury were not told that the doctrine could apply only in the event
they found that the needle had been inserted in the wrong place. On the
contrary, the court instructed the jury that as a matter of law, from the

"happening of all the events involved in this case, however, as established
by the evidence," (emphasis added)

the inference of negligence arose.

The jury were given no opportunity to determine the facts upon which the
383
doctrine would or would not arise.

It should be noted that in both of these cases there is some expert
testimony establishing the underlying premises of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
Not only have the California courts liberalized the requirements for
the application of res ipsa loquitur, but they have also given it a procedural effect beyond that of permitting a jury to infer negligence. As
the Supreme Court of California indicated in Ybarra, the defendants
have an obligation to come forward with an explanation.384 In Dierman v. Providence Hospital,38 the court again asserted that where
the patient was ignorant of the facts because he was unconscious the
defendants must make an adequate explanation and in the absence of
such explanation the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. Any question
382. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
383. Id. at 572, 317 P.2d at 177-78. (Emphasis is the court's.)
384. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (1954). See the application of this on second trial, 93 Cal. App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949).
385. 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947).
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concerning the present effect of res ipsa loquitur in the California
courts was done away with in a non-medical case, Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co.= in which the court announced:
It is our conclusion that in all res ipsa loquitur situations the defendant
must present evidence sufficient to meet or balance the inference of
negligence, and that the jurors should be instructed that, if the
defendant fails to do so, they should find for the plaintiff.387
A review of the past fifteen years (post-Ybarra) in other jurisdictions indicates that res ipsa loquitur has not been given quite such
broad application. Only some twenty-odd cases have applied the doctrine or related rules in malpractice actions, and most of these fall
within the categories of pre-1940 cases discussed above.388 Only a
few seem to have extended the doctrine to encompass cases in which
it is doubtful that common knowledge would definitely indicate negligence as the cause of injury. In one, gangrene followed an operation
for varicose veins, and the court concluded that, although res ipsa
loquitur would not support the plaintiff's claim of specific acts of
negligence, it could support a general claim of negligence since the
reduction of circulation probably arose from tying off or damage to
the arterial system in the course of operation on the venous system.3 9 In another, a dentist's drill slipped and severely cut the patient's tongue, a fact which the court treated as giving rise to an
inference of negligence, 390 although generally injuries in the immediate area being treated are not so considered.3 91 Where the patient had
suffered a fracture requiring an open reduction and the wound became
infected and did not heal while the patient remained under the doctor's care for a period of five months but healed within a few weeks
when the patient transferred to another hospital and came under the
care of other doctors, the Ohio court said that the jury might infer
392
In another fracture case, 393
negligence on the part of the first doctor.
the patient went to the doctor with a simple transverse "greenstick"
fracture of the radius of her left forearm. The cast was removed six
weeks later and after examination of the arm by the doctor the patient
left the office. Two days later there was a marked displacement of
the radius which ultimately necessitated an open reduction. The doctor testified that when the cast was removed he was sure that the
386. 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
387. Id. at 691, 268 P.2d at 1046.
388. See the appendix to Morris, "Res Ipsa Loquitur"'--Liability Without
Fault, 163 J.A.M.A. 1055 (1957), reprinted in 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 97 (1958)
for a description of the cases from 1941-1955 in all jurisdictions.
389. McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950).
390. Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W.2d 296 (1957).

391. See notes 357, 358, 359, 364 supra.
392. Bradshaw v. Wilson, 87 Ohio App. 319, 94 N.E.2d 706 (1950).
393. Olson v. Weitz, 37 Wash. 2d 70, 221 P.2d 537 (1950).

1959 ]

LIABILITY OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

result was satisfactory, that there was some natural stiffness but
that upon fluoroscoping the arm the fragments of bone appeared to
be in good alignment and there was a callus formation. The plaintiff,
on the other hand, claimed that she immediately noticed that her
arm was crooked and that a lump projected from the top. The court
concluded that if there was in fact any misalignment at this time,
there was prima facie evidence of negligence, citing cases in which
plaintiffs had recovered without expert evidence on the basis of testimony that the doctor had used nonsterile instruments followed by
infection, 39 that the plaintiff was injured by a twelve inch spring
which broke loose from an instrument in the course of treatment
and was not discovered or removed by the doctor, 395 and that when
the patient's arm was removed from a cast it was visibly crooked and
had a large protuberance and the doctor failed to take any further
measures for treatment. 396 If the negligence of the doctor was subsequent failure to treat the crooked arm, the inference of negligence
may be appropriate; but if it is the failure of the doctor to achieve a
good union of the bones initially of which the patient complains, the
inference of negligence seems unwarranted.
During this same period, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or reliance
upon non-expert testimony and inferences therefrom has been rejected in cases involving fractures suffered during electro-shock treatments, 97 paralysis following a spinal anesthetic, 398 a "burn" which
might equally well have resulted from hot water bottles, reaction to
ether used in the operating room, herpes zoster (a disease of the
nerves), or collapse of the vascular structure of the plaintiff following
a thrombosis, 399 development of Volkmann's contracture (claw hand)
after reduction of a fracture and application of a tight cast,40 0 tetanus
following treatment of a scalp wound,40 1 and a violent reaction to the
administration of penicillin by hypodermic injection into the but402
tock.
In Ayers v. Parry4 3 the defendants administered a spinal anesthetic
in preparation for an operation on the common bile duct. Plaintiff
394. Helland v. Bridenstine, 55 Wash. 470, 104 Pac. 626 (1909).

395. Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913).
396. Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573, 205 Pac. 1059

(1922) (there was
some expert testimony from the doctor who later treated the plaintiff from
which the jury might have reached the conclusion that the treatment was
improper).
397. Johnson v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Quinley v. Cocke, 183
Tenn. 448, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946). In the Johnson case, the court permitted
recovery on the basis of breach of a warranty of safety of the procedure.
398. Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955), af'd, 234 F.2d
811 (5th Cir. 1956).
399. Wallstedt v. Swedish Hosp., 220 Minn. 274, 19 N.W.2d 426 (1945).
400. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
401. Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1958).
402. Toy v. Rickert, 53 N.J. Super. 27, 146 A.2d 510 (App. Div. 1958).
403. 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

testified he felt a jabbing pain in his spinal column and a terrific pain
down his right leg. He became unconscious and when he regained
consciousness was unable to move his right leg and subsequently
suffered partial paralysis and marked atrophy in the leg and adjacent
organs. One expert was of the opinion that if there was pain it was
caused by the needle striking nerve roots; another that the painful
reaction was a common experience and that this patient suffered
injury to the nerve roots in the lower end of the spinal cord which
caused his difficulty. The trial court dismissed the action at the close
of plaintiff's case. This was affirmed, the Court of Appeals pointing
out that while experts were agreed that the paralysis was the consequence of the anesthetic, it was the toxic quality of the anesthetic
to which reaction was unpredictable which they emphasized rather
than negligence in its administration. The court said that where there
is injury to healthy tissue within the region of treatment, whose cause
is beyond the realm of knowledge or experience of laymen, the issue
of negligence must be determined by expert testimony.
This does not mean that in no case involving administration of
spinal anesthetic can the patient rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa
40 4
loquitur. In Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hospital Association,
the defendant anesthesiologist testified that the proper place to administer a spinal anesthetic was between the second and third lumbar vertebrae. Yet the patient, who was conscious at the time of the insertion
of the needle, later pointed to a place higher up as the spot where the
needle was inserted and his parents testified that after the operation
they saw a red spot on his back a short distance below his shoulder
blade and just to the left of the spine. The patient testified that when
the anesthetic was administered a pain shot to his head and he felt as
if he had been hit by something. Moreover, the ultimate reactions
were those likely to follow from injury to the spinal cord itself. The
court distinguished Ayers and reversed a directed verdict for the
anesthesiologist. In Walker v. Distler40 5 the defendant used a spinal
anesthetic on an expectant mother rather than a "caudal analgesia"
which would have avoided puncturing the spinal canal. The patient
suffered foot drop and increasing paralysis of the right leg and total
paralysis of the left thigh and calf as well as impairment of control
of her bladder and bowels. The defendant's testimony indicated that
the choice of anesthetic was dictated by the necessity for a swiftacting anesthetic, although there was other testimony that he might
have commenced the procedure at least two hours earlier. The trial
court granted a new trial, following a directed verdict for the doctor.
This was affirmed, the appellate court saying that the doctrine of res
404. 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E.2d 864 (1956).
405. 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956).
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ipsa loquitur is not so clearly inapplicable as to preclude a new trial
at which evidence might be admitted which would permit-the jury
to infer negligence. In both of these latter cases there was some
evidence other than the administration of the anesthetic and the consequences. It may be that these can therefore be reconciled with the
Ayers case and that in turn Ayers may be reconciled with the California decisions in Seneris v. Haas4 6 and Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ.407 in which the courts suggest that res ipsa loquitur may be
available if there is some expert testimony to the effect that paraplegia is not likely to occur if the needle is properly placed and if
there is some other evidence from which the jury may infer that the
needle was not properly placed. But this scarcely brings the plaintiff
total relief from the necessity for producing expert testimony.
CONCLUSION

In recent years, one of the principle complaints of attorneys engaged
in presenting plaintiffs' cases against doctors has been the alleged
"conspiracy of silence" by which the medical profession is said to
protect its members.408 Perhaps the foremost opponent of the conspiracy has been Mr. Melvin Belli, who in article 40 9 and treatise 410
has bemoaned the difficulties of obtaining adequate evidence to
establish a prima facie case against a doctor. The courts, too, have
given recognition to the difficulty of obtaining expert testimony.41
To meet this difficulty the courts have liberalized the qualifications
required of expert witnesses, permitting practitioners who are not
within the same branch of medicine as the defendant to testify, and
406. 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
407. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
408. See Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 731, 733-35 (1957) in which the results
of a survey of both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys and doctors are re-

ported. See also Comment, 2 VILL. L. REv. 95 (1956) for a survey of why
doctors do not testify.
409. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment,
1 VILL. L. REV. 250 (1956); Belli, "Ready for the Plaintiff!," 30 TEMP. L. Q. 408
(1957); Belli, More on Being "Ready for the Plaintiff," 20 GA. B.J. 451 (1958).
410. 3 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 1964-66 (1953).
411. See Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827-29 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175
(1957); Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 258, 288 P.2d 1003, 1010 (1955);

Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 44, 173 Pac. 200, 202 (1918); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1130, 43 N.W.2d 121, 127 (1950); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d
777, 779 (Ky. App. 1956); Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 430, 94 N.W. 607,
609 (1903); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 427, 94 A.2d 680, 684 (1953).
See also Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 483, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951)
(dissenting opinion of Carter, J.); Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 419, 272
P.2d 718, 721 (1954); Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 130, 83 P.2d 1021, 1030
(1938). But see McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 404 (M.D. Pa. 1947) refusing to impute to others the conduct of one physician; and Coleman v. McCarthy, 53 R.I. 266, 267-68, 165 Atl. 900, 901 (1933) which treats the plaintiff's
counsel's statement that he was unable to obtain medical testimony as
"startling" and if true "a grave concern to those charged with the administration of justice."
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permitting the plaintiff to go well outside the immediate locality of
the defendant's practice to obtain his experts. They may go further
and permit the plaintiff to make use of the defendant's own expertise
as a witness for the plaintiff or to rely upon the defendant's own testimony to establish the plaintiff's case in chief. There is some suggestion
in the recent enactment of special statutes in Massachusetts and
Nevada that the use of medical treatises may be expanded in the
future, giving the plaintiff access to expert evidence as to the existing
practices or standards of the profession. Finally, there is the recent
extension of res ipsa loquitur to provide at least an inference of negligence where the injuries which the plaintiff has received are of a type
unusual or not to be expected from careful treatment and where the
defendant or those subject to his control have control of the instrumentalities which probably caused the injury.
Does the difficulty of obtaining expert testimony justify the courts
in going further and modifying the standard of care required of
doctors? There has been some suggestion, particularly in the res ipsa
loquitur cases, that this is being done. Where the jury members are
permitted to infer negligence from the mere existence of unusual
injuries, such as damage to the mouth in a dental operation, burns in
the course of X-ray therapy, or even atrophy of an arm following an
appendectomy, the courts may be assuming more medical knowledge
than the average layman is likely to possess and may be imposing
something more than a duty of compliance with ordinary practices
upon the doctor. As pointed out at the close of the discussion on customary practices as a standard of care, there is a strong argument for
limiting the care required of the doctor to the accepted practice of
his profession. It is therefore, undesirable I believe, for the court to
use res ipsa loquitur as a basis for creating a new standard. True, if
there is medical evidence that injuries of the sort which the plaintiff
has suffered are highly unlikely to occur when customary practices
are followed, some inference of negligence may be drawn, but here
the facts merely dispute the exercise of customary care. In each case
the jury should be instructed that they are to find the doctor-defendant liable only if there has been a deviation from the custom of the
profession and that the custom of the profession is a matter which
must be established by expert testimony or the use of learned treatises
or other professional literature. By liberalizing the means available
to the plaintiff in proving the custom and its safety, the burden of
coming forward with expert testimony to support the practices used
may be shifted to the defendant, who is more likely to have access to
such proof.

